- In Pursuit of the Non-Trivial.Colin R. Caret - 2021 - Episteme 18 (2):282-297.details
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The Methods of Science and Religion: Epistemologies in Conflict.Tiddy Smith - 2019 - Lanham: Lexington Books.details
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Imagery and Possibility.Dominic Gregory - 2019 - Noûs 54 (4):755-773.details
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Trading One Kind of Dogmatism for Another: Comments on Williams Criticism of Aggripan Scepticism.Armando Cíntora & Jorge Ornelas - 2013 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 44:9-34.details
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Against Minimalist Responses to Moral Debunking Arguments.Daniel Z. Korman & Dustin Locke - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15:309-332.details
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Seeing White and Wrong: Reid on the Role of Sensations in Perception, with a Focus on Color Perception.Lucas Thorpe - 2015 - In Thomas Reid on Mind, Knowledge, and Value (Mind Association Occasional Series). Oxford University Press. pp. 100-123.details
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Phenomenal Conservatism and the Demand for Metajustification.Rogel E. Oliveira - 2017 - Manuscrito 40 (4):159-177.details
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Debunking Arguments in Metaethics and Metaphysics.Daniel Z. Korman - 2019 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), Metaphysics and Cognitive Science. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 337-363.details
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(1 other version)Summa Contra Scepticos.Martin Kusch - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (270):184-193.details
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(1 other version)Self‐supporting Arguments.Andrew D. Cling - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):279-303.details
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Inference to the best explanation and epistemic circularity.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2017 - In Kevin McCain & Ted Poston (eds.), Best Explanations: New Essays on Inference to the Best Explanation. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
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Why Worry about Epistemic Circularity?Michael P. Lynch & Paul Silva - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41 (9999):33-52.details
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Analytic Theology and Analytic Philosophy of Religion: What’s the difference?Max Baker-Hytch - 2016 - Journal of Analytic Theology 4:347-361.details
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Epistemic relativism, scepticism, pluralism.Martin Kusch - 2017 - Synthese 194 (12):4687-4703.details
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Problems for Dogmatism.Roger White - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):525-557.details
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The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology.Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Scientific Realism, Adaptationism and the Problem of the Criterion.Fabio Sterpetti - 2015 - Kairos 13 (1):7-45.details
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(1 other version)The concept of belief and evidentialism: A review of belief's own ethics by Jonathan Adler. [REVIEW]Todd Stewart - 2004 - Behavior and Philosophy 32:269-272.details
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On Dreaming and Being Lied To.Paul Faulkner - 2006 - Episteme 2 (3):149-159.details
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What’s the matter with epistemic circularity?David James Barnett - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (2):177-205.details
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A problem for rationalist responses to skepticism.Sinan Dogramaci - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):355-369.details
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Imagining as a Guide to Possibility.Peter Kung - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):620-663.details
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Intuition.Joel Pust - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Does the Consequence Argument Beg the Question?John Martin Fischer & Garrett Pendergraft - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):575-595.details
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Boghossian on inferential knowledge.José L. Zalabardo - 2011 - Analytic Philosophy 52 (2):124-139.details
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The Competing Practices Argument and Self-defeat.Todd Stewart - 2005 - Episteme 2 (1):13-24.details
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Reliabilist justification: Basic, easy, and brute. [REVIEW]Jesper Kallestrup - 2009 - Acta Analytica 24 (3):155-171.details
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(1 other version)How Are Basic Belief-Forming Methods Justified?David Enoch & Joshua Schechter - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):547–579.details
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Externalism, skepticism, and the problem of easy knowledge.José L. Zalabardo - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (1):33-61.details
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Knowledge and the Fall in American Neo-Calvinism: Toward a Van Til–Plantinga Synthesis.Bálint Békefi - 2022 - Philosophia Reformata 87 (1):27-48.details
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The paradox of epistemology: A defense of naturalism.Richard J. Ketchum - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 62 (1):45 - 66.details
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Justification-affording circular arguments.Andrew D. Cling - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 111 (3):251 - 275.details
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Non-inferential justification and epistemic circularity.Jessica Brown - 2004 - Analysis 64 (4):339–348.details
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Topical epistemologies.Todd Stewart - 2007 - Metaphilosophy 38 (1):23–43.details
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What's wrong with Moore's argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.details
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On the logical unsolvability of the Gettier problem.L. Floridi - 2004 - Synthese 142 (1):61 - 79.details
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(1 other version)An internalist externalism.William P. Alston - 1988 - Synthese 74 (3):265 - 283.details
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Externalism and skepticism.Michael Bergmann - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (2):159-194.details
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Three arguments against foundationalism: arbitrariness, epistemic regress, and existential support.Daniel Howard-Snyder & E. J. Coffman - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):535-564.details
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Consciousness, agents and the knowledge game.Luciano Floridi - 2005 - Minds and Machines 15 (3):415-444.details
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(2 other versions)Memory.Kourken Michaelian & John Sutton - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Disagreement, Skepticism, and Begging the Question.Jonathan Matheson - forthcoming - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism:1-17.details
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Bootstrapping and Persuasive Argumentation.Guido Melchior - 2024 - Argumentation 38 (2).details
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Foundationalism and empirical reason: On the rational significance of observation.Anil Gupta - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):177-202.details
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A Disjunctive Account of Desire.Kael McCormack - 2022 - Dissertation, University of New South Walesdetails
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Desire-Based Theories of Reasons and the Guise of the Good.Kael McCormack - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9 (47):1288-1321.details
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Skeptical Arguments and Deep Disagreement.Guido Melchior - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (5):1869-1893.details
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(1 other version)Justification as a loaded notion.Yuval Avnur - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4897-4916.details
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The Epistemology of Thomas Reid.Derek R. Brookes - 1996 - Discipline Filosofiche 2 (VI):119-168.details
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The Moral Closure Argument.Matt Lutz - 2021 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 19 (1).details
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