Can Infinitists Handle the Finite Mind Objection and the Distinction Objection?

Philosophia 49 (5):2275-2291 (2021)
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This paper examines two objections to the infinitist theory of epistemic justification, namely “the finite mind objection” and “the distinction objection.” It criticizes Peter Klein’s response to the distinction objection and offers a more plausible response. It is then argued that this response is incompatible with Klein’s response to the finite mind objection. Infinitists, it would seem, cannot handle both objections when taken together.

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Bin Zhao
Peking University


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