Switch to: Citations

References in:

Gestalt Shifts in the Liar Or Why KT4M Is the Logic of Semantic Modalities

In Bradley P. Armour-Garb (ed.), Reflections on the Liar. Oxford, England: Oxford University. pp. 71-113 (2017)

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. (3 other versions)A New Introduction to Modal Logic.M. J. Cresswell & G. E. Hughes - 1996 - New York: Routledge. Edited by M. J. Cresswell.
    This long-awaited book replaces Hughes and Cresswell's two classic studies of modal logic: _An Introduction to Modal Logic_ and _A Companion to Modal Logic_. _A New Introduction to Modal Logic_ is an entirely new work, completely re-written by the authors. They have incorporated all the new developments that have taken place since 1968 in both modal propositional logic and modal predicate logic, without sacrificing tha clarity of exposition and approachability that were essential features of their earlier works. The book takes (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   242 citations  
  • (1 other version)The Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox.J. C. Beall (ed.) - 2007 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK.
    The Liar paradox raises foundational questions about logic, language, and truth. A simple Liar sentence like 'This sentence is false' appears to be both true and false if it is either true or false. For if the sentence is true, then what it says is the case; but what it says is that it is false, hence it must be false. On the other hand, if the statement is false, then it is true, since it says that it is false.How, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • My own truth ---Pathologies of Self-Reference and Relative Truth.Alexandre Billon - 2011 - In Rahman Shahid, Primiero Giuseppe & Marion Mathieu (eds.), Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, Vol. 23. springer.
    emantic pathologies of self-reference include the Liar (‘this sentence is false’), the Truth-Teller (‘this sentence is true’) and the Open Pair (‘the neighbouring sentence is false’ ‘the neighbouring sentence is false’). Although they seem like perfectly meaningful declarative sentences, truth value assignment to their uses seems either inconsistent (the Liar) or arbitrary (the Truth-Teller and the Open-Pair). These pathologies thus call for a resolution. I propose such a resolution in terms of relative-truth: the truth value of a pathological sentence use (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Truth and paradoxical consequence.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1970 - In Robert L. Martin (ed.), Paradox of the Liar. New Haven [Conn.]: Ridgeview.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Truth, Vagueness, and Paradox: An Essay on the Logic of Truth.Vann McGee - 1990 - Indianapolis, IN, USA: Hackett.
    Awarded the 1988 Johnsonian Prize in Philosophy. Published with the aid of a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   108 citations  
  • Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications.John MacFarlane - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    John MacFarlane explores how we might make sense of the idea that truth is relative. He provides new, satisfying accounts of parts of our thought and talk that have resisted traditional methods of analysis, including what we mean when we talk about what is tasty, what we know, what will happen, what might be the case, and what we ought to do.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   443 citations  
  • Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
    A formal theory of truth, alternative to tarski's 'orthodox' theory, based on truth-value gaps, is presented. the theory is proposed as a fairly plausible model for natural language and as one which allows rigorous definitions to be given for various intuitive concepts, such as those of 'grounded' and 'paradoxical' sentences.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   885 citations  
  • Notes on naive semantics.Hans Herzberger - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):61 - 102.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   117 citations  
  • Paradoxes of grounding in semantics.Hans G. Herzberger - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (6):145-167.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   63 citations  
  • Truth, reflection, and hierarchies.Michael Glanzberg - 2005 - Synthese 142 (3):289 - 315.
    A common objection to hierarchical approaches to truth is that they fragment the concept of truth. This paper defends hierarchical approaches in general against the objection of fragmentation. It argues that the fragmentation required is familiar and unprob-lematic, via a comparison with mathematical proof. Furthermore, it offers an explanation of the source and nature of the fragmentation of truth. Fragmentation arises because the concept exhibits a kind of failure of closure under reflection. This paper offers a more precise characterization of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Toward useful type-free theories. I.Solomon Feferman - 1984 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 49 (1):75-111.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   115 citations  
  • Reflecting on incompleteness.Solomon Feferman - 1991 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 56 (1):1-49.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   146 citations  
  • The Revision Theory of Truth. [REVIEW]Vann McGee - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):727-730.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   116 citations  
  • The Liar: An Essay on Truth and Circularity.Jon Barwise & John Etchemendy - 1987 - Oxford, England and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press USA. Edited by John Etchemendy.
    Bringing together powerful new tools from set theory and the philosophy of language, this book proposes a solution to one of the few unresolved paradoxes from antiquity, the Paradox of the Liar. Treating truth as a property of propositions, not sentences, the authors model two distinct conceptions of propositions: one based on the standard notion used by Bertrand Russell, among others, and the other based on J.L. Austin's work on truth. Comparing these two accounts, the authors show that while the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   125 citations  
  • I—Columnar Higher-Order Vagueness, or Vagueness is Higher-Order Vagueness.Susanne Bobzien - 2015 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):61-87.
    Most descriptions of higher-order vagueness in terms of traditional modal logic generate so-called higher-order vagueness paradoxes. The one that doesn't is problematic otherwise. Consequently, the present trend is toward more complex, non-standard theories. However, there is no need for this.In this paper I introduce a theory of higher-order vagueness that is paradox-free and can be expressed in the first-order extension of a normal modal system that is complete with respect to single-domain Kripke-frame semantics. This is the system QS4M+BF+FIN. It corresponds (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Der wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten sprachen.Alfred Tarski - 1935 - Studia Philosophica 1:261--405.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   343 citations  
  • Vagueness, truth and logic.Kit Fine - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.
    This paper deals with the truth-Conditions and the logic for vague languages. The use of supervaluations and of classical logic is defended; and other approaches are criticized. The truth-Conditions are extended to a language that contains a definitely-Operator and that is subject to higher order vagueness.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   664 citations  
  • Presupposition, implication, and self-reference.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (5):136-152.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   102 citations  
  • The liar paradox.Charles Parsons - 1974 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 3 (4):381 - 412.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   119 citations  
  • Constructive methodological deflationism, dialetheism and the Liar.David Liggins - 2014 - Analysis 74 (4):566-574.
    Thanks to the work of Kendall Walton, appeals to the notion of pretence (or make-believe) have become popular in philosophy. Now the notion has begun to appear in accounts of truth. My aim here is to assess one of these accounts, namely the ‘constructive methodological deflationism’ put forward by Jc Beall. After introducing the view, I argue that Beall does not manage to overcome the problem of psychological implausibility. Although Beall claims that constructive methodological deflationism supports dialetheism, I argue that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Metaworlds: A Possible-Worlds Semantics for Truth.Hannes Leitgeb - 2002 - In Volker Halbach & Leon Horsten (eds.), Principles of truth. New York: Hänsel-Hohenhausen. pp. 129-152.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Naive semantics and the liar paradox.Hans Herzberger - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (9):479-497.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   47 citations  
  • Modalized Disquotationalism.Volker Halbach - 2002 - In Volker Halbach & Leon Horsten (eds.), Principles of truth. New York: Hänsel-Hohenhausen. pp. 75-102.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • The Revision Theory of Truth.Anil Gupta & Nuel D. Belnap - 1993 - MIT Press.
    In this rigorous investigation into the logic of truth Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap explain how the concept of truth works in both ordinary and pathological..
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   217 citations  
  • The Liar, An Essay in Truth and Circularity.J. Cargile - 1990 - Noûs 24 (5):757-773.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • (1 other version)The Liar. An Essay in Truth and Circularity.Jon Barwise & John Etchemendy - 1989 - Mind 98 (391):451-453.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   72 citations