Penser l'homme et la folie : dans ce recueil d'études où s'est condensée, au fil des dernières années, sa réflexion, Henri Maldiney se propose de penser ensemble l'énigme de l'humanité et l'énigme de la " catastrophe " qui survient à certains d'entre nous. Double décentrement de la pensée, qui la met à la fois hors de l'anthropologie, fût-elle philosophique, et de son envers dans les théories psycho-pathologiques. Double décentrement où s'éprouvent donc au mieux la tradition philosophique - et en particulier (...) celle qui est issue de Heidegger - et la tradition de la Daseinsanalyse et de la Schicksalsanalyse, telle qu'elle est représentée par Binswanger, Straus, Minkiwski, Von Weizsäcker et Szondi. Dans une démarche authentiquement phénoménologique, où il s'agit de retourner à la " chose même " de l'humain et de la folie, de penser en va-et-vient de l'énigme à penser à ce qui en a été dit, Henri Maldiney dégage, par sa conception toute nouvelle de la transpossibilité et de la transpassibilité, une " compréhension " globale du phénomène humain qui le rend moins intraitable que par le passé. Le " séisme " de la folie, montre-t-il, vient d'un énigmatique court-circuit de la transpossibilité et de la transpassibilité, qui est seul propre à les mettre véritablement en relief comme la dimension profonde et cachée de notre expérience : celle de l' "événement " ou de l'émergence du nouveau, de la surprise de l'inattendu. La transpassiblité est une " possibilité " qui nous excède, en ce qu'elle fonde toute possibilité pour nous d'exister, parce qu'elle est en deçà de tout projet, transpossiblité de l'accueil - et de l'accueil transpassible -, y compris de l'accueil par nous-mêmes, de nous-mêmes. " Le réel -répète Henri Maldiney comme un leitmotiv qui traverse tout l'ouvrage -, est toujours ce qu'on n'attendait pas". (shrink)

Christian Lotz shows in this book that Husserl's Phenomenology and its key concept--subjectivity--is based on a concrete anthropological structure, such as self-affection and the bodily experience of the other. The analysis of the sensual sphere and the lived Body forces Husserl to an ongoing correction of his strong methodological assumptions. Subjectivity turns out to be an ambivalent phenomenon, as the subject is unable to fully present itself to itself, and therefore is forced to allow for a fundamental non-transparency in itself.

... Let me start my investigation by taking a brief look at the way in which self-awareness is expressed linguistically, as in the sentences "I am tired" or ...

Merleau-Ponty developed a phenomenology of the body that promoted a non-dualistic account of human existence. In this paper I intend to develop Merleau-Ponty's analysis further by questioning his account of the body on the issues of body perception, and the body's relation to its environment. To clarify these issues I draw from both the phenomenological tradition and recent psychological investigations.

The theory of hyletic data has been criticized and dismissed a number of times since Edmund Husserl proposed it early in this century. This rejection of Husserl's theory has been part of a larger, wholesale critique of the traditional notion of sensation in which theories of sensation have been displaced by theories of perception.

This paper reflects on certain working assumptions of Husserlian phenomenological practice, using an investigation of interkinaesthetic affectivity as an example. I suggest that in some cases, Husserl’s “stratificational” model should be replaced with the notion of the ongoing dynamic efficacy of mutually co-founding, interpenetrating, and interfunctioning moments-“through”-which experience proceeds. Finally, I relate the latter model to Patočka’s call for a genuine integration of the three movements of embodied human life.

Given its transcendental impulse, Husserl's analysis of the lived body has been considered by many phenomenologists and by most Husserl scholars as unable to account for our everyday intimate relationship with our own embodied self and with other embodied selves. Contrary to such a widespread contention, the author sets out to show that Husserl's phenomenology contains unknown descriptive resources which provide a detailed account of our individual and communitarian lived body at a transcendental level proper.

Edmund Husserl published in his lifetime only works which represent a compilation of individual phenomenological analyses or which have the character of an introduction to his phenomenology. It always made him uneasy that he did not publish any systematic work in phenomenology. In his later years, from the beginning of the 1920s, he tried several times to write such a work, but in vain. The masterplan for this work, which his assistant Eugen Fink sketched out in 1930/31 is preserved. According (...) to this plan, the Phänomenologie der Instinkte has attracted very little attention in Husserl studies until now, takes a central and fundamental position in the whole system of his mature transcendental phenomenology. In this book, Nam-In Lee reconstructs the Phänomenologie der Instinkte on the basis of the already published works and, above all, of the unpublished manuscripts of Husserl. Moreover, he draws out the consequences which the Phänomenologie der Instinkte bears for the whole system of phenomenology. Transcendental phenomenology, in its form of a genetic phenomenology of which the Phänomenologie der Instinkte is the concluding part, can, according to him, no longer be considered as one-sided philosophy of consciousness in the traditional sense, as it has often been thought of hitherto. Thus, the author presents a new face of phenomenology; one which has scarcely been noticed in the field of Husserl studies until now. (shrink)

The “phenomenological” method according to Emmanuel Lévinas consists of two steps: first, reducing the said (le dit) to the saying (le dire); and second, “hyperbole” in his own words. Reducing the said to the saying, in itself, means in this context of the methodology a method to escape from ontology and cognitive philosophy, and to discover the dimension of inter-human facticity. In the second step of “hyperbole”, Lévinas outlines the horizon of this inter-human facticity as that of affectivity. In this (...) horizon (of ethics), the self is defined as phenomena containing the affectivity related to the two extreme situations: personal (physical and mental) suffering and that of the other. Ultimately, the death of the other person and a person’s own possible death limit the internal structure of this horizon. (shrink)

This paper consists of critical interrogations and speculative reflections on the ethical bearings of Emmanuel Levinas’ resourceful and intricate views on death, otherness, and time, while illustrating the nature of the philosophical challenges confronting the interpreters of his prolific writings, and investigating their intellectual, moral and political prolongations. This line of inquiry probes the multiple aspects of ethical responsibility that are entailed by the “face-to-face” relation with the other, and their potential theoretical extensions in meditations on the notion of “visage”, (...) particularly in the context of concrete practices and everyday demands. Moreover, this study offers selective analytic parallels with Martin Heidegger’s thoughts on mortality, along with associated pointers by Jean-Paul Sartre, in view of further elucidating the ethical implications of Levinas’ thinking, and exploring their tacit entanglements with politics. (shrink)

This paper thematizes the operative kinaesthetic style of world-experiencing life by turning to the ongoing how of our habitual bodily comportment: to our deeply sedimented way(s) of making a body; to schematic inner vectors or tendencies toward movement that persist as bodily ghost gestures even if one is not making the larger, visible gestures they imply; and to inadvertent isometrics, i.e., persisting patterns of trying, bracing, freezing, etc. All such micromovements witness to our sociality insofar as they are not only (...) socially shaped, but perpetuate certain styles of intercorporeal interaction and sustain certain modes of responsivity. Reactivating the sediment -- retrieving the tacit choreography of everyday life from its anonymity and sensing our ongoing ways of living out the legacy of our communal body -- not only allows one''s individual bodily style to shift, but can open new possibilities for healthy interkinaesthetic comportment. Such work can thus contribute to an embodied ethics in both theory and practice. (shrink)

This is an unusual volume. During his periods of study with Ed mund Husserl - first from I924 1. 0 I926, then from I93I to I932 - Dorion Cairns had become imnlensely impressed with the stri king philosophical quality of Husserl's conversations with his students and co-workers. Not unlike his daily writing (five to six hours a day was not uncommon, as Husserl reports herein, the nature of which was a continuous searching, reassessing, modi fying, advancing and even rejecting of (...) former views), Husserl's conversations, especially evidenced from Cairns's record, were remarkable for their depth and probing character. Because of this, and because of the importaIlt light they threw on Husserl's written and published works, Cairns had early resolved to set down in writing, as accurately as possible, the details of these conversations. Largely prompted by the questions and concerns of his students, including Cairns, the present Conversations (from the second period, I93I-I932, except for the initial conversation) provide a significant, intriguing, and always fascinating insight into both the issues which were prominent to Husserl at this time, and the way he had come to view the systematic and historical placement of his own earlier studies. Cairns had often insisted - principally in his remarkable lec 1 tures at the Graduate Faculty of the New School - that attaining a fair and accurate view of Husserl's enormously rich and complex 1 Cairns's lectures between 1956 and 1964 are especially important. (shrink)

Addressing the matter of attention from a phenomenological perspective as it bears on the problem of becoming aware, I draw on Edmund Husserl''s analyses and distinctions that mark his genetic phenomenology. I describe several experiential levels of affective force and modes of attentiveness, ranging from what I call dispositional orientation and passive discernment to so-called higher levels of attentiveness in cognitive interest, judicative objectivation, and conceptualization. These modes of attentiveness can be understood as motivating a still more active mode of (...) reflective attention, i.e., philosophical attentiveness, and to this extent, even it would be subject to varying influences of affection. What role, if any, does affection play in a peculiar kind of reflective attention that is phenomenological? I conclude by briefly considering phenomenological reflective attentiveness and its relation to affection. (shrink)

Das vorliegende Buch enthaJt den Text einer Dissertation, die im Sommer-Semester 1970 von der Philosophischen Fakultat der Universitat Freiburg i. Br. angenommen wurde. An dieser Stelle mochte ich meinem Lehrer, Herrn Prof. Dr. Werner Marx, fUr die stete Forderung meiner Arbeit meinen zu­ tiefst empfundenen Dank aussprechen. Herrn Prof. Dr. H. L. Van Breda, O. F. M., Direktor des Husserl-Archivs zu Lowen, bin ich auch fUr seine Unterstutzung und die Erlaubnis, aus unver­ offentlichten Manuskripten Husserls zitieren zu durfen, besonders zu (...) Dank verpflichtet. Dank schulde ich auch dem "Deutschen Akademischen Austauschdienst" fur die Gewahrung des Stipen­ diums, das die Abfassung dieser Arbeit ermoglichte. EINLEITUNG § I. Die "Reprrisentationstheorie" und das Form-Inhalt-Modell Die Repdisentationstheorie Husserls, die er zum ersten Mal in LUI formulierte, ist moglicherweise nicht die Grundidee, wohl aber eine der wichtigsten Hypothesen seiner erst en phanomeno­ logischen Untersuchungen. Sie muBte zwar mit der Entdeckung der transzendentalen Subjektivitat und der transzendentalen Konstitution einen neuen Sinn annehmen, indessen blieb der Hauptgedanke dabei stets derselbe: die Gegenstande unserer Er­ kenntnis stellen sich selbst aufgrund intuitiver Inhalte im Erleb­ nisstrom des BewuBtseins dar, wobei der intuitive Inhalt erst mittels einer subjektiv vollzogenen Auffassungssynthese zu einem 2 (den Gegenstand) darstellenden wird. Schon auf der untersten Erkenntnisstufe ist der intuitive Inhalt der bloBe Bestand an sinnlichen Merkmalen, welche "auBer der Auffassung" bloB "Empfindungsdaten" sind. (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Zur Genese des Selbstbewußtseins" verfügbar.

In den Cartesianischen Meditationen von Edmund Husserl heißt es: "Der Andere ist Spiegelung meiner selbst und doch nicht eigentlich Spiegelung." . Man kann den Satz nicht nur als einen Reflex der Leibniz-Lektüre Husserls auslegen, sondern ihn auch als sachlichen Hinweis auf die Erfahrung der Spiegelung verstehen. Meine Überlegungen beschränken sich auf eine Grundskizze einer Phänomenologie der Spiegelerfahrung, die die konkrete Fremderfahrung, also abgesehen von ihrer Grundlegungsdimension, genauer beleuchten hilft. Man kann die ursprüngliche Assoziation, die Husserl unter dem Titel "Paarung" anführt, (...) im Sinne einer leiblichen Spiegelung interpretieren. Mit der Bestimmung einer solchen unmittelbaren leiblichen "Übereinkunft" wäre ein erster rudimentärer Begriff des Mitmachens gewonnen, bei dessen Bestimmung kognitive Muster vermieden werden können. Die passive Fremderfahrung läßt sich verstehen als eine passive Einigung der Leiber und Bewegungssysteme, die spiegelverkehrt verläuft. Dieser Aufweis kann nicht nur helfen kann, den psychologischen Begriff der Nachahmung phänomenologisch zur reinterpretieren, sondern auch als Voraussetzung jeder intersubjektiven Erfahrung angesehen werden. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Band der Phaenomenologica bringt den durch gesehenen, im wesentlichen unveränderten Text einer Disserta tion, die im Sommersemester 1963 von der Philosophischen Fakultät der Universität Köln angenommen wurde. Ich nehme dieses Vorwort zum Anlaß, noch einmal Herrn Professor Dr. Ludwig Landgrebe für die Förderung zu danken, die die vorliegende Arbeit durch ihn erfahren hat. Gedankt sei auch dem Direktor des Husserl-Archives zu Louvain, Herrn Professor Dr. Dr. h. c. H. L. van Breda, für die freundliche Erlaubnis, aus unveröffentlichten Manuskripten (...) zu zitieren. Köln, im Mai 1964 U. c. INHALTSVERZEICHN 1S Einleitung I 1. TEIL. ALLGEMEINE VORZEICHNUNG DES PROBLEMS DER 7 TRANSZENDENTALEN KONSTITUTION DES RAUMES I. Abschnitt: Die Rolle der Konstitutionsproblematik ~m Rahmen der allgemeinen Phänomenologie 9 § I. Zur Einführung: Der Husserlsche Weltbegriff 9 § 2. Die Vorgegebenheit der Welt und das ontische Apriori I4 § 3. Der Rückgang zur transzendentalen Subjektivität. Transzendentale Subjektivität und Intentionalität I9 § 4. Die Idee der Intentionalanalyse und das Problem des transzendentalen Leitfadens 22 § 5. Das Wesen als transzendentaler Leitfaden 27 § 6. Intentionalanalyse und Konstitution. Das konsti- tive Apriori 32 2. Abschnitt: Das Apriori der Raum-Zeitlichkeit und die regionale Ontologie des Dinges 35 § 7. Zur Begründung des Husserlschen Ansatzes der Theorie der Raumkonstitution an der regionalen - tologie des Dinges 35 § 8. Die Schichtung im regionalen Apriori des Dinges 40 § 9. Die Möglichkeit einer nicht mathematischen Wissen schaft vom Raume. (shrink)