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  1. Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
    It is my view that one essential difference between persons and other creatures is to be found in the structure of a person's will. Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, men may also want to have certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are. Many animals appear to have the capacity for what I shall call "first-order desires" or "desires of the (...)
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  • The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail.Jonathan Haidt - 2001 - Psychological Review 108 (4):814-834.
    Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private reasoning done (...)
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  • Autonomy and Morality: A Self-Determination Theory Discussion of Ethics.Alexios Arvanitis - 2017 - New Ideas in Psychology 47:57-61.
    Kantian ethics is based on a metaphysical conception of autonomy that may seem difficult to reconcile with the empirically-based science of psychology. I argue that, although not formally developed, a Self-Determination Theory (SDT) perspective of ethics can broaden the field of Kantian-based moral psychology and specify what it means, motivationally, to have autonomy in the application of a moral norm. More specifically, I argue that this is possible when a moral norm is fully endorsed by the self through a process (...)
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  • The Sources of Normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196):384-394.
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  • Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior.John M. Doris - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):648-655.
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  • Identification and Wholeheartedness.Harry Frankfurt - 1987 - In Ferdinand David Schoeman (ed.), Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology. Cambridge University Press.
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  • The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect.Philippa Foot - 1967 - Oxford Review 5:5-15.
    One of the reasons why most of us feel puzzled about the problem of abortion is that we want, and do not want, to allow to the unborn child the rights that belong to adults and children. When we think of a baby about to be born it seems absurd to think that the next few minutes or even hours could make so radical a difference to its status; yet as we go back in the life of the fetus we (...)
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  • Reason and Emotion, Not Reason or Emotion in Moral Judgment.Leland F. Saunders - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations (3):1-16.
    One of the central questions in both metaethics and empirical moral psychology is whether moral judgments are the products of reason or emotions. This way of putting the question relies on an overly simplified view of reason and emotion as two fully independent cognitive faculties whose causal contributions to moral judgment can be cleanly separated. However, there is a significant body of evidence in the cognitive sciences that seriously undercuts this conception of reason and emotion, and supports the view that (...)
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  • Moral Emotions.Jesse J. Prinz & Shaun Nichols - 2010 - In John Michael Doris (ed.), The Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press. pp. 111.
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  • Putting the Self Into Self-Conscious Emotions: A Theoretical Model.Jessica L. Tracy & Richard W. Robins - 2004 - Psychological Inquiry 15 (2):103-125.
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