References in:
Gestalt Shifts in the Liar Or Why KT4M Is the Logic of Semantic Modalities
In Bradley ArmourGarb (ed.), Reflections on the Liar. Oxford University. pp. 71113 (2017)
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A formal theory of truth, alternative to tarski's 'orthodox' theory, based on truthvalue gaps, is presented. the theory is proposed as a fairly plausible model for natural language and as one which allows rigorous definitions to be given for various intuitive concepts, such as those of 'grounded' and 'paradoxical' sentences. 





Most descriptions of higherorder vagueness in terms of traditional modal logic generate socalled higherorder vagueness paradoxes. The one that doesn't is problematic otherwise. Consequently, the present trend is toward more complex, nonstandard theories. However, there is no need for this.In this paper I introduce a theory of higherorder vagueness that is paradoxfree and can be expressed in the firstorder extension of a normal modal system that is complete with respect to singledomain Kripkeframe semantics. This is the system QS4M+BF+FIN. It corresponds (...) 

Thanks to the work of Kendall Walton, appeals to the notion of pretence (or makebelieve) have become popular in philosophy. Now the notion has begun to appear in accounts of truth. My aim here is to assess one of these accounts, namely the ‘constructive methodological deflationism’ put forward by Jc Beall. After introducing the view, I argue that Beall does not manage to overcome the problem of psychological implausibility. Although Beall claims that constructive methodological deflationism supports dialetheism, I argue that (...) 

John MacFarlane explores how we might make sense of the idea that truth is relative. He provides new, satisfying accounts of parts of our thought and talk that have resisted traditional methods of analysis, including what we mean when we talk about what is tasty, what we know, what will happen, what might be the case, and what we ought to do. 

This longawaited book replaces Hughes and Cresswell's two classic studies of modal logic: _An Introduction to Modal Logic_ and _A Companion to Modal Logic_. _A New Introduction to Modal Logic_ is an entirely new work, completely rewritten by the authors. They have incorporated all the new developments that have taken place since 1968 in both modal propositional logic and modal predicate logic, without sacrificing tha clarity of exposition and approachability that were essential features of their earlier works. The book takes (...) 

Bringing together powerful new tools from set theory and the philosophy of language, this book proposes a solution to one of the few unresolved paradoxes from antiquity, the Paradox of the Liar. Treating truth as a property of propositions, not sentences, the authors model two distinct conceptions of propositions: one based on the standard notion used by Bertrand Russell, among others, and the other based on J.L. Austin's work on truth. Comparing these two accounts, the authors show that while the (...) 





This paper deals with the truthConditions and the logic for vague languages. The use of supervaluations and of classical logic is defended; and other approaches are criticized. The truthConditions are extended to a language that contains a definitelyOperator and that is subject to higher order vagueness. 

emantic pathologies of selfreference include the Liar (‘this sentence is false’), the TruthTeller (‘this sentence is true’) and the Open Pair (‘the neighbouring sentence is false’ ‘the neighbouring sentence is false’). Although they seem like perfectly meaningful declarative sentences, truth value assignment to their uses seems either inconsistent (the Liar) or arbitrary (the TruthTeller and the OpenPair). These pathologies thus call for a resolution. I propose such a resolution in terms of relativetruth: the truth value of a pathological sentence use (...) 





A common objection to hierarchical approaches to truth is that they fragment the concept of truth. This paper defends hierarchical approaches in general against the objection of fragmentation. It argues that the fragmentation required is familiar and unproblematic, via a comparison with mathematical proof. Furthermore, it offers an explanation of the source and nature of the fragmentation of truth. Fragmentation arises because the concept exhibits a kind of failure of closure under reflection. This paper offers a more precise characterization of (...) 

In this rigorous investigation into the logic of truth Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap explain how the concept of truth works in both ordinary and pathological.. 



Awarded the 1988 Johnsonian Prize in Philosophy. Published with the aid of a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities. 





The Liar paradox raises foundational questions about logic, language, and truth. A simple Liar sentence like 'This sentence is false' appears to be both true and false if it is either true or false. For if the sentence is true, then what it says is the case; but what it says is that it is false, hence it must be false. On the other hand, if the statement is false, then it is true, since it says that it is false.How, (...) 





