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  1. (Anti-)sceptics simple and subtle: G. E. Moore and John McDowell.Crispin Wright - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):330-348.
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  • (1 other version)Reliabilism leveled.Jonathan Vogel - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (11):602-623.
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  • Epistemic circularity.William P. Alston - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (1):1-30.
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  • Transfer of warrant, begging the question, and semantic externalism.Helen Beebee - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):356-74.
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  • (1 other version)Basic knowledge and the problem of easy knowledge.Stewart Cohen - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):309-329.
    The dominant response to this problem of the criterion focuses on the alleged requirement that we need to know a belief source is reliable in order for us to acquire knowledge by that source. Let us call this requirement, “The KR principle”.
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  • (1 other version)Cogency and question-begging: Some reflections on McKinsey's paradox and Putnam's proof.Crispin Wright - 2000 - Philosophical Issues 10 (1):140-63.
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  • Metaepistemology and Skepticism.Richard A. Fumerton - 1995 - Rowman & Littlefield.
    ... and Normative Epistemology The Distinction Between Metaepistemology and Normative Epistemology Although this terminology is relatively new, ...
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  • Externalism and armchair knowledge.Martin Davies - 2000 - In Paul Artin Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 384--414.
    [I]f you could know a priori that you are in a given mental state, and your being in that state conceptually or logically implies the existence of external objects, then you could know a priori that the external world exists. Since you obviously _can.
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