We are pleased to present this special issue of the journal History and Philosophy of Logic dedicated to the square of opposition.The square of opposition is a diagram and a theory of opposition re...

The hexagon of opposition is an improvement of the square of opposition due to Robert Blanché. After a short presentation of the square and its various interpretations, we discuss two important problems related with the square: the problem of the I-corner and the problem of the O-corner. The meaning of the notion described by the I-corner does not correspond to the name used for it. In the case of the O-corner, the problem is not a wrong-name problem but a no-name (...) problem and it is not clear what is the intuitive notion corresponding to it. We explain then that the triangle of contrariety proposed by different people such as Vasiliev and Jespersen solves these problems, but that we don’t need to reject the square. It can be reconstructed from this triangle of contrariety, by considering a dual triangle of subcontrariety. This is the main idea of Blanché’s hexagon. We then give different examples of hexagons to show how this framework can be useful to conceptual analysis in many different fields such as economy, music, semiotics, identity theory, philosophy, metalogic and the metatheory of the hexagon itself. We finish by discussing the abstract structure of the hexagon and by showing how we can swing from sense to non-sense thinking with the hexagon. (shrink)

In this paper evidence will be provided that Wittgenstein’s intuition about the logic of colour relations is to be taken near-literally. Starting from the Aristotelian oppositions between propositions as represented in the logical square of oppositions on the one hand and oppositions between primary and secondary colors as represented in an octahedron on the other, it will be shown algebraically how definitions for the former carry over to the realm of colour categories and describe very precisely the relations obtaining between (...) the known primary and secondary colours. Linguistic evidence for the reality of the resulting isomorphism will be provided. For example, the vertices that resist natural single-item lexicalization in logic (such as the O-corner, for which there is no natural lexicalization *nall (=not all)) are not naturally lexicalized in the realm of colour terms either. From the perspective of the architecture of cognition, the isomorphism suggests that the foundations of logical oppositions and negation may well be much more deeply rooted in the physiological structure of human cognition than is standardly assumed. (shrink)

The aim of the present paper is to analyse the archeology of the concept of contradiction, more precisely in Plato, and to reveal the influence that the latter had on Aristotle’s reflection on contradiction and contrariety. This paper will show that it is possible to find examples of a notion of contradiction in Plato’s refutative dialogues, in which Socrates is described as refuting his interlocutors by demonstrating the contrary of their initial thesis. However, Plato never used the word antiphasis to (...) name the act of contradicting oneself, but preferred the expression enantia legein heautôi, which means “to say the contrary to oneself”. (shrink)