Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Formal learning theory.Oliver Schulte - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Formal learning theory is the mathematical embodiment of a normative epistemology. It deals with the question of how an agent should use observations about her environment to arrive at correct and informative conclusions. Philosophers such as Putnam, Glymour and Kelly have developed learning theory as a normative framework for scientific reasoning and inductive inference.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • The automation of science.Ross King, Rowland D., Oliver Jem, G. Stephen, Michael Young, Wayne Aubrey, Emma Byrne, Maria Liakata, Magdalena Markham, Pinar Pir, Larisa Soldatova, Sparkes N., Whelan Andrew, E. Kenneth & Amanda Clare - 2009 - Science 324 (5923):85-89.
    The basis of science is the hypothetico-deductive method and the recording of experiments in sufficient detail to enable reproducibility. We report the development of Robot Scientist "Adam," which advances the automation of both. Adam has autonomously generated functional genomics hypotheses about the yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae and experimentally tested these hypotheses by using laboratory automation. We have confirmed Adam's conclusions through manual experiments. To describe Adam's research, we have developed an ontology and logical language. The resulting formalization involves over 10,000 different (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Progress and its problems: Towards a theory of scientific growth.L. Laudan - 1978 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32 (1):57-71.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   249 citations  
  • On the Nature of Bayesian Convergence.James Hawthorne - 1994 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:241 - 249.
    The objectivity of Bayesian induction relies on the ability of evidence to produce a convergence to agreement among agents who initially disagree about the plausibilities of hypotheses. I will describe three sorts of Bayesian convergence. The first reduces the objectivity of inductions about simple "occurrent events" to the objectivity of posterior probabilities for theoretical hypotheses. The second reveals that evidence will generally induce converge to agreement among agents on the posterior probabilities of theories only if the convergence is 0 or (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Philosophy of Natural Science.Carl G. Hempel - 1967 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 18 (1):70-72.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   575 citations  
  • Belief revision and truthlikeness.I. Niiniluoto - 1999 - In B. Hansson, S. Halld’en, N.-E. Sahlin & W. Rabinowicz (eds.), Internet Festschrift for Peter Gärdenfors. Department of Philosophy, Lund University.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge.Imre Lakatos, Alan Musgrave, Roger C. Buck & Robert S. Cohen - 1972 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23 (3):266-274.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   129 citations  
  • The Logic of Reliable Inquiry.Kevin Kelly - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (2):351-354.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   181 citations  
  • Scientific controversies: An introduction.P. Machamer, M. Pera & A. Baltas - 2000 - In Peter K. Machamer, Marcello Pera & Aristeidēs Baltas (eds.), Scientific Controversies: Philosophical and Historical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. pp. 3--17.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations