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  1. Thinking-is-Moving: Dance, Agency, and a Radically Enactive Mind. [REVIEW]Michele Merritt - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):95-110.
    Recently, in cognitive science, the enactivist account of cognition has been gaining ground, due in part to studies of movement in conjunction with thought. The idea, as Noë , has put it, that “cognition is not something happening inside us or to us, but it’s something we do, something we achieve,” is increasingly supported by research on joint attention, movement coordination, and gesture. Not surprisingly, therefore, enactivists have also begun to look at “movement specialists”—dancers—for both scientific and phenomenological accounts of (...)
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  • Conceptual Confusions and Causal Dynamics.Patrizio Lo Presti - forthcoming - Phenomenology and Mind.
    This paper argues that rules and norms are conceptually distinct: what is norm is not thereby rule, and vice versa. Versions of conflating the two are discussed and an argument for distinction given. Two objections to the argument are responded to. It is accepted that rules and norms are often intimately related. They are so causally, not conceptually: what norms we live by can make a difference to what rules we accept and what rules we accept can make a difference (...)
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  • Representation and Extension in Consciousness Studies.Zsuzsanna Kondor - 2017 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 8 (1):209-227.
    Various theories suggest conscious phenomena are based exclusively on brain activity, while others regard them as a result of the interaction between embodied agents and their environment. In this paper, I will consider whether this divergence entails the acceptance of the fact that different theories can be applied in different scales, or if they are reconcilable. I will suggest that investigating how the term representation is used can reveal some hints, building upon which we can bridge the gulf between the (...)
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  • Towards an Integration of Two Aspects of Semiosis – A Cognitive Semiotic Perspective.Piotr Konderak - 2021 - Sign Systems Studies 49 (1-2):132-165.
    Meaning-making processes, understood hierarchically, in line with the Semiotic Hierarchy framework, change on various timescales. To account for and predict these changes, one can take a cognitive view on semiosis. I adopt an interdis-ciplinary approach combining semiotic studies and cognitive studies in an attempt to account for meaning-making activity and to predict the course of semiosis. In this context, I consider meaning-making activity as shaped by both “external” (to a semiotic system) as well as “internal” factors. I also show how (...)
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  • From Cybernetics to Second-Order Cybernetics: A Comparative Analysis of Their Central Ideas.T. Froese - 2010 - Constructivist Foundations 5 (2):75--85.
    Context: The enactive paradigm in the cognitive sciences is establishing itself as a strong and comprehensive alternative to the computationalist mainstream. However, its own particular historical roots have so far been largely ignored in the historical analyses of the cognitive sciences. Problem: In order to properly assess the enactive paradigm’s theoretical foundations in terms of their validity, novelty and potential future directions of development, it is essential for us to know more about the history of ideas that has led to (...)
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  • Mind-Wandering and the Field of Consciousness.Peter Crout - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (1-2):7-33.
    In this article I develop a phenomenological model of the dynamics of mind-wandering based on Aron Gurwitsch's (1964) field theory of consciousness. Specifically, I articulate these dynamics in terms of conscious field transformations resulting from particular interactions between the attentional focus, contextual background, and non-contextual background -- structures that Gurwitsch understood as invariantly present. According to the model, during guided thought the conscious context that escorts the focus of attention behaves like an autonomous self-defining system, as the primary determinant of (...)
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  • Neural Representations Not Needed - No More Pleas, Please.Daniel D. Hutto & Erik Myin - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2):241-256.
    Colombo (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2012) argues that we have compelling reasons to posit neural representations because doing so yields unique explanatory purchase in central cases of social norm compliance. We aim to show that there is no positive substance to Colombo’s plea—nothing that ought to move us to endorse representationalism in this domain, on any level. We point out that exposing the vices of the phenomenological arguments against representationalism does not, on its own, advance the case for representationalism (...)
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  • Non-Representationalist Cognitive Science and Realism.Karim Zahidi - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (3):461-475.
    Embodied and extended cognition is a relatively new paradigm within cognitive science that challenges the basic tenet of classical cognitive science, viz. cognition consists in building and manipulating internal representations. Some of the pioneers of embodied cognitive science have claimed that this new way of conceptualizing cognition puts pressure on epistemological and ontological realism. In this paper I will argue that such anti-realist conclusions do not follow from the basic assumptions of radical embodied cognitive science. Furthermore I will show that (...)
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  • Consciousness-Body-Time: How Do People Think Lacking Their Body? [REVIEW]Yochai Ataria & Yuval Neria - 2013 - Human Studies 36 (2):159-178.
    War captivity is an extreme traumatic experience typically involving exposure to repeated stressors, including torture, isolation, and humiliation. Captives are flung from their previous known world into an unfamiliar reality in which their state of consciousness may undergo significant change. In the present study extensive interviews were conducted with fifteen Israeli former prisoners of war who fell captive during the 1973 Yom Kippur war with the goal of examining the architecture of human thought in subjects lacking a sense of body (...)
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  • Neuropragmatism, Old and New.Tibor Solymosi - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (3):347-368.
    Recent work in neurophilosophy has either made reference to the work of John Dewey or independently developed positions similar to it. I review these developments in order first to show that Dewey was indeed doing neurophilosophy well before the Churchlands and others, thereby preceding many other mid-twentieth century European philosophers’ views on cognition to whom many present day philosophers refer (e.g., Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty). I also show that Dewey’s work provides useful tools for evading or overcoming many issues in contemporary neurophilosophy (...)
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  • Introduction to the Special Issue on 4E Cognition.Richard Menary - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):459-463.
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  • The Deep Bodily Roots of Emotion.Albert A. Johnstone - 2012 - Husserl Studies 28 (3):179-200.
    This article explores emotions and their relationship to ‘somatic responses’, i.e., one’s automatic responses to sensations of pain, cold, warmth, sudden intensity. To this end, it undertakes a Husserlian phenomenological analysis of the first-hand experience of eight basic emotions, briefly exploring their essential aspects: their holistic nature, their identifying dynamic transformation of the lived body, their two-layered intentionality, their involuntary initiation and voluntary espousal. The fact that the involuntary tensional shifts initiating emotions are irreplicatable voluntarily, is taken to show that (...)
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  • Das Leibgedächtnis. Ein Beitrag aus der Phänomenologie Husserls.Michela Summa - 2011 - Husserl Studies 27 (3):173-196.
    ZusammenfassungDie Unterscheidung von verschiedenen Gedächtnisformen und -systemen sowie die Beziehung zwischen Gedächtnis und Leiblichkeit stehen sowohl im Fokus der kognitionswissenschaftlichen, als auch der phänomenologischen Debatte. In diesem Artikel wird versucht, beide Ansätze zum Thema in einen Dialog zu bringen. Das Leibgedächtnis wird hier zunächst phänomenologisch als der konkreteste Ausdruck des impliziten Gedächtnisses bestimmt. Basierend auf Edmund Husserls Analysen zum Zeitbewusstsein und zur leiblichen Erfahrung werden folglich die Strukturen und die Dynamik des Leibgedächtnisses hervorgehoben. Dabei wird gezeigt, dass das Leibgedächtnis sowohl (...)
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  • Vulnerability to Psychosis, I-Thou Intersubjectivity and the Praecox-Feeling.Somogy Varga - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):131-143.
    Psychotic and prodromal states are characterized by distortions of intersubjectivity, and a number of psychopathologists see in the concrete I-You frame of the clinical encounter the manifestation of such impairment. Rümke has coined the term of ‘praecox-feeling’, designated to describe a feeling of unease emanating in the interviewer that reflects the detachment of the patient and the failure of an ‘affective exchange.’ While the reliability of the praecox-feeling as a diagnostic tool has since been established, the explanation and theoretical framing (...)
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  • The Extended Body: A Case Study in the Neurophenomenology of Social Interaction. [REVIEW]Tom Froese & Thomas Fuchs - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):205-235.
    There is a growing realization in cognitive science that a theory of embodied intersubjectivity is needed to better account for social cognition. We highlight some challenges that must be addressed by attempts to interpret ‘simulation theory’ in terms of embodiment, and argue for an alternative approach that integrates phenomenology and dynamical systems theory in a mutually informing manner. Instead of ‘simulation’ we put forward the concept of the ‘extended body’, an enactive and phenomenological notion that emphasizes the socially mediated nature (...)
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  • La actualidad de la fenomenología husserliana: superación de viejos tópicos y apertura de nuevos campos de exploración.Jesús Adrián Escudero - 2013 - Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad Del Norte 18:12-45.
    En el marco de un nuevo descubrimiento de la fenomenología, este trabajo ofrece diferentes argumentos para superar la clásica interpretación de Husserl considerándolo un representante prototípico del solipsismo. En primer lugar, se refuta la interpretación mentalista de Dreyfus de la fenomenología husserliana, mostrando que su programa filosófico va más allá de la tradicional dicotomía entre internalismo y externalismo; en segundo lugar, se señalan algunas de las principales contribuciones realizadas por la fenomenología de Husserl al campo de las ciencias cognitivas y (...)
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  • Phenomenology and Naturalism in Autopoietic and Radical Enactivism: Exploring Sense-Making and Continuity From the Top Down.Hayden Kee - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 9):2323-2343.
    Radical and autopoietic enactivists disagree concerning how to understand the concept of sense-making in enactivist discourse and the extent of its distribution within the organic domain. I situate this debate within a broader conflict of commitments to naturalism on the part of radical enactivists, and to phenomenology on the part of autopoietic enactivists. I argue that autopoietic enactivists are in part responsible for the obscurity of the notion of sense-making by attributing it univocally to sentient and non-sentient beings and following (...)
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  • Cognitive Ontology in Flux: The Possibility of Protean Brains.Daniel D. Hutto, Anco Peeters & Miguel Segundo-Ortin - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (2):209-223.
    This paper motivates taking seriously the possibility that brains are basically protean: that they make use of neural structures in inventive, on-the-fly improvisations to suit circumstance and context. Accordingly, we should not always expect cognition to divide into functionally stable neural parts and pieces. We begin by reviewing recent work in cognitive ontology that highlights the inadequacy of traditional neuroscientific approaches when it comes to divining the function and structure of cognition. Cathy J. Price and Karl J. Friston, and Colin (...)
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  • Accounting for the Specious Present: A Defense of Enactivism.Kaplan Hasanoglu - 2018 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 39 (3):181-204.
    I argue that conscious visual experience is essentially a non-representational demonstration of a skill. The explication and defense of this position depends on both phenomenological and empirical considerations. The central phenomenological claim is this: as a matter of human psychology, it is impossible to produce a conscious visual experience of a mind-independent object that is sufficiently like typical cases, without including concomitant proprioceptive sensations of the sort of extra-neural behavior that allows us to there and then competently detect such objects. (...)
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  • A Non-Representational Understanding of Visual Experience.Kaplan Hasanoglu - 2016 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 37:271-286.
    This paper argues that various phenomenological considerations support a non-representational causal account of visual experience. This position claims that visual experiences serve as a non-representational causally efficacious medium for the production of beliefs concerning the external world. The arguments are centered on defending a non-representational causal account’s understanding of the cognitive significance of visual experience. Among other things, such an account can easily explain the inextricable role that background beliefs and conceptual capacities play in perceptually-based external world belief-formation processes, the (...)
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  • Making Enactivism Even More Embodied.Shaun Gallagher & Matthew Bower - 2013 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2):232-247.
    The full scope of enactivist approaches to cognition includes not only a focus on sensory-motor contingencies and physical affordances for action, but also an emphasis on affective factors of embodiment and intersubjective affordances for social interaction. This strong conception of embodied cognition calls for a new way to think about the role of the brain in the larger system of brain-body-environment. We ask whether recent work on predictive coding offers a way to think about brain function in an enactive system, (...)
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  • Is Collective Agency a Coherent Idea? Considerations From the Enactive Theory of Agency.Mog Stapleton & Tom Froese - 2015 - In Catrin Misselhorn (ed.), Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Springer Verlag. pp. 219-236.
    Whether collective agency is a coherent concept depends on the theory of agency that we choose to adopt. We argue that the enactive theory of agency developed by Barandiaran, Di Paolo and Rohde (2009) provides a principled way of grounding agency in biological organisms. However the importance of biological embodiment for the enactive approach might lead one to be skeptical as to whether artificial systems or collectives of individuals could instantiate genuine agency. To explore this issue we contrast the concept (...)
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  • The Body and the Experience of Presence.Joerg Fingerhut - 2012 - In Joerg Fingerhut & Sabine Marienberg (eds.), Feelings of Being Alive. de Gruyter. pp. 8--167.
    We experience our encounters with the world and others in different degrees of intensity – the presence of things and others is gradual. I introduce this kind of presence as a ubiquitous feature of every phenomenally conscious experience, as well as a key ingredient of our ‘feeling of being alive’, and distinguish explanatory agendas that might be relevant with regard to this phenomenon (1 – 3). My focus will be the role of the body-brain nexus in realizing these experiences and (...)
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  • Enactivism and the New Teleology: Reconciling the Warring Camps.Ralph D. Ellis - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2):173-198.
    Enactivism has the potential to provide a sense of teleology in purpose-directed action, but without violating the principles of efficient causation. Action can be distinguished from mere reaction by virtue of the fact that some systems are self-organizing. Self-organization in the brain is reflected in neural plasticity, and also in the primacy of motivational processes that initiate the release of neurotransmitters necessary for mental and conscious functions, and which guide selective attention processes. But in order to flesh out the enactivist (...)
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  • Embodied Cognitive Science and its Implications for Psychopathology.Zoe Drayson - 2009 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 16 (4):329-340.
    The past twenty years have seen an increase in the importance of the body in psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy of mind. This 'embodied' trend challenges the orthodox view in cognitive science in several ways: it downplays the traditional 'mind-as-computer' approach and emphasizes the role of interactions between the brain, body, and environment. In this article, I review recent work in the area of embodied cognitive science and explore the approaches each takes to the ideas of consciousness, computation and representation. Finally, (...)
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  • Defining the Environment in Organism–Environment Systems.Amanda Corris - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11:1285.
    Enactivism and ecological psychology converge on the relevance of the environment in understanding perception and action. On both views, perceiving organisms are not merely passive receivers of environmental stimuli, but rather form a dynamic relationship with their environments in such a way that shapes how they interact with the world. In this paper, I suggest that while enactivism and ecological psychology enjoy a shared specification of the environment as the cognitive domain, on both accounts, the structure of the environment, itself, (...)
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  • Love In-Between.Laura Candiotto & Hanne De Jaegher - 2021 - The Journal of Ethics:1-24.
    In this paper, we introduce an enactive account of loving as participatory sense-making inspired by the “I love to you” of the feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray. Emancipating from the fusionist concept of romantic love, which understands love as unity, we conceptualise loving as an existential engagement in a dialectic of encounter, in continuous processes of becoming-in-relation. In these processes, desire acquires a certain prominence as the need to know more. We build on Irigaray’s account of love to present a phenomenology (...)
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  • Embodied Decisions and the Predictive Brain.Christopher Burr - 2017 - Philosophy and Predictive Processing.
    A cognitivist account of decision-making views choice behaviour as a serial process of deliberation and commitment, which is separate from perception and action. By contrast, recent work in embodied decision-making has argued that this account is incompatible with emerging neurophysiological data. We argue that this account has significant overlap with an embodied account of predictive processing, and that both can offer mutual development for the other. However, more importantly, by demonstrating this close connection we uncover an alternative perspective on the (...)
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  • El post-cognitivismo en cuestión: extensión, corporización y enactivismo.Federico Burdman - 2015 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 3 (19):475-495.
    In this paper I look into a problem concerning the characterization of the main conceptual commitments of the ‘post-cognitivist’ theoretical framework. I first consider critically a proposal put forward by Rowlands (2010), which identifies the theoretical nucleus of post-cognitivism with a convergence of the theses of the extended and the embodied mind. The shortcomings I find in this proposal lead me to an indepedent and wider issue concerning the apparent tensions between functionalism and the embodied and enactive approaches.
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  • Enactivism and the ‘Explanatory Trap’. A Wittgensteinian Perspective.Anna Boncompagni - 2013 - Methode - Analytic Perspectives 2:27-49.
    This paper explores the enactive approach in cognitive science with an eye on the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy. The aim is not that of answering the question: was Wittgenstein an ante litteram enactivist? He was not, because he was not an ante litteram (cognitive) scientist of any kind. The aim, conversely, is that of answering the question: can enactivism be Wittgensteinian? In answering positively, it will be argued that a Wittgensteinian framework can help enactive cognitive scientists in dissolving certain old problems (...)
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  • Horizons of the Word: Words and Tools in Perception and Action.Hayden Kee - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (5):905-932.
    In this paper I develop a novel account of the phenomenality of language by focusing on characteristics of perceived speech. I explore the extent to which the spoken word can be said to have a horizonal structure similar to that of spatiotemporal objects: our perception of each is informed by habitual associations and expectations formed through past experiences of the object or word and other associated objects and experiences. Specifically, the horizonal structure of speech in use can fruitfully be compared (...)
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  • Pointing the Way to Social Cognition: A Phenomenological Approach to Embodiment, Pointing, and Imitation in the First Year of Infancy.Hayden Kee - 2020 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 40 (3):135-154.
    I have two objectives in this article. The first is methodological: I elaborate a minimal phenomenological method and attempt to show its importance in studies of infant behavior. The second objective is substantive: Applying the minimal phenomenological approach, combined with Meltzoff’s “like-me” developmental framework, I propose the hypothesis that infants learn the pointing gesture at least in part through imitation. I explain how developments in sensorimotor ability (posture, arm and hand control and coordination, and locomotion) in the first year of (...)
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  • Phenomenological Reduction in Merleau‐Ponty's The Structure of Behavior : An Alternative Approach to the Naturalization of Phenomenology.Hayden Kee - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):15-32.
    Approaches to the naturalization of phenomenology usually understand naturalization as a matter of rendering continuous the methods, epistemologies, and ontologies of phenomenological and natural scientific inquiry. Presupposed in this statement of the problematic, however, is that there is an original discontinuity, a rupture between phenomenology and the natural sciences that must be remedied. I propose that this way of thinking about the issue is rooted in a simplistic understanding of the phenomenological reduction that entails certain assumptions about the subject matter (...)
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  • An Enactive-Ecological Approach to Information and Uncertainty.Eros Moreira de Carvalho & Giovanni Rolla - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11:1-11.
    Information is a central notion for cognitive sciences and neurosciences, but there is no agreement on what it means for a cognitive system to acquire information about its surroundings. In this paper, we approximate three influential views on information: the one at play in ecological psychology, which is sometimes called information for action; the notion of information as covariance as developed by some enactivists, and the idea of information as minimization of uncertainty as presented by Shannon. Our main thesis is (...)
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  • Whatever Next and Close to My Self—The Transparent Senses and the “Second Skin”: Implications for the Case of Depersonalization.Anna Ciaunica, Andreas Roepstorff, Aikaterini Katerina Fotopoulou & Bruna Petreca - 2021 - Frontiers in Psychology 12.
    In his paper “Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science,” Andy Clark seminally proposed that the brain's job is to predict whatever information is coming “next” on the basis of prior inputs and experiences. Perception fundamentally subserves survival and self-preservation in biological agents, such as humans. Survival however crucially depends on rapid and accurate information processing of what is happening in the here and now. Hence, the term “next” in Clark's seminal formulation must include not (...)
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  • Contemplative Inquiry in Movement: Managing Writer´s Block in Academic Writing.Eva Bojner Horwitz, Cecilia Stenfors & Walter Osika - 2013 - International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 32 (1):16-26.
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  • Radical Embodiment in Two Directions.Anthony Chemero & Edward Baggs - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 9):2175-2190.
    Radical embodied cognitive science is split into two camps: the ecological approach and the enactive approach. We propose that these two approaches can be brought together into a productive synthesis. The key is to recognize that the two approaches are pursuing different but complementary types of explanation. Both approaches seek to explain behavior in terms of the animal–environment relation, but they start at opposite ends. Ecological psychologists pursue an ontological strategy. They begin by describing the habitat of the species, and (...)
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  • Revaluing the Behaviorist Ghost in Enactivism and Embodied Cognition.Nikolai Alksnis & Jack Alan Reynolds - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5785-5807.
    Despite its short historical moment in the sun, behaviorism has become something akin to a theoria non grata, a position that dare not be explicitly endorsed. The reasons for this are complex, of course, and they include sociological factors which we cannot consider here, but to put it briefly: many have doubted the ambition to establish law-like relationships between mental states and behavior that dispense with any sort of mentalistic or intentional idiom, judging that explanations of intelligent behavior require reference (...)
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  • Don't Ask, Look! Linguistic Corpora as a Tool for Conceptual Analysis.Roland Bluhm - 2013 - In Migue Hoeltje, Thomas Spitzley & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), Was dürfen wir glauben? Was sollen wir tun? Sektionsbeiträge des achten internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie e.V. DuEPublico. pp. 7-15.
    Ordinary Language Philosophy has largely fallen out of favour, and with it the belief in the primary importance of analyses of ordinary language for philosophical purposes. Still, in their various endeavours, philosophers not only from analytic but also from other backgrounds refer to the use and meaning of terms of interest in ordinary parlance. In doing so, they most commonly appeal to their own linguistic intuitions. Often, the appeal to individual intuitions is supplemented by reference to dictionaries. In recent times, (...)
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  • Somatic Intentionality Bifurcated: A Sellarsian Response to Sachs’s Merleau-Pontyan Account of Intentionality.Dionysis Christias - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (4):539-561.
    In a recent article Sachs suggests that the concept of somatic intentionality is the key to understanding how the conceptual order is externally constrained by something outside itself which is nonetheless fully intentional in nature. Sachs claims that his proposal fares better than Sellars’ view on the issue of how our experience can so much as be about objective reality. In this paper, I shall argue that this is not the case because Sellars’ view is in crucial respects misdescribed. Sachs (...)
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  • Response to ‘Somatic Intentionality Bifurcated: A Sellarisan Response to Sachs’s Merleau-Pontyan Account of Intentionality.Carl B. Sachs - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (4):562-565.
    Christia (2015) argues that my criticism of Sellars -- that for Sellars, all intentionality is what I call "discursive intentionality" -- relies on a misunderstanding of Sellarsian intuitions (see Sachs 2014). Here I respond to Christias by pointing that that while is correct that Sellars has a distinction between full-blown linguistic intentionality and perceptual takings, Sellars's theory of perceptual takings cannot do justice to the figure/ground structure of embodied perception stressed by Merleau-Ponty.
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  • Merleau-Ponty and the Radical Sciences of Mind.Robin M. Muller - 2018 - Synthese (Suppl 9):1-35.
    In this paper, I critically reconstruct the development of Merleau-Pontyan phenomenology and “radical embodied cognitive science” out of Berlin-School Gestalt theory. I first lay out the basic principles of Gestalt theory and then identify two ways of revising that theory: one route, followed by enactivism and ecological psychology, borrows Gestaltist resources to defend a pragmatic ontology. I argue, however, that Merleau-Ponty never endorses this kind of ontology. Instead, I track his second route toward an ontology of “flesh.” I show how (...)
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  • The Field and Landscape of Affordances: Koffka’s Two Environments Revisited.Julian Kiverstein, Ludger van Dijk & Erik Rietveld - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 9):2279-2296.
    The smooth integration of the natural sciences with everyday lived experience is an important ambition of radical embodied cognitive science. In this paper we start from Koffka’s recommendation in his Principles of Gestalt Psychology that to realize this ambition psychology should be a “science of molar behaviour”. Molar behavior refers to the purposeful behaviour of the whole organism directed at an environment that is meaningfully structured for the animal. Koffka made a sharp distinction between the “behavioural environment” and the “geographical (...)
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  • Introduction.Alistair M. C. Isaac & Dave Ward - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 9):2135-2151.
    Several strands of contemporary cognitive science and its philosophy have emerged in recent decades that emphasize the role of action in cognition, resting their explanations on the embodiment of cognitive agents, and their embedding in richly structured environments. Despite their growing influence, many foundational questions remain unresolved or underexplored for this cluster of proposals, especially questions of how they can be extended beyond straightforwardly visuomotor cognitive capacities, and what constraints the commitment of embodiment places on the ontology of explanations. This (...)
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  • Truly Enactive Emotion.Daniel D. Hutto - 2012 - Emotion Review 4 (2):176-181.
    Any adequate account of emotion must accommodate the fact that emotions, even those of the most basic kind, exhibit intentionality as well as phenomenality. This article argues that a good place to start in providing such an account is by adjusting Prinz’s (2004) embodied appraisal theory (EAT) of emotions. EAT appeals to teleosemantics in order to account for the world-directed content of embodied appraisals. Although the central idea behind EAT is essentially along the right lines, as it stands Prinz’s proposal (...)
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  • Experimental Phenomenology: Multistabilities. [REVIEW]Thomas F. Cloonan - 2013 - Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 44 (1):129-134.
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  • Why Go for a Computation-Based Approach to Cognitive Representation.Dimitri Coelho Mollo - forthcoming - Synthese:1-21.
    The traditional view in (philosophy of) cognitive science is that computation in cognitive systems conceptually depends on representation: to compute is to manipulate representations. I argue that accepting the non-semantic teleomechanistic view of computation lays the ground for a promising alternative strategy, in which computation helps to explain and naturalise representation, rather than the other way around. I show that this computation-based approach to representation presents six decisive advantages over the traditional view. I claim that it can improve the two (...)
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  • Deflationary Realism: Representation and Idealisation in Cognitive Science.Dimitri Coelho Mollo - forthcoming - Mind and Language:1-19.
    Debate on the nature of representation in cognitive systems tends to oscillate between robustly realist views and various anti-realist options. I defend an alternative view, deflationary realism, which sees cognitive representation as an offshoot of the extended application to cognitive systems of an explanatory model whose primary domain is public representation use. This extended application, justified by a common explanatory target, embodies idealisations, partial mismatches between model and reality. By seeing representation as part of an idealised model, deflationary realism avoids (...)
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  • Teleology and Theology. On the Specificity of Teleological Explanations.Gabriele De Anna - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10 (3):27-50.
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  • Meaning Making From Life to Language: The Semiotic Hierarchy and Phenomenology.Jordan Zlatev - 2018 - Cognitive Semiotics 11 (1).
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