- (1 other version)Commitments, Reasons, and the Will.Ruth Chang - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8.details
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The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning.Samuel Asarnow - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):614-636.details
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Reducing Reasons.Matthew Silverstein - 2016 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 10 (1):1-22.details
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(1 other version)Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.details
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Intending.Donald Davidson - 1978 - Philosophy of History and Action 11:41-60.details
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The Humean Theory of Motivation Reformulated and Defended.Neil Sinhababu - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (4):465-500.details
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The Abductive Case for Humeanism over Quasi-Perceptual Theories of Desire.Derek Clayton Baker - 2014 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8 (2):1-29.details
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Favoring.Antti Kauppinen - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1953-1971.details
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Perception and the Rational Force of Desire.Karl Schafer - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (5):258-281.details
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Still waiting for a plausible Humean theory of reasons.Nicholas Shackel - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):607-633.details
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Grounding practical normativity: going hybrid.Ruth Chang - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):163-187.details
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Things That Make Things Reasonable.John Gibbons - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):335-361.details
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What is a Reason to Act?Kieran Setiya - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):221-235.details
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(1 other version)Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational action: studies in philosophy and social science. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.details
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The majesty of reason.Simon Blackburn - 2010 - Philosophy 85 (1):5-27.details
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Knowing what one wants.Krista Lawlor - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):47-75.details
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Intention, practical rationality, and self‐governance.Michael Bratman - 2009 - Ethics 119 (3):411-443.details
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(1 other version)In defense of future tuesday indifference: Ideally coherent eccentrics and the contingency of what matters.Sharon Street - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):273-298.details
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Reasons as Evidence.Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:215-42.details
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Do the desires of rational agents converge?David Sobel - 1999 - Analysis 59 (3):137–147.details
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Agency, shmagency: Why normativity won't come from what is constitutive of action.David Enoch - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (2):169-198.details
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Defeasible Reasoning.John L. Pollock - 1987 - Cognitive Science 11 (4):481-518.details
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Moral cognitivism and motivation.Sigrun Svavarsdóttir - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (2):161-219.details
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Pain for objectivists: The case of matters of mere taste.David Sobel - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (4):437 - 457.details
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(2 other versions)Internal reasons.Michael Smith - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):109-131.details
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Means-end coherence, stringency, and subjective reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (2):223 - 248.details
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(1 other version)What Happens When Someone Acts?J. David Velleman - 1992 - Mind 101 (403):461-481.details
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Skepticism about practical reason.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):5-25.details
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Arational actions.Rosalind Hursthouse - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):57-68.details
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Why idealize?David Enoch - 2005 - Ethics 115 (4):759-787.details
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(1 other version)Constructivism about reasons.Sharon Street - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3:207-45.details
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Practical rationality is a problem in the philosophy of mind.Timothy Schroeder - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):394-409.details
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Reasons and Causes.Kieran Setiya - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):129-157.details
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(2 other versions)Reasons : Explanatory and normative.Joseph Raz - 2009 - In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New essays on the explanation of action. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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Non-monotonic inference.Keith Frankish - 2005 - In Keith Brown (ed.), Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics. Elsevier.details
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Reasons and that‐clauses.James Pryor - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):217-244.details
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Desiring the bad: An essay in moral psychology.Michael Stocker - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (12):738-753.details
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(1 other version)Why be An Internalist about Reasons?Julia Markovits - 2011 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 6: Volume 6. Oxford University Press.details
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Agency, Reason, and the Good.Joseph Raz - 1999 - In Engaging Reason. International Phenomenological Society.details
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Reason and motivation: the wrong distinction?S. L. Hurley - 2001 - Analysis 61 (2):151-155.details
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Reasons as explanations.John Brunero - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):805-824.details
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(1 other version)Why be an Internalist about Reasons?Julia Markovits - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:255.details
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The authority of desire.Dennis W. Stampe - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (July):335-81.details
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(2 other versions)Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Studia Logica 48 (2):260-261.details
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(1 other version)Morality as consistency in living: Korsgaard’s Kantian lectures.Allan Gibbard - 1999 - Ethics 110 (1):140-164.details
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Internal Reasons and the Conditional Fallacy.Robert N. Johnson - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (194):53-72.details
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Internal reasons and the motivating intuition.Julia Markovits - 2010 - In Michael S. Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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(1 other version)7. What Happens When Someone Acts?J. Velleman - 1993 - In John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (eds.), Perspectives on moral responsibility. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. pp. 188-210.details
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Davidson on justification and rationalization.Lilian O'brien - 2006 - Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 37:171-178.details
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For Badness' Sake.David Sussman - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (11):613-628.details
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