- Affordances and the Contents of Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2014 - In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? New York, NY: Oup Usa. pp. 39-76.details
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Two Conceptions of Mind and Action: Knowledge How and the Philosophical Theory of Intelligence.John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett - 2011 - In John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 3-55.details
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Murdoch on the Sovereignty of Good.Kieran Setiya - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13.details
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Deliberation and Acting for Reasons.Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):209-239.details
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Sameness of Fregean sense.Susanna Schellenberg - 2012 - Synthese 189 (1):163-175.details
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Presentational Phenomenology.Elijah Chudnoff - 2012 - In Sofia Miguens & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. [Place of publication not identified]: Ontos Verlag. pp. 51–72.details
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Knowing How and Knowing That: The Presidential Address.Gilbert Ryle - 1946 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 46:1 - 16.details
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Reidian Moral Perception.Terence Cuneo - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):229 - 258.details
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(2 other versions)Conscience and Moral Convictions.Gilbert Ryle - 1939 - Analysis 7 (2):31 - 39.details
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(1 other version)Virtue and Reason.John Mcdowell - 1979 - The Monist 62 (3):331-350.details
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A New Framework for Conceptualism.John Bengson, Enrico Grube & Daniel Z. Korman - 2010 - Noûs 45 (1):167 - 189.details
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(1 other version)Experience and content.Alex Byrne - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):429-451.details
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Life and action: elementary structures of practice and practical thought.Michael Thompson - 2008 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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Ethics without principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Situated normativity: The normative aspect of embodied cognition in unreflective action.Erik Rietveld - 2008 - Mind 117 (468):973-1001.details
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Essence and modality.Kit Fine - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8 (Logic and Language):1-16.details
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(1 other version)Intelligence without representation – Merleau-ponty's critique of mental representation the relevance of phenomenology to scientific explanation.Hubert L. Dreyfus - 2002 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (4):367-383.details
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(1 other version)Moral cognitivism and motivation.Sigrún Svavarsdóttir - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (2):161-219.details
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Naive action theory.Michael Thompson - 2008 - In Life and action: elementary structures of practice and practical thought. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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Nonconceptual content and the "space of reasons".Richard G. Heck - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):483-523.details
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The return of the myth of the mental.Hubert L. Dreyfus - 2007 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):352 – 365.details
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Moral perception and particularity.Lawrence Blum - 1991 - Ethics 101 (4):701-725.details
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Seeing What to Do: Affective Perception and Rational Motivation.Sabine A. Döring - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (3):363-394.details
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What myth?John McDowell - 2007 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):338 – 351.details
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The visual brain in action (precis).David Milner - 1998 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 4.details
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Overcoming the myth of the mental.Hubert L. Dreyfus - 2006 - Topoi 25 (1-2):43-49.details
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(1 other version)Visual experience and motor action: Are the bonds too tight?Andy Clark - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (4):495-519.details
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Replies.Bill Brewer - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):449-464.details
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Is there a problem about nonconceptual content?Jeff Speaks - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (3):359-98.details
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A theory of concepts and concepts possession.George Bealer - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:261-301.details
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Intelligence without representation – Merleau-Ponty’s critique of mental representation.Hubert L. Dreyfus - 2002 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (4):367-83.details
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(2 other versions)Individualism and the mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.details
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The Unity of Understanding.John Bengson - 2017 - In Stephen R. Grimm (ed.), Making Sense of the World: New Essays on the Philosophy of Understanding. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 14-53.details
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(1 other version)The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.details
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(1 other version)The Sovereignty of Good.Iris Murdoch - 1959 - Philosophy 47 (180):178-180.details
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(1 other version)Action‐oriented Perception.Bence Nanay - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):430-446.details
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(1 other version)Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:321-332.details
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Practical Senses.Carlotta Pavese - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.details
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The Intellectual Given.John Bengson - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):707-760.details
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(1 other version)Perceptual Guidance.Sebastian Watzl - 2014 - Ratio 27 (4):414-438.details
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Success and Knowledge-How.Katherine Hawley - 2003 - American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (1):19 - 31.details
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Externalist moral realism.David O. Brink - 1986 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (S1):23-41.details
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(2 other versions)Mind and World.Huw Price & John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Books 38 (3):169-181.details
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(1 other version)Action-oriented Perception.Bence Nanay - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):430-446.details
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McDowell and Dreyfus on Unreflective Action.Erik Rietveld - 2010 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 53 (2):183-207.details
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Moral concepts and motivation.Mark Greenberg - 2009 - Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):137-164.details
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Response to Dreyfus.John McDowell - 2007 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):366 – 370.details
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Does perception have a nonconceptual content?Christopher Peacocke - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (5):239-264.details
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Perceptual experience has conceptual content.Bill Brewer - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell.details
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Demonstrative concepts without reidentification.Philippe Chuard - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (2):153-201.details
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