- Why Is a Valid Inference a Good Inference?Sinan Dogramaci - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):61-96.details
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An Argument for Uniqueness About Evidential Support.Sinan Dogramaci & Sophie Horowitz - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):130-147.details
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What is Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):167-196.details
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No, We Cannot.Bart Streumer - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (4):537-546.details
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The Fragility of Common Knowledge.Cédric Paternotte - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (3):451-472.details
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Reasoning From Inconsistency to Consistency.P. N. Johnson-Laird, Vittorio Girotto & Paolo Legrenzi - 2004 - Psychological Review 111 (3):640-661.details
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Belief, Credence, and the Preface Paradox.Alex Worsnip - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):549-562.details
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Making Up Your Mind: How Language Enables Self‐Knowledge, Self‐Knowability and Personhood.Philip Pettit - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):3-26.details
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How I learned to stop worrying and love probability 1.Daniel Greco - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):179-201.details
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Rebutting and undercutting in mathematics.Kenny Easwaran - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):146-162.details
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Against the Taking Condition.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):314-331.details
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Memory and epistemic conservatism.Matthew McGrath - 2007 - Synthese 157 (1):1-24.details
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Cognitive Penetrability, Rationality and Restricted Simulation.Stephen Stich & Shaun Nichols - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (3-4):297-326.details
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Don’t stop believing.Jennifer Rose Carr - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):744-766.details
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Can I Only Intend My Own Actions?Luca Ferrero - 2013 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford studies in agency and responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. (1) 70-94.details
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Epistemic Reasons II: Basing.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (7):377-389.details
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Preferences and Positivist Methodology in Economics.Christopher Clarke - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (2):192-212.details
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Frege and Carnap on the normativity of logic.Florian Steinberger - 2017 - Synthese 194 (1):143-162.details
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Prospects for an Expressivist Theory of Meaning.Nate Charlow - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15:1-43.details
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Cognitive Mobile Homes.Daniel Greco - 2017 - Mind 126 (501):93-121.details
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The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.details
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Reliabilism and the Suspension of Belief.Weng Hong Tang - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):362-377.details
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The Philosophy of Argument.J. Anthony Blair - unknowndetails
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The “Logic” of Informal Logic.J. Anthony Blair - unknowndetails
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Inferential Justification and the Transparency of Belief.David James Barnett - 2016 - Noûs 50 (1):184-212.details
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Making Ranking Theory Useful for Psychology of Reasoning.Niels Skovgaard Olsen - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Konstanzdetails
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Solving Frege's puzzle.Richard Heck - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (1-2):728-732.details
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Chains of Inferences and the New Paradigm in the Psychology of Reasoning.Ulf Hlobil - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):1-16.details
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Duty and knowledge.Yoaav Isaacs - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):95-110.details
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Intuitive And Reflective Responses In Philosophy.Nick Byrd - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Coloradodetails
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The Ramsey test revisited.Sten Lindström & Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz - 1992 - Theoria 58 (2-3):131-182.details
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The Lottery Paradox and Our Epistemic Goal.Igor Douven - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):204-225.details
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Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy. [REVIEW]David Christensen - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):754-767.details
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Uncertainty Without All the Doubt.Aaron Norby - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (1):70-94.details
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Intuitive and reflective inferences.Hugo Mercier & Dan Sperber - 2009 - In Jonathan St B. T. Evans & Keith Frankish (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond. Oxford University Press. pp. 149--170.details
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Interrogatives and Uncontrollable Abductions.Christopher Hookaway - 2005 - Semiotica 2005 (153 - 1/4):101-115.details
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The erotetic theory of reasoning: Bridges between formal semantics and the psychology of deductive inference.Philipp Koralus & Salvador Mascarenhas - 2013 - Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):312-365.details
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What is an inference.Ram Neta - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):388-407.details
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Coherence, Probability and Explanation.William Roche & Michael Schippers - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (4):821-828.details
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The Price of Inscrutability.J. R. G. Williams - 2008 - Noûs 42 (4):600 - 641.details
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Intentionality and partial belief.Weng Hong Tang - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7).details
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Success Semantics and Partial Belief.Weng Hong Tang - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Research 39:17-22.details
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Moorean Arguments and Moral Revisionism.Tristram McPherson - 2009 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2):1-25.details
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Strict-Choice Validities: A Note on a Familiar Pluralism.Jc Beall - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S2):301-307.details
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Prediction, Authority, and Entitlement in Shared Activity.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):626-652.details
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Against Boghossian, Wright and Broome on inference.Ulf Hlobil - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):419-429.details
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Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief.Miriam Schoenfield - 2014 - Noûs 48 (2):193-218.details
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Scientific Inference and Ordinary Cognition: Fodor on Holism and Cognitive Architecture.Tim Fuller & Richard Samuels - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (2):201-237.details
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The Impossibility of Skepticism.Daniel Greco - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (3):317-358.details
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Knowledge, Justification and Normative Coincidence1.Martin Smith - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):273-295.details
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