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  1. Compressed Environments: Unbounded Optimizers Should Sometimes Ignore Information. [REVIEW]Nathan Berg & Ulrich Hoffrage - 2010 - Minds and Machines 20 (2):259-275.
    Given free information and unlimited processing power, should decision algorithms use as much information as possible? A formal model of the decision-making environment is developed to address this question and provide conditions under which informationally frugal algorithms, without any information or processing costs whatsoever, are optimal. One cause of compression that allows optimal algorithms to rationally ignore information is inverse movement of payoffs and probabilities (e.g., high payoffs occur with low probably and low payoffs occur with high probability). If inversely (...)
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  • Is it always rational to satisfy Savage's axioms?Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler - 2009 - Economics and Philosophy 25 (3):285-296.
    This note argues that, under some circumstances, it is more rational not to behave in accordance with a Bayesian prior than to do so. The starting point is that in the absence of information, choosing a prior is arbitrary. If the prior is to have meaningful implications, it is more rational to admit that one does not have sufficient information to generate a prior than to pretend that one does. This suggests a view of rationality that requires a compromise between (...)
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  • Well-being, agency and freedom: The Dewey lectures 1984.Amartya Sen - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (4):169-221.
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  • Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart.Gerd Gigerenzer, Peter M. Todd & A. B. C. Research Group - 1999 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press USA. Edited by Peter M. Todd.
    Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart invites readers to embark on a new journey into a land of rationality that differs from the familiar territory of cognitive science and economics. Traditional views of rationality tend to see decision makers as possessing superhuman powers of reason, limitless knowledge, and all of eternity in which to ponder choices. To understand decisions in the real world, we need a different, more psychologically plausible notion of rationality, and this book provides it. It is about (...)
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  • Democracy under uncertainty: The wisdom of crowds and the free-rider problem in group decision making.Tatsuya Kameda, Takafumi Tsukasaki, Reid Hastie & Nathan Berg - 2011 - Psychological Review 118 (1):76-96.
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  • From tools to theories: A heuristic of discovery in cognitive psychology.Gerd Gigerenzer - 1991 - Psychological Review 98 (2):254-267.
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  • Appraising Models Nonrepresentationally.Till Grüne-Yanoff - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):850-861.
    Many scientific models lack an established representation relation to actual targets and instead refer to merely possible processes, background conditions, and results. This article shows how such models can be appraised. On the basis of the discussion of how-possibly explanations, five types of learning opportunities are distinguished. For each of these types, an example—from economics, biology, psychology, and sociology—is discussed. Contexts and purposes are identified in which the use of a model offers a genuine opportunity to learn. These learning opportunities (...)
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  • The Problems of Testing Preference Axioms with Revealed Preference Theory.Till Grüne - 2004 - Analyse & Kritik 26 (2):382-397.
    In economics, it has often been claimed that testing choice data for violation of certain axioms-particularly if the choice data is observed under laboratory conditions-allows conclusions about the validity of certain preference axioms and the neoclassical maximization hypothesis. In this paper I argue that these conclusions are unfounded. In particular, it is unclear what exactly is tested, and the interpretation of the test results are ambiguous. Further, there are plausible reasons why the postulated choice axioms should not hold. Last, these (...)
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