_ Convention_ was immediately recognized as a major contribution to the subject and its significance has remained undiminished since its first publication in 1969. Lewis analyzes social conventions as regularities in the resolution of recurring coordination problems-situations characterized by interdependent decision processes in which common interests are at stake. Conventions are contrasted with other kinds of regularity, and conventions governing systems of communication are given special attention.

Classic analysis of the subject and the development of personal probability; one of the greatest controversies in modern statistcal thought.

The approach to decision theory floated in my 1965 book is reviewed (I), challenged in various related ways (II–V) and defended, firstad hoc (II–IV) and then by a general argument of Ellery Ells's (VI). Finally, causal decision theory (in a version sketched in VII) is exhibited as a special case of my 1965 theory, according to the Eellsian argument.

In past years, the traditional Bayesian theory of rational decision making, based on subjective calculations of expected utility, has faced powerful attack from philosophers such as David Lewis and Brian Skyrms, who advance an alternative causal decision theory. The test they present for the Bayesian is exemplified in the decision problem known as 'Newcomb's paradox' and in related decision problems and is held to support the prescriptions of the causal theory. As well as his conclusions, the concepts and methods of (...) Professor Eells introduces in the course of his analyses have extensive implications, not solely for probability theorists narrowly conceived, but for economists, statisticians and psychologists concerned with decision making and the employment of Bayesian principles. They and their students will, in addition, find the early chapters of great use as a background and introduction to the subject as a whole. (shrink)

"[This book] proposes new foundations for the Bayesian principle of rational action, and goes on to develop a new logic of desirability and probabtility."—Frederic Schick, _Journal of Philosophy_.

Newcomb's problem and similar cases show the need to incorporate causal distinctions into the theory of rational decision; the usual noncausal decision theory, though simpler, does not always give the right answers. I give my own version of causal decision theory, compare it with versions offered by several other authors, and suggest that the versions have more in common than meets the eye.

First published in 1982, Ellery Eells' original work on rational decision making had extensive implications for probability theorists, economists, statisticians and psychologists concerned with decision making and the employment of Bayesian principles. His analysis of the philosophical and psychological significance of Bayesian decision theories, causal decision theories and Newcomb's paradox continues to be influential in philosophy of science. His book is now revived for a new generation of readers and presented in a fresh twenty-first-century series livery, including a specially commissioned (...) preface written by Brian Skyrms, illuminating its continuing importance and relevance to philosophical enquiry. (shrink)

Sequel to Armendt 1986, ‘A Foundation for Causal Decision Theory.’ The representation theorem for causal decision theory is slightly revised, with the addition of a new restriction on lotteries and a new axiom (A7). The discussion gives some emphasis to the way in which appropriate K-partitions are characterized by relations found among the agent’s conditional preferences. The intended interpretation of conditional preference is one that embodies a sensitivity to the agent’s causal beliefs.

In recent years rational decision theories such as Richard Jeffrey's, which recommend that an agent act so as to maximize his conditional expected utility, have come under attack on the grounds that they are unable to adequately handle certain kinds of decision problems. Because of their general structure, these problems are sometimes known as "causal counterexamples" to the theories; well-known examples are Newcomb's problem, the Prisoner's Dilemma, and Fisher's smoking gene problem. Several versions of "causal decision theory" have been presented (...) by Gibbard and Harper, Brian Skyrms, and David Lewis; these theories are designed to deal with the counterexamples correctly. In this dissertation I show how an axiomatic treatment, including representation and uniqueness theorems, for Brian Skyrms' version of causal decision theory can be obtained from work done by Peter Fishburn on another theory; I partially reinterpret Fishhburn's formal theory and then show how the expected utility rule of Skyrms' theory can be derived from the rule of Fishburn's theory. With the interpretation I give of the formal theory, together with an account of conditional preference which I develop, I reply to criticisms which have been made of Skyrms' theory: It has been suggested that the theory is flawed because it requires the use of "K-partitions" of state descriptions which must be identified by judging the causal independence of the states from the possible actions and the causal relevance of the states to the problem. This is thought to be an undesirable dependence of rational decision theory upon an adequate theory of causal independence and causal relevance. I argue that this criticism is mistaken, and I state conditions which identify adequate K-partitions of state descriptions in terms of the behavior of those descriptions in the agent's prference system. Finally, I discuss the axioms of the formal theory under my interpretation of them, and I conclude that, properly understood, they are reasonable requirements for rational conditional preferences, so that the causal decision theory is well-founded. (shrink)