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Switch to: Citations
References in:
Foundationalism, epistemic dependence, and defeasibility
Synthese 55 (1):119 - 139 (1983)
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Epistemological foundationalism is best conceived as a thesis about the structure of a body of knowledge. Although its major proponents have been non-skeptics, the thesis may be construed as neutral with respect to skepticism. A modest version of epistemological foundationalism so construed might be formulated as the view that necessarily, if one has any knowledge, one has some direct knowledge, i.e., knowledge not based on other knowledge or beliefs one has, and any further knowledge one has is at least in (...) |
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Many epistemologists have been interested in justification because of its presumed close relationship to knowledge. This relationship is intended to be ... |
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Rich with historical and cultural value, these works are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions. |
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Since Edmund L. Gettier reminded us recently of a certain important inadequacy of the traditional analysis of "S knows that p," several attempts have been made to correct that analysis. In this paper I shall offer still another analysis (or a sketch of an analysis) of "S knows that p," one which will avert Gettier's problem. My concern will be with knowledge of empirical propositions only, since I think that the traditional analysis is adequate for knowledge of nonempirical truths. |
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Bertrand Russell is concerned in this book with the foundations of knowledge. He approaches his subject through a discussion of language, the relationships of truth to experience and an investigation into how knowledge of the structure of language helps our understanding of the structure of the world. This edition includes a new introduction by Thomas Baldwin, Clare College, Cambridge. |
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This paper presents a partial analysis of perceptual knowledge, an analysis that will, I hope, lay a foundation for a general theory of knowing. Like an earlier theory I proposed, the envisaged theory would seek to explicate the concept of knowledge by reference to the causal processes that produce (or sustain) belief. Unlike the earlier theory, however, it would abandon the requirement that a knower's belief that p be causally connected with the fact, or state of affairs, that p. |
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Epistemological foundationalism has typically been thought to hold that in order to account for human knowledge we must countenance the direct Justification of some specific kind of beliefs, such as one's beliefs to the effect that one is having a certain sensation. How else, it may be thought, can one analyse Justification without confronting an infinite regress or a vicious circle? I believe that this conception of foundationalism has been so influential that most foundationalists and nearly all their critics have (...) |
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It is no part of my purpose in this paper to advocate Minimal Foundationalism. In fact I believe there to be strong objections to any form of foundationalism, and I feel that some kind of coherence or contextualist theory will provide a more adequate general orientation in epistemology. Will and Lehrer are to be commended for providing, in their different ways, important insights into some possible ways of developing a nonfoundationalist epistemology. Nevertheless if foundationalism is to be successfully disposed of (...) |
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Princeton University Press, 1974. This book is out of print, but can be downloaded as a pdf file (5 MB). |
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In this paper I would like to explore Sellars' answers to these general epistemological questions in order to get clear about the sense in which he can be said to be in the empiricist tradition broadly construed and to ascertain what resources he has available to demarcate science from other (rationally acceptable or unacceptable) forms of inquiry. My contention will be that to the degree that one moves away from the notion of basic empirical proposition in the strong sense it (...) |
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