It is shown that a number of questions, usually considered philosophical rather than scientific, can be reformulated to apply to a world of automata or "well-informed heat engines." In some cases they admit of physical answers, but in many cases obtaining answers entails violation of the second law of thermodynamics. This is demonstrated explicitly for the problem of determinism and free will, for the discovery of the origin or ultimate fate of the universe, or for the discovery of causes or (...) purposes in nature. (shrink)

A Quantum-Mechanical automation, equipped with mechanisms for the measurement and the recording and the prediction of certain physical properties of the world, is described. It is inquired what sort of empirical description such an automation would produce of itself. It turns out that this description would be a very novel one, one such as was never imagined in the conventional discussions of measurement.

Winner of the Wolf Prize for his contribution to our understanding of the universe, Penrose takes on the question of whether artificial intelligence will ever ...

It is demonstrated that neither the arguments leading to inconsistencies in the description of quantum-mechanical measurement nor those “explaining” the process of measurement by means of thermodynamical statistics are valid. Instead, it is argued that the probability interpretation is compatible with an objective interpretation of the wave function.

It is shown that it is impossible for an observer to distinguish all present states of a system in which he or she is contained, irrespective of whether this system is a classical or a quantum mechanical one and irrespective of whether the time evolution is deterministic or stochastic. As a corollary, this implies that it is impossible for an observer to measure the EPR-correlations between himself or herself and an outside system. Implications of the main result are discussed for (...) how we have to conceive of universally valid theories. (shrink)

Modern insolubility proofs of the measurement problem in quantum mechanics not only differ in their complexity and degree of generality, but also reveal a lack of agreement concerning the fundamental question of what constitutes such a proof. A systematic reworking of the (incomplete) 1970 Fine theorem is presented, which is intended to go some way toward clarifying the issue.

Abner Shimony is one of the most eminent of present-day philosophers of science, whose work has exerted a profound influence in both the philosophy and physics communities. This two-volume 1993 collection of his essays written over a period of forty years explores the interrelations between science and philosophy. Shimony regards the knowing subject as an entity in nature whose faculties must be studied from the points of view of evolutionary biology and empirical psychology. He maintains that the twentieth century is (...) one of the great ages of metaphysics, given the deep implications of quantum mechanics, relativity theory and molecular biology. Nevertheless he rejects the thesis that mentality is entirely explicable in physical terms and argues that mind has a fundamental place in nature. Though distinguishing between values and scientifically established facts, Shimony holds that the sense of wonder cultivated by the natural sciences is one of the noblest of human values. (shrink)

Recent findings in the computer sciences, discrete mathematics, formal logics and metamathematics have opened up a royal road for the investigation of undecidability and randomness in physics. A translation of these formal concepts yields a fresh look into diverse features of physical modelling such as quantum complementarity and the measurement problem, but also stipulates questions related to the necessity of the assumption of continua.Conversely, any computer may be perceived as a physical system: not only in the immediate sense of the (...) physical properties of its hardware. Computers are a medium to virtual realities. The foreseeable importance of such virtual realities stimulates the investigation of an?inner description?, a?virtual physics? of these universes of computation. Indeed, one may consider our own universe as just one particular realisation of an enormous number of virtual realities, most of them awaiting discovery.One motive of this book is the recognition that what is often referred to as?randomness? in physics might actually be a signature of undecidability for systems whose evolution is computable on a step-by-step basis. To give a flavour of the type of questions envisaged: Consider an arbitrary algorithmic system which is computable on a step-by-step basis. Then it is in general impossible to specify a second algorithmic procedure, including itself, which, by experimental input-output analysis, is capable of finding the deterministic law of the first system. But even if such a law is specified beforehand, it is in general impossible to predict the system behaviour in the?distant future?. In other words: no?speedup? or?computational shortcut? is available. In this approach, classical paradoxes can be formally translated into no-go theorems concerning intrinsic physical perception.It is suggested that complementarity can be modelled by experiments on finite automata, where measurements of one observable of the automaton destroys the possibility to measure another observable of the same automaton and it vice versa.Besides undecidability, a great part of the book is dedicated to a formal definition of randomness and entropy measures based on algorithmic information theory. (shrink)