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Phenomenal Conservatism, Reflection and Self-Defeat

Julien Beillard

Logos and Episteme 7 (2): 187-199 (2016)

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Phenomenal Conservatism, Justification, and Self-defeat.Moti Mizrahi - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (1):103-110.details In this paper, I argue that Phenomenal Conservatism (PC) is not superior to alternative theories of basic propositional justification insofar as those theories that reject PC are self-defeating. I show that self-defeat arguments similar to Michael Huemer’s Self-Defeat Argument for PC can be constructed for other theories of basic propositional justification as well. If this is correct, then there is nothing special about PC in that respect. In other words, if self-defeat arguments can be advanced in support of alternatives to (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
Phenomenal Conservatism and the Internalist Intuition.Michael Huemer - 2006 - American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2):147-158.details Externalist theories of justification create the possibility of cases in which everything appears to one relevantly similar with respect to two propositions, yet one proposition is justified while the other is not. Internalists find this difficult to accept, because it seems irrational in such a case to affirm one proposition and not the other. The underlying internalist intuition supports a specific internalist theory, Phenomenal Conservatism, on which epistemic justification is conferred by appearances. Download Export citation Bookmark 95 citations
(1 other version)Apology of a modest intuitionist. [REVIEW]Michael Huemer - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):222-236.details Download Export citation Bookmark 9 citations
Compassionate phenomenal conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.details I defend the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism, on which appearances of all kinds generate at least some justification for belief. I argue that there is no reason for privileging introspection or intuition over perceptual experience as a source of justified belief; that those who deny Phenomenal Conservatism are in a self-defeating position, in that their view cannot be both true and justified; and that thedemand for a metajustification for Phenomenal Conservatism either is an easily met demand, or is an unfair (...) or question-begging one. (shrink) Download Export citation Bookmark 315 citations
Alternative Self-Defeat Arguments: A Reply to Mizrahi.Michael Huemer - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (2):223-229.details I address Moti Mizrahi‟s objections to my use of the Self-Defeat Argument for Phenomenal Conservatism (PC). Mizrahi contends that other epistemologicaltheories can be supported by parallel self-defeat arguments. I argue that the self-defeat arguments for other theories either (a) are compatible with PC and thus present no problem, or (b) have a false premise, unlike the self-defeat argument for PC. Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
Phenomenal conservatism and self-defeat: a reply to DePoe.Michael Huemer - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 156 (1):1-13.details John DePoe has criticized the self-defeat argument for Phenomenal Conservatism. He argues that acquaintance, rather than appearance, may form the basis for non-inferentially justified beliefs, and that Phenomenal Conservatism conflicts with a central motivation for internalism. I explain how Phenomenal Conservatism and the self-defeat argument may survive these challenges. Download Export citation Bookmark 15 citations
(1 other version)Phenomenal Conservatism and Self‐Defeat.Michael Depaul - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):205-212.details Download Export citation Bookmark 9 citations

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