- Bootstrapping and dogmatism.Tim Butzer - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):2083-2103.details
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Modest meta‐philosophical skepticism.Jimmy Alfonso Licon - 2019 - Ratio 32 (2):93-103.details
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Evidence and the openness of knowledge.Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):1001-1037.details
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(1 other version)The Composite Nature of Epistemic Justification.Paul Silva - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1).details
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Epistemic logic without closure.Stephan Leuenberger & Martin Smith - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4751-4774.details
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How to take skepticism seriously.Adam Leite - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (1):39 - 60.details
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Epistemic Value and the Jamesian Goals.Sophie Horowitz - 2018 - In Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Why Worry about Epistemic Circularity?Michael P. Lynch & Paul Silva - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41 (9999):33-52.details
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Falsehood and Entailment.Juan Comesaña - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):82-94.details
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Easy Knowledge, Closure Failure, or Skepticism: A Trilemma.Guido Melchior - 2016 - Metaphilosophy 47 (2):214-232.details
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Memory scepticism and the Pritchardean solution.Changsheng Lai - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-20.details
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Knowing how to put knowledge first in the theory of justification.Paul Silva - 2017 - Episteme 14 (4):393-412.details
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How to Be a Bayesian Dogmatist.Brian T. Miller - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):766-780.details
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Self-knowledge and the KK principle.Conor McHugh - 2010 - Synthese 173 (3):231-257.details
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(1 other version)Conservadurismo epistemológico.Rodrigo Laera - 2013 - Filosofia Unisinos 14 (3).details
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Contextualismo meta-epistemológico y el problema del criterio.Rodrigo Laera - 2013 - Agora 32 (2):101-128.details
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Closure principles.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (3):256–267.details
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Problems for Dogmatism.Roger White - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):525-557.details
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Transmission Failure Failure.Nicholas Silins - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (1):71-102.details
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Conciliating to Avoid Moral Scepticism.Nick Küspert - 2023 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 31 (3):279-300.details
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Cognitive Penetration and the Epistemology of Perception.Nicholas Silins - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (1):24-42.details
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Epistemic perceptualism and neo-sentimentalist objections.Robert Cowan - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):59-81.details
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Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology.Annalisa Coliva - 2015 - London, England: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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Dragging and Confirming.Matthew Kotzen - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (1):55-93.details
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Epistemological Problems of Perception.Jack Lyons - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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A reliabilist solution to the problem of promiscuous bootstrapping.Hilary Kornblith - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):263-267.details
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The Problem with Uniform Solutions to Peer Disagreement.Amir Konigsberg - 2013 - Theoria 79 (2):96-126.details
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The heterogeneity problem for sensitivity accounts.Guido Melchior - 2015 - Episteme 12 (4):479-496.details
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Scepticism and Reliable Belief, written by José L. Zalabardo. [REVIEW]Jack C. Lyons - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (4):412-417.details
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Skepticism and Epistemic Closure: Two Bayesian Accounts.Luca Moretti & Tomoji Shogenji - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (1):1-25.details
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The Aim of Justification and Epistemic Difference-Making Principles.Hamid Vahid - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (1):11-29.details
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Is Epistemological Disjunctivism the Holy Grail?Guido Melchior - 2014 - Grazer Philosophische Studien, Vol. 86-2012 90:335-346.details
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Knowing what's Not Up the Road by Seeing what's Right in Front of You: Epistemological disjunctivism's Fake Barn Problem.Michael Veber - 2015 - Episteme 12 (3):401-412.details
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Evidentialism and the Problem of Basic Competence.Timothy Kearl - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.details
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On Negative Entitlement.Kazuyoshi Kamiyama - 2009 - Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 37 (1):19-26.details
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Reliabilist justification: Basic, easy, and brute. [REVIEW]Jesper Kallestrup - 2009 - Acta Analytica 24 (3):155-171.details
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Bootstrap and rollback: generalizing epistemic circularity.Jesper Kallestrup - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):395-413.details
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De la epistemología de virtudes a la felicidad epistémica.Andrés L. Jaume - 2024 - Logos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica [Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España] 57 (1):9-30.details
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Perceptual Fundamentalism and a priori bootstrapping.Magdalena Balcerak Jackson - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2087-2103.details
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How to solve Hume's problem of induction.Alexander Jackson - 2019 - Episteme 16 (2):157-174.details
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Is knowledge of causes sufficient for understanding?Xingming Hu - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):291-313.details
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The Puzzle of Metacoherence.Michael Huemer - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):1-21.details
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Hume and reliabilism.Qu Hsueh - 2021 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 1 (34):27-51.details
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Epistemic Akrasia.Sophie Horowitz - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):718-744.details
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Epistemic Closure and Epistemic Logic I: Relevant Alternatives and Subjunctivism.Wesley H. Holliday - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (1):1-62.details
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(1 other version)Problems From Reid, By James Van Cleve Oxford University Press, 2016.Christopher S. Hill - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (4):515-526.details
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(1 other version)Problems From Reid, By James Van Cleve Oxford University Press, 2016 (550 + Xiv Pages).Christopher S. Hill - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (4):515-526.details
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Evidentially embedded epistemic entitlement.David Henderson & Terence Horgan - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4907-4926.details
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The philosophy of memory technologies: Metaphysics, knowledge, and values.Heersmink Richard & Carter J. Adam - 2020 - Memory Studies 13 (4):416-433.details
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Entitlement and mutually recognized reasonable disagreement.Allan Hazlett - 2013 - Episteme (1):1-25.details
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