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Kevin Lynch [20]Michael Lynch [4]Michael P. Lynch [3]William T. Lynch [1]
Rolandson Lynch [1]Sandra Lynch [1]
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Michael Lynch
University of Connecticut
Kevin Lynch
Huaqiao University
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  1. Willful Ignorance and Self-Deception.Kevin Lynch - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):505-523.
    Willful ignorance is an important concept in criminal law and jurisprudence, though it has not received much discussion in philosophy. When it is mentioned, however, it is regularly assumed to be a kind of self-deception. In this article I will argue that self-deception and willful ignorance are distinct psychological kinds. First, some examples of willful ignorance are presented and discussed, and an analysis of the phenomenon is developed. Then it is shown that current theories of self-deception give no support to (...)
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  2. On the “Tension” Inherent in Self-Deception.Kevin Lynch - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):433-450.
    Alfred Mele's deflationary account of self-deception has frequently been criticised for being unable to explain the ?tension? inherent in self-deception. These critics maintain that rival theories can better account for this tension, such as theories which suppose self-deceivers to have contradictory beliefs. However, there are two ways in which the tension idea has been understood. In this article, it is argued that on one such understanding, Mele's deflationism can account for this tension better than its rivals, but only if we (...)
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  3. From One to Many: Recent Work on Truth.Jeremy Wyatt & Michael Lynch - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (4):323-340.
    In this paper, we offer a brief, critical survey of contemporary work on truth. We begin by reflecting on the distinction between substantivist and deflationary truth theories. We then turn to three new kinds of truth theory—Kevin Scharp's replacement theory, John MacFarlane's relativism, and the alethic pluralism pioneered by Michael Lynch and Crispin Wright. We argue that despite their considerable differences, these theories exhibit a common "pluralizing tendency" with respect to truth. In the final section, we look at the underinvestigated (...)
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  4. Self-Deception and Shifts of Attention.Kevin Lynch - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (1):63-75.
    A prevalent assumption among philosophers who believe that people can intentionally deceive themselves (intentionalists) is that they accomplish this by controlling what evidence they attend to. This article is concerned primarily with the evaluation of this claim, which we may call ‘attentionalism’. According to attentionalism, when one justifiably believes/suspects that not-p but wishes to make oneself believe that p, one may do this by shifting attention away from the considerations supportive of the belief that not-p and onto considerations supportive of (...)
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  5. Self-Deception and Stubborn Belief.Kevin Lynch - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (6):1337-1345.
    Stubborn belief, like self-deception, is a species of motivated irrationality. The nature of stubborn belief, however, has not been investigated by philosophers, and it is something that poses a challenge to some prominent accounts of self-deception. In this paper, I argue that the case of stubborn belief constitutes a counterexample to Alfred Mele’s proposed set of sufficient conditions for self-deception, and I attempt to distinguish between the two. The recognition of this phenomenon should force an amendment in this account, and (...)
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  6. An Agentive Non-Intentionalist Theory of Self-Deception.Kevin Lynch - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):779-798.
    The self-deception debate often appears polarized between those who think that self-deceivers intentionally deceive themselves (‘intentionalists’), and those who think that intentional actions are not significantly involved in the production of self-deceptive beliefs at all. In this paper I develop a middle position between these views, according to which self-deceivers do end up self-deceived as a result of their own intentional actions, but where the intention these actions are done with is not an intention to deceive oneself. This account thus (...)
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  7. The Divisibility of Basic Actions.Kevin Lynch - 2017 - Analysis 77 (2):312-318.
    The notion of basic action has recently come under attack based on the idea that any putative basic action can always be divided into more basic sub-actions. In this paper it is argued that this criticism ignores a key aspect of the idea of basic action, namely, the ‘anything else’ part of the idea that basic actions are not done by doing anything else. This aspect is clarified, and it is argued that doing the sub-actions of which a putative basic (...)
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  8. Self-Deception, Religious Belief, and the False Belief Condition.Kevin Lynch - 2010 - Heythrop Journal 51 (6):1073-1074.
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  9. The Vagaries of Psychoanalytic Interpretation: An Investigation Into the Causes of the Consensus Problem in Psychoanalysis.Kevin Lynch - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (3):779-799.
    Though the psychoanalytic method of interpretation is seen by psychoanalysts as a reliable scientific tool for investigating the unconscious mind, its reputation has long been marred by what’s known as the consensus problem: where different analysts fail to reach agreement when they interpret the same phenomena. This has long been thought, by both practitioners and observers of psychoanalysis, to undermine its claim to scientific status. The causes of this problem, however, are dimly understood. In this paper I attempt to illuminate (...)
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  10. Understanding and Coming to Understand.Michael Lynch - forthcoming - In Stephen Grimm (ed.), Making Sense of the World: New Essays on the Philosophy of Understanding. Oxford University Press.
    Many philosophers take understanding to be a distinctive kind of knowledge that involves grasping dependency relations; moreover, they hold it to be particularly valuable. This paper aims to investigate and address two well-known puzzles that arise from this conception: (1) the nature of understanding itself—in particular, the nature of “grasping”; (2) the source of understanding’s distinctive value. In what follows, I’ll argue that we can shed light on both puzzles by recognizing first, the importance of the distinction between the act (...)
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  11. A Multiple Realization Thesis for Natural Kinds.Kevin Lynch - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):389-406.
    Two important thought-experiments are associated with the work of Hilary Putnam, one designed to establish multiple realizability for mental kinds, the other designed to establish essentialism for natural kinds. Comparing the thought-experiments with each other reveals that the scenarios in both are structurally analogous to each other, though his intuitions in both are greatly at variance, intuitions that have been simultaneously well received. The intuition in the former implies a thesis that prioritizes pre-scientific over scientific indicators for identifying mental kinds (...)
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  12. Social Epistemology Transformed: Steve Fuller’s Account of Knowledge as a Divine Spark for Human Domination.William T. Lynch - 2016 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 3 (2): 191-205.
    In his new book, Knowledge: The Philosophical Quest in History, Steve Fuller returns to core themes of his program of social epistemology that he first outlined in his 1988 book, Social Epistemology. He develops a new, unorthodox theology and philosophy building upon his testimony in Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District in defense of intelligent design, leading to a call for maximal human experimentation. Beginning from the theological premise rooted in the Abrahamic religious tradition that we are created in the (...)
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  13. Self‐Knowledge for Humans, by Quassim Cassam (Oxford University Press, 2014). [REVIEW]Kevin Lynch - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (1):113-119.
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  14. Prospects for an Intentionalist Theory of Self-Deception.Kevin Lynch - 2009 - Abstracta 5 (2):126-138.
    A distinction can be made between those who think that self-deception is frequently intentional and those who don’t. I argue that the idea that self-deception has to be intentional can be partly traced to a particular invalid method for analyzing reflexive expressions of the form ‘Ving oneself’ (where V stands for a verb). However, I take the question of whether intentional self-deception is possible to be intrinsically interesting, and investigate the prospects for such an alleged possibility. Various potential strategies of (...)
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  15. The Price of Truth.Michael P. Lynch - forthcoming - In Steven Gross & Michael Williams (eds.), Meaning Without Representation: Essays on Truth, Expression, Normativity, and Naturalism.
    Like William James before him, Huw Price has influentially argued that truth has a normative role to play in our thought and talk. I agree. But Price also thinks that we should regard truth-conceived of as property of our beliefs-as something like a metaphysical myth. Here I disagree. In this paper, I argue that reflection on truth's values pushes us in a slightly different direction, one that opens the door to certain metaphysical possibilities that even a Pricean pragmatist can love.
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  16. Deception and the Nature of Truth.Michael Lynch - 2009 - In Clancy W. Martin (ed.), The Philosophy of Deception. Oxford University Press. pp. 188.
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  17. Aristotle and Derrida on Friendship.Sandra Lynch - unknown
    Jacques Derrida begins the first chapter of his book The Politics of Friendship1 with a statement attributed to Aristotle by both Diogenes Laertes and the 16th Century French philosopher Michel de Montaigne. The statement is this: “O my friends, there is no friend.” Derrida points out the paradox and apparent contradication in such an impossible declaration. Who is Aristotle talking to, given that he is addressing friends to inform them that there are none? How can the statement be taken seriously? (...)
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  18.  38
    Being Self-Deceived About One’s Own Mental State.Kevin Lynch - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    A familiar puzzle about self-deception concerns how self-deception is possible in light of the paradoxes generated by a plausible way of defining it. A less familiar puzzle concerns how a certain type of self-deception—being self-deceived about one's own intentional mental state—is possible in light of a plausible way of understanding the nature of self-knowledge. According to this understanding, we ordinarily do not infer our mental states from evidence, but then it's puzzling how this sort of self-deception could occur given that (...)
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  19. Irrationality, by Lisa Bortolotti (Polity Press, 2014). [REVIEW]Kevin Lynch - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (4):605-609.
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  20. Knowing How, Basic Actions, and Ways of Doing Things.Kevin Lynch - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (8):956-977.
    This paper investigates whether we can know how to do basic actions, from the perspective according to which knowing how to do something requires knowledge of a way to do it. A key argument from this perspective against basic know-how is examined and is found to be unsound, involving the false premise that there are no ways of doing basic actions. However, a new argument along similar lines is then developed, which contends that there are no ways of doing basic (...)
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  21. Knowing What an Experience Is Like and the Reductive Theory of Knowledge‐Wh.Kevin Lynch - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 61 (3):252-275.
    This article discusses a kind of knowledge classifiable as knowledge-wh but which seems to defy analysis in terms of the standard reductive theory of knowledge-wh ascriptions, according to which they are true if and only if one knows that p, where this proposition is an acceptable answer to the wh-question ‘embedded’ in the ascription. Specifically, it is argued that certain cases of knowing what an experience is like resist such treatment. I argue that in some of these cases, one can (...)
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  22. Limits to Caribbean Political Thought as a Tool in Overthrowing Re-Colonisation: An Abridged Critique.Nathaniel Lynch, Rolandson - manuscript
    This essay develops an argumentative position which implies that historically Caribbean political philosophers have engaged in establishing a theoretical position that is trapped, and entrenched, within European hegemony. The essay traverse the works of some noted Caribbean thinkers and highlight limitations in logic, and or tactical approach, to the question of Caribbean decolonisation, and establishes the essay’s principal hypothesis. The article revealed three (3) Philosophers; namely C.L.R. James, Franz Fanon, and Walter Rodney as the principal thinkers whose philosophical approaches gave (...)
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  23. Epistemic Arrogance and Political Dissent.Michael Lynch - forthcoming - In Voicing Dissent. New York: Routledge.
    In this essay, I examine four different reasons for thinking that political dissent has epistemic value. The realization of this epistemic value hinges in part on what I’ll loosely call the epistemic environment, or the environment in which individuals come to believe, reason, inquire, and debate. In particular, to the degree that our social practices encourage and even embody an attitude of epistemic arrogance, the epistemic value of dissent will be difficult to realize. Ironically, it is precisely then that dissent (...)
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  24. Paradigm Case Arguments.Kevin Lynch - 2019 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:NA.
    From time to time philosophers and scientists have made sensational, provocative claims that certain things do not exist or never happen that, in everyday life, we unquestioningly take for granted as existing or happening. These claims have included denying the existence of matter, space, time, the self, free will, and other sturdy and basic elements of our common-sense or naïve world-view. Around the middle of the twentieth century an argument was developed that can be used to challenge many such skeptical (...)
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  25.  98
    Self-Deception, by Eric Funkhouser (Routledge, 2019). [REVIEW]Kevin Lynch - 2020 - Philosophy 95 (1):147-151.
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  26. Subliminal: How Your Unconscious Mind Rules Your Behavior, by Leonard Mlodinow (Vintage Books, 2013). [REVIEW]Kevin Lynch - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (9-10):229-234.
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  27. Truth and Freedom: Rorty and the Problem of Priority.Michael P. Lynch - 2014 - The European Legacy 19 (2):163-173.
    What does truth have to do with freedom? That is, what is the relationship between our political and epistemic principles? In this paper, I grapple and reject Rorty's reasons for thinking that the former can't be based on the latter, but offer an alternative argument that supports his over-all conclusion that our epistemic and political values are ultimately intertwined.
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  28. The Intellectual Powers: A Study of Human Nature, by P.M.S. Hacker (Wiley-Blackwell, 2013). [REVIEW]Kevin Lynch - 2015 - Philosophy 90 (2):332-336.
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  29. The Myth of the Intuitive: Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Method, by Max Deutsch (MIT Press, 2015). [REVIEW]Kevin Lynch - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (7):1088-1091.
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  30. Why Worry About Epistemic Circularity?Michael P. Lynch & Paul Silva - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41 (9999):33-52.
    Although Alston believed epistemically circular arguments were able to justify their conclusions, he was also disquieted by them. We will argue that Alston was right to be disquieted. We explain Alston’s view of epistemic circularity, the considerations that led him to accept it, and the purposes he thought epistemically circular arguments could serve. We then build on some of Alston’s remarks and introduce further limits to the usefulness of such arguments and introduce a new problem that stems from those limits. (...)
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