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  1. Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?David Premack & G. Woodruff - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (4):515-629.
    An individual has a theory of mind if he imputes mental states to himself and others. A system of inferences of this kind is properly viewed as a theory because such states are not directly observable, and the system can be used to make predictions about the behavior of others. As to the mental states the chimpanzee may infer, consider those inferred by our own species, for example, purpose or intention, as well as knowledge, belief, thinking, doubt, guessing, pretending, liking, (...)
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  • We don't need a microscope to explore the chimpanzee's mind.Daniel J. Povinelli & Jennifer Vonk - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (1):1-28.
    The question of whether chimpanzees, like humans, reason about unobservable mental states remains highly controversial. On one account, chimpanzees are seen as possessing a psychological system for social cognition that represents and reasons about behaviors alone. A competing account allows that the chimpanzee's social cognition system additionally construes the behaviors it represents in terms of mental states. Because the range of behaviors that each of the two systems can generate is not currently known, and because the latter system depends upon (...)
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  • Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?David Premack & Guy Woodruff - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (4):515-526.
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  • Philosophical investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein & G. E. M. Anscombe - 1953 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 161:124-124.
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  • Machiavellian Intelligence: Social Expertise and the Evolution of Intellect in Monkeys, Apes, and Humans.Richard W. Byrne & Andrew Whiten - 1990 - Behavior and Philosophy 18 (1):73-75.
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  • Wittgenstein Today.Danièle Moyal-Sharrock - 2016 - Wittgenstein-Studien 7 (1):1-14.
    In this paper,¹ I briefly take stock of Wittgenstein’s contribution to philosophy and some other disciplines. Surveying some of the ways in which he emphasizes the primacy of action, together with the superfluity - in basic cases - of propositions and cognition, in his account of mind, language and action, I suggest that, far from being a maverick philosopher, Wittgenstein’s pioneering ’enactivism’ puts him in the mainstream of philosophy today. I mention the importance of his thought for the philosophy of (...)
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  • The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature.Steven Pinker - 2002 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 66 (4):765-767.
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  • Animal Mindreading: A Defense of Optimistic Agnosticism.Robert W. Lurz, Sharisse Kanet & Carla Krachun - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (4):428-454.
    We recommend the attitude of optimistic agnosticism toward animal mindreading: suspending acceptance until tests succeed in overcoming Povinelli's problem, and being optimistic about the feasibility of such tests. Fletcher and Carruthers argue for sufficient reasons to accept animal mindreading; we find their arguments unconvincing. Points they raise against the behavior-reading theory apply equally to mindreading theory, and their claims of greater parsimony are unfounded. Premature acceptance of mindreading could inhibit the search for innovative ways to overcome longstanding methodological problems. Optimistic (...)
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  • Do chimpanzees know what others see - or only what they are looking at?Michael Tomasello & Josep Call - 2006 - In Susan Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press. pp. 371-384.
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  • Can chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) discriminate appearance from reality?Carla Krachun, Josep Call & Michael Tomasello - 2009 - Cognition 112 (3):435-450.
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  • Chimpanzees deceive a human competitor by hiding.Brian Hare, Josep Call & Michael Tomasello - 2006 - Cognition 101 (3):495-514.
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  • If chimpanzees are mindreaders, could behavioral science tell? Toward a solution of the logical problem.Robert Lurz - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (3):305-328.
    There is a persistent methodological problem in primate mindreading research, dubbed the 'logical problem,' over how to determine experimentally whether chimpanzees are mindreaders or just clever behavior-readers of a certain sort. The problem has persisted long enough that some researchers have concluded that it is intractable. The logical problem, I argue, is tractable but only with experimental protocols that are fundamentally different from those that have been currently used or suggested. In the first section, I describe what the logical problem (...)
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  • How Could We Know Whether Nonhuman Primates Understand Others’ Internal Goals and Intentions? Solving Povinelli’s Problem.Robert W. Lurz & Carla Krachun - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):449-481.
    A persistent methodological problem in primate social cognition research has been how to determine experimentally whether primates represent the internal goals of other agents or just the external goals of their actions. This is an instance of Daniel Povinelli’s more general challenge that no experimental protocol currently used in the field is capable of distinguishing genuine mindreading animals from their complementary behavior-reading counterparts. We argue that current methods used to test for internal-goal attribution in primates do not solve Povinelli’s problem. (...)
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  • We don't need a microscope to explore the chimpanzee's mind.Daniel J. Povinelli & Jennifer Vonk - 2006 - In Susan Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press. pp. 1-28.
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  • Toward a Science of Other Minds: Escaping the Argument by Analogy.Daniel J. Povinelli, Jesse M. Bering & Steve Giambrone - 2000 - Cognitive Science 24 (3):509-541.
    Since Darwin, the idea of psychological continuity between humans and other animals has dominated theory and research in investigating the minds of other species. Indeed, the field of comparative psychology was founded on two assumptions. First, it was assumed that introspection could provide humans with reliable knowledge about the causal connection between specific mental states and specific behaviors. Second, it was assumed that in those cases in which other species exhibited behaviors similar to our own, similar psychological causes were at (...)
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  • Wittgenstein Today.Danièle Moyal-Sharrock - 2016 - Wittgenstein-Studien 7 (1):1-14.
    In this paper,¹ I briefly take stock of Wittgenstein’s contribution to philosophy and some other disciplines. Surveying some of the ways in which he emphasizes the primacy of action, together with the superfluity - in basic cases - of propositions and cognition, in his account of mind, language and action, I suggest that, far from being a maverick philosopher, Wittgenstein’s pioneering ’enactivism’ puts him in the mainstream of philosophy today. I mention the importance of his thought for the philosophy of (...)
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  • Belief Attribution in Animals: On How to Move Forward Conceptually and Empirically. [REVIEW]Robert W. Lurz - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (1):19-59.
    There is considerable debate in comparative psychology and philosophy over whether nonhuman animals can attribute beliefs. The empirical studies that suggest that they can are shown to be inconclusive, and the main philosophical and empirical arguments that purport to show they cannot are shown to be invalid or weak. What is needed to move the debate and the field forward, it is argued, is a fundamentally new experimental protocol for testing belief attribution in animals, one capable of distinguishing genuine belief-attributing (...)
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  • Understanding children's and adults' limitations in mental state reasoning.Paul Bloom - 2004 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (6):255-260.
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  • Smoke and mirrors: Testing the scope of chimpanzees’ appearance–reality understanding.Carla Krachun, Robert Lurz, Jamie L. Russell & William D. Hopkins - 2016 - Cognition 150 (C):53-67.
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  • Précis of How monkeys see the world.Dorothy L. Cheney & Robert M. Seyfarth - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):135-147.
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  • Characterizing the mind of another species.Dorothy L. Cheney & Robert M. Seyfarth - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):172-182.
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  • Back to the rough ground and into the hurly-burly Why cognitive ethology needs ‘Wittgenstein’s razor’.Louise Barrett - 2015 - In Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Volker Munz & Annalisa Coliva (eds.), Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 299-316.
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  • A Better Kind of Continuity.Louise Barrett - 2015 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (S1):28-49.
    Discussions of what minds are and what they do is a contentious issue. This is particularly so when considering non‐human animals, for here the questions become: do they have minds at all? And if so, what kinds of minds are they? Alternatives to Cartesian or computational models of mind open up a whole new space of possibility for how we should conceive of animal minds, while also highlighting how Skinner's pragmatist‐inspired radical behaviourism has much more to offer than most researchers (...)
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  • Enactivism, from a Wittgensteinian Point of View.Daniel D. Hutto - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (3):281-302.
    Enactivists seek to revolutionize the new sciences of the mind. In doing so, they promote adopting a thoroughly anti-intellectualist starting point, one that sees mentality as rooted in engaged, embodied activity as opposed to detached forms of thought. In advocating the so-called embodied turn, enactivists touch on recurrent themes of central importance in Wittgenstein's later philosophy. More than this, today's enactivists characterize the nature of minds and how they fundamentally relate to the world in ways that not only echo but (...)
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  • Wittgenstein's Razor: The Cutting Edge of Enactivism.Danièle Moyal-Sharrock - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (3):263-280.
    If I had to say what the single most important contribution Wittgenstein made to philosophy was, it would be to have revived the animal in us: the animal that is there in every fiber of our human being, and therefore also in our thinking and reasoning. This means, his pushing us to realize that we are animals not only genealogically, but as evolved human beings—whether neonate, or language-possessing, civilized, law-abiding, fully fledged adults. Constitutionally, and in everything we do, still fundamentally (...)
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  • Against theory of mind.Ivan Leudar & Alan Costall (eds.) - 2009 - New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
    The "theory of mind" framework has been the fastest growing body of empirical research in contemporary psychology. It has given rise to a range of positions on what it takes to relate to others as intentional beings. This book brings together disparate strands of ToM research, lays out historical roots of the idea, and indicates better alternatives.
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  • Tom : A critical commentary continued.Wes Sharrock & Jeff Coulter - 2009 - In Ivan Leudar & Alan Costall (eds.), Against theory of mind. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
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  • Machiavellian Intelligence : Social Expertise and the Evolution of Intellect in Monkeys, Apes, and Humans.Richard W. Byrne & Andrew Whiten - 1988 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 179 (4):627-628.
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  • Theory of mind : The madness behind the method.Ivan Leudar & Alan Costall - 2009 - In Ivan Leudar & Alan Costall (eds.), Against theory of mind. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
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