At the outset, the philosopher being challenged hopes that the whole question rests on a false assumption. Maybe one can in fact fit together all of the doctrines of major philosophers in a single system which will be consistent, and so prove that there is no contradiction? But that plan hits a snag almost at once: for there are types of philosophic system so related that whenever a given proposition is true in one, its contrary is true in the other. (...) Sextus Empiricus was particularly ingenious at arranging these dual positions in parallel column, but even without his help, brief experiment shows that a simple conjunction rule will not answer the skeptic’s question. (shrink)

All too often in contemporary discourse, we hear about science overstepping its proper limits—about its brazenness, arrogance, and intellectual imperialism. The problem, critics say, is scientism: the privileging of science over all other ways of knowing. Science, they warn, cannot do or explain everything, no matter what some enthusiasts believe. In Science Unlimited?, noted philosophers of science Maarten Boudry and Massimo Pigliucci gather a diverse group of scientists, science communicators, and philosophers of science to explore the limits of science and (...) this alleged threat of scientism. In this wide-ranging collection, contributors ask whether the term scientism in fact (or in belief) captures an interesting and important intellectual stance, and whether it is something that should alarm us. Is scientism a well-developed position about the superiority of science over all other modes of human inquiry? Or is it more a form of excessive confidence, an uncritical attitude of glowing admiration? What, if any, are its dangers? Are fears that science will marginalize the humanities and eradicate the human subject—that it will explain away emotion, free will, consciousness, and the mystery of existence—justified? Does science need to be reined in before it drives out all other disciplines and ways of knowing? Both rigorous and balanced, Science Unlimited? interrogates our use of a term that is now all but ubiquitous in a wide variety of contexts and debates. Bringing together scientists and philosophers, both friends and foes of scientism, it is a conversation long overdue. (shrink)

I. In “Whitehead’s Theory of Becoming," V.C. Chappell asserts that Whitehead’s “epochal theory of time or becoming is both untenable and unnecessary”. It is untenable, he argues, because “ … the theory itself is unintelligible, and … … the Zenonian argument on which the theory is founded, even in its amended, Whiteheadian version, is invalid”. Although it is not clear to me that Whitehead’s use of Zeno’s arguments is unsound, our concern here will be limited to the first of these (...) two claims. I will attempt to show that Chappell’s demonstration of the unintelligibility of Whitehead’s theory begs the question. His purpose is to present us with a reductio ad absurdum of the epochal theory of time, but he succeeds only in demonstrating that if we substitute other premises for Whitehead’s own, his conclusions will not be consistent with these substitute premises. (shrink)

So far as I know, only two readers have paid much attention to my 1953 proposal. G. K. Plochmann was quick to point out its limitations, since the definition of "System" I was using seemed not to apply to the major work of modern philosophers in the 17th and 18th centuries. More recently, Donald Sherburne has suggested that the project is a fine idea, and one that should be carried out. His enthusiasm has persuaded me to resume the discussion.