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Inferentialism

In Steinberger Florian & Murzi Julien (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Philosophy of Language. pp. 197-224 (2017)

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  1. The province of logic.William Kneale - 1956 - Mind 66 (262):258.
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  • (1 other version)Understanding and Semantic Structure: Reply to Timothy Williamson.Brendan Balcerak Jackson - 2009 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):337-343.
    In his essay ‘“Conceptual Truth”’, Timothy Williamson (2006) argues that there are no truths or entailments that are constitutive of understanding the sentences involved. In this reply I provide several examples of entailment patterns that are intuitively constitutive of understanding in just the way that Williamson rejects, and I argue that Williamson’s argument does nothing to show otherwise. Williamson bolsters his conclusion by appeal to a certain theory about the nature of understanding. I argue that his theory fails to consider (...)
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  • (1 other version)Understanding and Semantic Strucure: Reply to Timothy Williamson.Brendan Balcerak Jackson - 2009 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):337-343.
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  • (2 other versions)Paul Horwich (ed.): Meaning. [REVIEW]Jaroslav Peregrin - 2000 - Erkenntnis 53 (3):415-422.
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  • (7 other versions)Conceptual role semantics.Gilbert Harman - 1982 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23:242-256.
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  • What can we learn from the paradox of knowability?Cesare Cozzo - 1994 - Topoi 13 (2):71--78.
    The intuitionistic conception of truth defended by Dummett, Martin Löf and Prawitz, according to which the notion of proof is conceptually prior1 to the notion of truth, is a particular version of the epistemic conception of truth. The paradox of knowability (first published by Frederic Fitch in 1963) has been described by many authors2 as an argument which threatens the epistemic, and the intuitionistic, conception of truth. In order to establish whether this is really so, one has to understand what (...)
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  • Intuitionism reconsidered.Roy Cook - 2005 - In Stewart Shapiro (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 387--411.
    This chapter examines the debate between advocates of classical logic and advocates of intuitionistic logic. It examines the semantic and epistemic issues on which this debate is usually conducted. After introducing the idea that logic is a model of correct reasoning, the chapter explores the viability of a logic intermediate between classical and intuitionistic.
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  • Making it Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment.Robert Kirk - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (183):238-241.
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  • (1 other version)Inferentialism and Some of Its Challenges.Robert Brandom - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (3):651-676.
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  • Robert B. Brandom, Articulating Reasons (An Introduction to Inferentialism). [REVIEW]Robert B. Brandom - 2001 - Erkenntnis 55 (1):121-127.
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  • .Joe Salerno - 2008 - In New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford, England and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
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  • From Epistemic Expressivism to Epistemic Inferentialism.Matthew Chrisman - 2008 - In Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Recent philosophical debate about the meaning of knowledge claims has largely centered on the question of whether epistemic claims are plausibly thought to be context sensitive. The default assumption has been that sentences that attribute knowledge or justification have stable truth-conditions across different contexts of utterance, once any non-epistemic context sensitivity has been fixed. The contrary view is the contextualist view that such sentences do not have stable truth-conditions but can vary depending on the context of utterance. This debate manifestly (...)
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  • Reply to Wolfgang Künne.Michael Dummett - 2007 - In R. E. Auxier & L. E. Hahn (eds.), The Philosophy of Michael Dummett. Open Court. pp. 345--350.
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  • Review of Marconi 1997. [REVIEW]Paolo Casalegno - 1999 - Dialectica 53:154-159.
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  • (1 other version)Wittgenstein on Necessity: Some Reflections.Michael Dummett - 1994 - In ¸ Iteclarkhale:Rp. pp. 49--65.
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