Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Boundaries of the Mind: The Individual in the Fragile Sciences - Cognition.Robert A. Wilson - 2004 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Where does the mind begin and end? Most philosophers and cognitive scientists take the view that the mind is bounded by the skull or skin of the individual. Robert Wilson, in this provocative and challenging 2004 book, provides the foundations for the view that the mind extends beyond the boundary of the individual. The approach adopted offers a unique blend of traditional philosophical analysis, cognitive science, and the history of psychology and the human sciences. The companion volume, Genes and the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   179 citations  
  • Why the mind is still in the head.Fred Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 2008 - In Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 78--95.
    Philosophical interest in situated cognition has been focused most intensely on the claim that human cognitive processes extend from the brain into the tools humans use. As we see it, this radical hypothesis is sustained by two kinds of mistakes, the confusion of coupling relations with constitutive relations and an inattention to the mark of the cognitive. Here we wish to draw attention to these mistakes and show just how pervasive they are. That is, for all that the radical philosophers (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  • What Might Cognition Be, If Not Computation?Tim Van Gelder - 1995 - Journal of Philosophy 92 (7):345 - 381.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   305 citations  
  • (1 other version)Exograms and Interdisciplinarity: history, the extended mind, and the civilizing process.John Sutton - 2010 - In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press. pp. 189-225.
    On the extended mind hypothesis (EM), many of our cognitive states and processes are hybrids, unevenly distributed across biological and nonbiological realms. In certain circumstances, things - artifacts, media, or technologies - can have a cognitive life, with histories often as idiosyncratic as those of the embodied brains with which they couple. The realm of the mental can spread across the physical, social, and cultural environments as well as bodies and brains. My independent aims in this chapter are: first, to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   223 citations  
  • Causal theories of mental content.Fred Adams & Ken Aizawa - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Causal theories of mental content attempt to explain how thoughts can be about things. They attempt to explain how one can think about, for example, dogs. These theories begin with the idea that there are mental representations and that thoughts are meaningful in virtue of a causal connection between a mental representation and some part of the world that is represented. In other words, the point of departure for these theories is that thoughts of dogs are about dogs because dogs (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  • (1 other version)Coupling, constitution and the cognitive kind: A reply to Adams and Aizawa.Andy Clark - 2010 - In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press. pp. 81-99.
    Adams and Aizawa, in a series of recent and forthcoming papers,, ) seek to refute, or perhaps merely to terminally embarrass, the friends of the extended mind. One such paper begins with the following illustration: "Question: Why did the pencil think that 2+2=4? Clark's Answer: Because it was coupled to the mathematician" Adams and Aizawa ms p.1 "That" the authors continue "about sums up what is wrong with Clark's extended mind hypothesis". The example of the pencil, they suggest, is just (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   67 citations  
  • Where is my mind? [REVIEW]Jerry Fodor - 2009 - London Review of Books 31 (3).
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  • Supersizing the mind: embodiment, action, and cognitive extension.Andy Clark (ed.) - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    In Supersizing the Mind, Andy Clark argues that the human mind is not bound inside the head but extends into body and environment.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   729 citations  
  • (1 other version)Curing cognitive hiccups: A defense of the extended mind.Andy Clark - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (4):163-192.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   69 citations  
  • Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind.Evan Thompson - 2007 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
    The question has long confounded philosophers and scientists, and it is this so-called explanatory gap between biological life and consciousness that Evan ...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   865 citations  
  • Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2004 - MIT Press.
    "Perception is not something that happens to us, or in us," writes Alva Noe. "It is something we do." In Action in Perception, Noe argues that perception and perceptual consciousness depend on capacities for action and thought — that ...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   927 citations  
  • Challenges to the hypothesis of extended cognition.Robert D. Rupert - 2004 - Journal of Philosophy 101 (8):389-428.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   327 citations  
  • Reasons, robots and the extended mind.Andy Clark - 2001 - Mind and Language 16 (2):121-145.
    A suitable project for the new Millenium is to radically reconfigure our image of human rationality. Such a project is already underway, within the Cognitive Sciences, under the umbrellas of work in Situated Cognition, Distributed and De-centralized Cogition, Real-world Robotics and Artificial Life1. Such approaches, however, are often criticized for giving certain aspects of rationality too wide a berth. They focus their attention on on such superficially poor cousins as.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   76 citations  
  • The extended mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.
    Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? The question invites two standard replies. Some accept the demarcations of skin and skull, and say that what is outside the body is outside the mind. Others are impressed by arguments suggesting that the meaning of our words "just ain't in the head", and hold that this externalism about meaning carries over into an externalism about mind. We propose to pursue a third position. We advocate a very different (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1645 citations  
  • (1 other version)Book Review: Handbook of Cognitive Science: An Embodied Approach. [REVIEW]David Teira - 2013 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43 (2):268-272.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   61 citations  
  • The Body in Mind: Understanding Cognitive Processes.Mark Rowlands - 1999 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    In this book, Mark Rowlands challenges the Cartesian view of the mind as a self-contained monadic entity, and offers in its place a radical externalist or environmentalist model of cognitive processes. Cognition is not something done exclusively in the head, but fundamentally something done in the world. Drawing on both evolutionary theory and a detailed examination of the processes involved in perception, memory, thought and language use, Rowlands argues that cognition is, in part, a process whereby creatures manipulate and exploit (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   117 citations  
  • How a cockpit remembers its speeds.Edwin Hutchins - 1995 - Cognitive Science 19 (3):265--288.
    Cognitive science normally takes the individual agent as its unit of analysis. In many human endeavors, however, the outcomes of interest are not determined entirely by the information processing properties of individuals. Nor can they be inferred from the properties of the individual agents, alone, no matter how detailed the knowledge of the properties of those individuals may be. In commercial aviation, for example, the successful completion of a flight is produced by a system that typically includes two or more (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   165 citations  
  • The dynamical hypothesis in cognitive science.Tim van Gelder - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):615-28.
    According to the dominant computational approach in cognitive science, cognitive agents are digital computers; according to the alternative approach, they are dynamical systems. This target article attempts to articulate and support the dynamical hypothesis. The dynamical hypothesis has two major components: the nature hypothesis (cognitive agents are dynamical systems) and the knowledge hypothesis (cognitive agents can be understood dynamically). A wide range of objections to this hypothesis can be rebutted. The conclusion is that cognitive systems may well be dynamical systems, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   210 citations  
  • Intrinsic content, active memory and the extended mind.Andy Clark - 2005 - Analysis 65 (1):1-11.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   80 citations  
  • Attacking the Bounds of cognition.Richard Menary - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (3):329-344.
    Recently internalists have mounted a counter-attack on the attempt to redefine the bounds of cognition. The counter-attack is aimed at a radical project which I call "cognitive integration," which is the view that internal and external vehicles and processes are integrated into a whole. Cognitive integration can be defended against the internalist counter arguments of Adams and Aizawa (A&A) and Rupert. The disagreement between internalists and integrationists is whether the manipulation of external vehicles constitutes a cognitive process. Integrationists think that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   91 citations  
  • The Bounds of Cognition.Sven Walter - 2001 - Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):43-64.
    An alarming number of philosophers and cognitive scientists have argued that mind extends beyond the brain and body. This book evaluates these arguments and suggests that, typically, it does not. A timely and relevant study that exposes the need to develop a more sophisticated theory of cognition, while pointing to a bold new direction in exploring the nature of cognition Articulates and defends the “mark of the cognitive”, a common sense theory used to distinguish between cognitive and non-cognitive processes Challenges (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   273 citations  
  • (2 other versions)Review of Alva Noe, Action in Perception[REVIEW]Ned Block - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (5):259-272.
    This is a charming and engaging book that combines careful attention to the phenomenology of experience with an appreciation of the psychology and neuroscience of perception. In some of its aimsfor example, to show problems with a rigid version of a view of visual perception as an inverse optics process of constructing a static 3-D representation from static 2-D information on the retina--it succeeds admirably. As No points out, vision is a process that depends on interactions between the perceiver and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   63 citations  
  • The Bounds of Cognition.Frederick Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 2008 - Malden, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell. Edited by Kenneth Aizawa.
    A critique of the hypothesis of extended cognition.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   448 citations  
  • Short-term and working memory.Alan D. Baddeley - 2000 - In Endel Tulving (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Memory. Oxford University Press. pp. 77--92.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Intentions as emergent products of social interactions.R. W. Gibbs - 2001 - In Bertram F. Malle, Louis J. Moses & Dare A. Baldwin (eds.), Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition. MIT Press. pp. 105--122.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind.John Haugeland - 1998 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
    The unifying theme of these thirteen essays is understanding.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   154 citations  
  • Representation, reduction, and interdisciplinarity in the sciences of memory.John Sutton - 2004 - In Hugh Clapin (ed.), Representation in Mind: New Approaches to Mental Representation. Elsevier. pp. 187--216.
    1. Introduction: memory and interdisciplinarity (footnote 1) Memory is studied at a bewildering number of levels, in a daunting range of disciplines, and with a vast array of methods. Is there any sense at all in which memory theorists - from neurobiologists to narrative theorists, from the developmental to the postcolonial, from the computational to the cross-cultural - are studying the same phenomena? This exploratory review paper sketches the bare outline of a positive framework for understanding current work on memory, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Fodorian semantics: A reply to Adams and Aizawa. [REVIEW]Ted A. Warfield - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (2):205-14.
    In a recent article in this journal (Adams and Aizawa 1992), Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa argued that Jerry Fodor's proposed naturalistic sufficient condition for meaning is unsatisfactory. In this paper, I respond to Adams and Aizawa, noting that (1) they have overestimated the importance of their “pathologies” objection, perhaps as a consequence of misunderstanding Fodor's asymmetric dependency condition, (2) they have misunderstood Fodor's asymmetric dependency condition in formulating their Twin Earth objection, and (3) they have, in addition to under (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • (2 other versions)Action in Perception by Alva Noë. [REVIEW]Ned Block - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (5):259-272.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   43 citations  
  • The Body in Mind.Mark Rowlands - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):401-403.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  • (1 other version)Varieties of externalism.Susan Hurley - 2010 - In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press. pp. 101-153.
    Externalism comes in varieties. While the landscape isn.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   92 citations  
  • (1 other version)The Bounds of Cognition. [REVIEW]D. Browne - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):385-386.
    Tools and technologies expand our capacities, including our cognitive capacities. Microscopes extend our perceptual capacities. Notebooks extend the natural limits of memory. These facts are important, for all that they are obvious. The extended cognition hypothesis wants more. Some external devices and processes are literal parts of cognitive processes themselves. When there is fast and reliable access to external data or processes, then the cognitive processes that occur uncontroversially inside the brain literally and controversially extend out into the world to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   134 citations  
  • (1 other version)Curing Cognitive Hiccups.Andy Clark - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (4):163-192.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   61 citations  
  • Extended cognition and the mark of the cognitive.Mark Rowlands - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (1):1 – 19.
    According to the thesis of the extended mind (EM) , at least some token cognitive processes extend into the cognizing subject's environment in the sense that they are (partly) composed of manipulative, exploitative, and transformative operations performed by that subject on suitable environmental structures. EM has attracted four ostensibly distinct types of objection. This paper has two goals. First, it argues that these objections all reduce to one basic sort: all the objections can be resolved by the provision of an (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   88 citations