- Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications.John MacFarlane - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The Irreducibility of Personal Obligation.Jacob Ross - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (3):307 - 323.details
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Reasons for Non-Agents.Eliot Watkins - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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On the Agent-Relativity of 'Ought'.Junhyo Lee - forthcoming - Analysis.details
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Verbal Disagreement and Semantic Plans.Alexander W. Kocurek - 2023 - Erkenntnis.details
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Structural Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter & Alex Worsnip - 2023 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Expressivism and moral independence.Elliot Salinger - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):136-152.details
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The Necessity of 'Need'.Ashley Shaw - 2023 - Ethics 133 (3):329-354.details
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Ought and agency.Daniel Skibra - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-40.details
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The Onus in 'Ought'.Mahrad Almotahari & Brian Rabern - 2023 - Analysis 83 (1):13-21.details
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The Fundamental Divisions in Ethics.Matthew Hammerton - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-24.details
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Thinking and being sure.Jeremy Goodman & Ben Holguín - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):634-654.details
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Consequentialism and the Agent’s Point of View.Nathan Robert Howard - 2022 - Ethics 132 (4):787-816.details
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On an Alleged Refutation of Ethical Egoism.John J. Tilley - 2023 - Journal of Value Inquiry 57 (3): 533-542.details
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Inheritance: Professor Procrastinate and the logic of obligation1.Kyle Blumberg & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (1):84-106.details
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Ethics and the Question of What to Do.Olle Risberg - 2023 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 25 (2).details
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Devoting ourselves to the manifestly unattainable.Nicholas Southwood & David Wiens - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):696-716.details
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The knowledge norm of apt practical reasoning.Andy Mueller - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):5395-5414.details
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“Ought” and Intensionality.Junhyo Lee - 2021 - Synthese 199:4621-4643.details
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The possibility of wildly unrealistic justice and the principle/proposal distinction.Nicholas Southwood - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (7):2403-2423.details
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Explicating the Concept of Epistemic Rationality.Anna-Maria A. Eder - 2021 - Synthese 199:4975–5000.details
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Editorial.Piotr Stalmaszczyk - 2017 - Studia Semiotyczne 31 (2):5-11.details
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Ought, Agents and Ambiguity that Matters.Joanna Klimczyk - 2017 - Studia Semiotyczne 31 (2):113-138.details
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Two puzzles about ability can.Malte Willer - 2020 - Linguistics and Philosophy 44 (3):551-586.details
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A puzzle about enkratic reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3177-3196.details
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Future Orientation on an Event-Relative Semantics for Modals.Daniel Skibra - 2019 - In Maggie Baird (ed.), NELS 49: Proceedings of the Forty-Ninth Annual Meeting of the North East Linguistic Society: Volume 3. GLSA, Dept. of Linguistics. pp. 149-162.details
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Evidential Probabilities and Credences.Anna-Maria Asunta Eder - 2023 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (1):1 -23.details
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Ascribing practical knowledge.Marija Jankovic - 2020 - Linguistics and Philosophy 43 (3):247-275.details
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The Game of Belief.Barry Maguire & Jack Woods - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):211-249.details
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The Nature of Desire.Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.) - 2017 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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A User’s Guide to Hybrid Tools.Caleb Perl - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):129-158.details
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Two Ways to Want?Ethan Jerzak - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (2):65-98.details
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Contractualism for Us As We Are.Nicholas Southwood - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):529-547.details
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Grading Modal Judgement.Nate Charlow - 2020 - Mind 129 (515):769-807.details
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Decision-theoretic relativity in deontic modality.Nate Charlow - 2018 - Linguistics and Philosophy 41 (3):251-287.details
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Two nondescriptivist views of normative and evaluative statements.Matthew Chrisman - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):405-424.details
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The Authority of Formality.Jack Woods - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13.details
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Believing the best: on doxastic partiality in friendship.Lindsay Crawford - 2017 - Synthese 196 (4):1575-1593.details
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‘Ought’ implies ‘can’ against epistemic deontologism: beyond doxastic involuntarism.Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2019 - Synthese 196 (4):1641-1656.details
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The "Guise of the Ought to Be": A Deontic View of the Intentionality of Desire.Federico Lauria - 2017 - In Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.), The Nature of Desire. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 352.details
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Categorical Norms and Convention‐Relativism about Epistemic Discourse.Cameron Boult - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):85-99.details
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On the agent-relativity of ‘ought’.Junhyo Lee - 2023 - Analysis 84 (3):483-492.details
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(1 other version)Forms of Luminosity: Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.David Elohim - 2017 - Dissertation, Arché, University of St Andrewsdetails
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(1 other version)Forms of Luminosity: Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.David Elohim - 2017details
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Clause-Type, Force, and Normative Judgment in the Semantics of Imperatives.Nate Charlow - 2018 - In Daniel Fogal, Daniel W. Harris & Matt Moss (eds.), New Work on Speech Acts. Oxford University Press. pp. 67–98.details
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Agency and Reasons in Epistemology.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherstdetails
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The Semantics of ‘What it’s like’ and the Nature of Consciousness.Daniel Stoljar - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1161-1198.details
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(1 other version)The Composite Nature of Epistemic Justification.Paul Silva - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1).details
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(1 other version)VI-B ayesian E xpressivism.Seth Yalcin - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2pt2):123-160.details
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If you justifiably believe that you ought to Φ, you ought to Φ.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1873-1895.details
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