Switch to: Citations

References in:

The Onus in 'Ought'

Analysis 83 (1):13-21 (2023)

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Rationality Through Reasoning.John Broome (ed.) - 2013 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
    Rationality Through Reasoning answers the question of how people are motivated to do what they believe they ought to do, built on a comprehensive account of normativity, rationality and reasoning that differs significantly from much existing philosophical thinking. Develops an original account of normativity, rationality and reasoning significantly different from the majority of existing philosophical thought Includes an account of theoretical and practical reasoning that explains how reasoning is something we ourselves do, rather than something that happens in us Gives (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   447 citations  
  • Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980.Bernard Williams - 1981 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    A new volume of philosophical essays by Bernard Williams. The book is a successor to Problems of the Self, but whereas that volume dealt mainly with questions of personal identity, Moral Luck centres on questions of moral philosophy and the theory of rational action. That whole area has of course been strikingly reinvigorated over the last deacde, and philosophers have both broadened and deepened their concerns in a way that now makes much earlier moral and political philosophy look sterile and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   384 citations  
  • (1 other version)Ought, Agents, and Actions.Mark Schroeder - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (1):1-41.
    According to a naïve view sometimes apparent in the writings of moral philosophers, ‘ought’ often expresses a relation between agents and actions – the relation that obtains between an agent and an action when that action is what that agent ought to do. It is not part of this naïve view that ‘ought’ always expresses this relation – on the contrary, adherents of the naïve view are happy to allow that ‘ought’ also has an epistemic sense, on which it means, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   121 citations  
  • The Meaning of 'Ought': Beyond Descriptivism and Expressivism in Metaethics.Matthew Chrisman - 2015 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press USA.
    The word 'ought' is one of the core normative terms, but it is also a modal word. In this book Matthew Chrisman develops a careful account of the semantics of 'ought' as a modal operator, and uses this to motivate a novel inferentialist account of why ought-sentences have the meaning that they have. This is a metanormative account that agrees with traditional descriptivist theories in metaethics that specifying the truth-conditions of normative sentences is a central part of the explanation of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   54 citations  
  • The Semantics of Definite and Indefinite Noun Phrases.Irene Heim - 1982 - Dissertation, Umass Amherst
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   608 citations  
  • (1 other version)Ought, Agents, and Actions.Mark Schroeder - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (3):1-41.
    According to a naive view sometimes apparent in the writings of moral philosophers, 'ought' often expresses a relation between agents and actions—the relation that obtains between an agent and an action when that action is what that agent ought to do. It is not part of this naive view that 'ought' always expresses this relation—adherents of the naive view are happy to allow that 'ought' also has an evaluative sense, on which it means, roughly, that were things ideal, some proposition (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   109 citations  
  • Moral Luck. Philosophical Papers 1973-1980.Bernard Williams - 1983 - Philosophical Quarterly 33 (132):288-296.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   160 citations  
  • Seeing to it that: a canonical form for agentives.Nuel Belnap & Michael Perloff - 1988 - Theoria 54 (3):175-199.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   119 citations  
  • On the event relativity of modal auxiliaries.Valentine Hacquard - 2010 - Natural Language Semantics 18 (1):79-114.
    Crosslinguistically, the same modal words can be used to express a wide range of interpretations. This crosslinguistic trend supports a Kratzerian analysis, where each modal has a core lexical entry and where the difference between an epistemic and a root interpretation is contextually determined. A long-standing problem for such a unified account is the equally robust crosslinguistic correlation between a modal’s interpretation and its syntactic behavior: epistemics scope high (in particular higher than tense and aspect) and roots low, a fact (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   47 citations  
  • (1 other version)Logical necessity, physical necessity, ethics, and quantifiers.Richard Montague - 1960 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 3 (1-4):259 – 269.
    Some philosophers, for example Quine, doubt the possibility of jointly using modalities and quantification. Simple model-theoretic considerations, however, lead to a reconciliation of quantifiers with such modal concepts as logical, physical, and ethical necessity, and suggest a general class of modalities of which these are instances. A simple axiom system, analogous to the Lewis systems S1 —S5, is considered in connection with this class of modalities. The system proves to be complete, and its class of theorems decidable.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   50 citations  
  • “Ought” and Intensionality.Junhyo Lee - 2021 - Synthese 199:4621-4643.
    The syntactic structure of the deontic “ought” has been much debated in philosophy and linguistics. Schroeder argues that the deontic “ought” is syntactically ambiguous in the sense that it can be associated with either a control or raising construction. He distinguishes between deliberative and evaluative “ought”s and argues that the deliberative “ought” is control while the evaluative “ought” is raising. However, if there is a control sense of “ought,” it implies that there is a sense of “ought” in which the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • One Ought Too Many.Stephen Finlay & Justin Snedegar - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):102-124.
    Some philosophers hold that „ought‟ is ambiguous between a sense expressing a propositional operator and a sense expressing a relation between an agent and an action. We defend the opposing view that „ought‟ always expresses a propositional operator against Mark Schroeder‟s recent objections that it cannot adequately accommodate an ambiguity in „ought‟ sentences between evaluative and deliberative readings, predicting readings of sentences that are not actually available. We show how adopting an independently well-motivated contrastivist semantics for „ought‟, according to which (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • ‘Ought’ and Control.Matthew Chrisman - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):433-451.
    Ethical theorists often assume that the verb ‘ought’ means roughly ‘has an obligation’; however, this assumption is belied by the diversity of ‘flavours’ of ought-sentences in English. A natural response is that ‘ought’ is ambiguous. However, this response is incompatible with the standard treatment of ‘ought’ by theoretical semanticists, who classify ‘ought’ as a member of the family of modal verbs, which are treated uniformly as operators. To many ethical theorists, however, this popular treatment in linguistics seems to elide an (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • Whatever happened to deontic logic?Peter T. Geach - 1982 - Philosophia 11 (1-2):1-12.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  • Contrastive Semantics for Deontic Modals.Justin Snedegar - 2013 - In Martijn Blaauw (ed.), Contrastivism in philosophy. New York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group.
    This paper argues for contrastivism about the deontic modals, 'ought', 'must', and 'may'. A simple contrastivist semantics that predicts the desired entailment relations among these modals is offered.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Two Sorts of 'Ought's.I. L. Humberstone - 1971 - Analysis 32 (1):8 - 11.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • On the Treatment of Incomparability in Ordering Semantics and Premise Semantics.Eric Swanson - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (6):693-713.
    In his original semantics for counterfactuals, David Lewis presupposed that the ordering of worlds relevant to the evaluation of a counterfactual admitted no incomparability between worlds. He later came to abandon this assumption. But the approach to incomparability he endorsed makes counterintuitive predictions about a class of examples circumscribed in this paper. The same underlying problem is present in the theories of modals and conditionals developed by Bas van Fraassen, Frank Veltman, and Angelika Kratzer. I show how to reformulate all (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • The Irreducibility of Personal Obligation.Jacob Ross - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (3):307 - 323.
    It is argued that claims about personal obligation (of the form "s ought to 0") cannot be reduced to claims about impersonal obligation (of the form "it ought to be the case that p"). The most common attempts at such a reduction are shown to have unacceptable implications in cases involving a plurality of agents. It is then argued that similar problems will face any attempt to reduce personal obligation to impersonal obligation.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • The Significance of Sense: Meaning, Modality, and Morality.Gilbert Harman - 1973 - Philosophical Review 82 (2):235.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Iterated deontic modalities.Ruth Barcan Marcus - 1966 - Mind 75 (300):580-582.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Two kinds of agent-relativity.I. L. Humberstone - 1991 - Philosophical Quarterly 41 (163):144-166.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Personal and impersonal obligation.Jacob Ross - unknown
    How are claims about what people ought to do related to claims about what ought to be the case? That is, how are claims about of personal obligation, of the form s ought to ?, related to claims about impersonal obligation, of the form it ought to be the case that p? Many philosophers have held that the former type of claim can be reduced to the latter. In particular, they have held a view known as the Meinong-Chisholm Thesis, which, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations