Hans Vaihinger was an important and fascinating figure in German philosophy in the early twentieth century, founding the well-known journal Kant-studien. Yet he was overshadowed by the burgeoning movements of phenomenology and analytical philosophy, as well as hostility towards his work because of his defense of Jewish scholars in a Germany controlled by Nazism. However, it is widely acknowledged today that The Philosophy of 'As If' is a philosophical masterwork. Vaihinger argues that in the face of an overwhelmingly complex world, (...) we produce a simpler set of ideas, or idealizations, that help us negotiate it. When cast as fictions, such ideas provide an easier and more useful way to think about certain subjects, from mathematics and physics to law and morality, than would the truth in all its complexity. Even in science, he wrote, we must proceed "as if " a material world exists independently of perceiving subjects; in behaviour, we must act "as if " ethical certainty were possible; in religion, we must believe "as if" there were a God. He also explores the role of fictions in the history of philosophy, going back to the ancient Greeks and the work of Leibniz, Adam Smith and Bentham. The Philosophy of 'As If' was a powerful influence on the emerging philosophical movement of pragmatism and was ground-breaking in its anticipation of the central role that model-building and simulation would come to play in the human sciences. This Routledge Classics edition includes a new foreword by Michael Rosenthal, which provides a fascinating and important background to Vaihinger's life and the legacy of The Philosophy of 'As If'. (shrink)

Originally published in 1914, this book examines the French Voluntarist school of philosophy and the key ways in which it differs from the Pragmatists. Stebbing argues that Voluntarism and Pragmatism both prove inadequate in their definition of truth, and suggests that an acknowledgment of the 'non-existential character of truth' is needed. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in philosophy.

The Third Reich conceived of life as a struggle (Kampf) between competing forces. This view of life was based on a growing emphasis in German philosophy and culture upon voluntarism, or the power of the will as the ultimate metaphysical reality. For these Germans, God was dead. There was no transcendent or universal standard to provide life with direction, no grand design or rationality to explain the succession of events, only the groundless and endless struggle of forces competing to assert (...) their power and extend their dominion. These Germans found early inspiration for this idea in the writings of Gottfried Leibniz, who spoke of life as possessing its own autonomous power in each of its individual members or monads. They saw this concept develop and become the one metaphysical truth in the works of Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche with their emphasis upon the “will to live” and the “will to power.” The two philosophers exerted particular influence upon the Nazis, who saw them as early exponents of their ideology. This influence is important in understanding the fundamental mentality of the Nazis, even if the metaphysics of voluntarism contained other possible forms of interpretation beyond what the Nazis represented in word and deed. To understand the relationship between Nazism and voluntarism, the article develops the philosophical background from Leibniz to Nietzsche and relates this development to its Nazi expression in Adolf Hitler, Alfred Rosenberg, Alfred Bäumler, and Martin Heidegger. (shrink)

The private self, however, cannot stand alone. "We cannot think of the self except in contrast to that which is other than the self". Royce finds the source of physical nature in this need of the self for a not-self. The whole difference between inner and outer is social in origin, for only social confirmation can sustain our belief that a fact is an outer fact rather than an inner fact which no one else can observe.

Unlike some other reproductions of classic texts (1) We have not used OCR(Optical Character Recognition), as this leads to bad quality books with introduced typos. (2) In books where there are images such as portraits, maps, sketches etc We have endeavoured to keep the quality of these images, so they represent accurately the original artefact. Although occasionally there may be certain imperfections with these old texts, we feel they deserve to be made available for future generations to enjoy.

This article investigates the history of the relation between idealism and pragmatism by examining the importance of the French idealist Charles Renouvier for the development of William James's ‘Will to Believe’. By focusing on French idealism, we obtain a broader understanding of the kinds of idealism on offer in the nineteenth century. First, I show that Renouvier's unique methodological idealism led to distinctively pragmatist doctrines and that his theory of certitude and its connection to freedom is worthy of reconsideration. Second, (...) I argue that the technical vocabulary and main structure of the argument from the ‘Will to Believe’ depend upon Renouvier's idealist theory of knowledge and psychology of belief, and that taking account of this line of influence is of crucial importance for establishing the correct interpretation of James's work. (shrink)

There are various reasons for taking a second look at anything at all. One reason is to discern aspects which have been overlooked; another frequently related reason is to reappraise the value or relevance of whatever is being reconsidered. A thing might be deemed worthless or negligible because some feature or set of features has been overlooked. And this way of conceiving the thing might become so familiar, so entrenched, that it powerfully, because subtly, works against alternative conceptions. In certain (...) intellectual circles, for example, the critiques of religion have become so familiar that the religious hypothesis is not a “living option.” As John Dewey noted, familiarity is more likely to breed credulity than contempt: We take the familiar conception, containing its implicit evaluation, as worthy of our belief, simply because it is familiar. Thus, a second look undertaken from a fresh perspective is ordinarily most promising; for it is most likely to bring into focus overlooked facets and unsuspected relevancies of familiar topics. (shrink)

From 1882 to 1903, Dewey explicitly espoused a Hegelian philosophy. Until recently, scholars agreed that he broke from Hegel no later than 1903, but never adequately accounted for what he called the "permanent deposit" that Hegel left in his mature thought. I argue that Dewey never made a clean break from Hegel. Instead, he drew on the work of the St. Louis Hegelians to fashion a non-metaphysical reading of Hegel, similar to that championed by Klaus Hartmann and other Hegel scholars (...) since the 1970s. This reading of Hegel is remarkably consistent with Dewey's mature philosophy. Although Dewey abruptly repudiated Hegel during World War I, I contend this reflected the exigencies of war rather than philosophical concerns. (shrink)

In his 1905 work on the logical foundations of geometry, Royce proposed a logic based on the “obverse” or O-relation that could provide a means of understanding any system of order. Royce explains that this relation, which he calls the O-relation, “in logical terms,... is the relation in which (if we were talking of the possible chances [choices] open to one who had to decide upon a course of action) any set of exhaustive but, in their entirety, inconsistent choices would (...) stand to one another” (Royce, 1951, 385). This focus on the process of making choices turns on the idea that the action of making a choice produces an asymmetrical relation and so a key part of Royce’s project was to demonstrate the.. (shrink)

It is an honor to participate in this commemoration of the centenary of the death of Josiah Royce. The commemoration provides an occasion for revisiting and reinterpreting Royce to find his continued significance. Once relegated to the margins of American philosophy, a growing group of scholars has been turning to Royce in recent years. The centenary provides an opportunity to reflect on the nature of the interest in Royce.1The first celebration of the body of Royce’s work took place on the (...) occasion of the philosopher’s 60th birthday.2 The American Philosophical Association devoted its 50th annual meeting in December 1915, in Philadelphia to a review of Royce’s life and work. Royce had served as the... (shrink)

On the evening of August 30, 1895, Josiah Royce addressed the Philosophical Union of his alma mater, the University of California at Berkeley, taking as his topic “The Conception of God.” Also speaking that evening were Royce’s former professor, Joseph LeConte, and his former student, Samuel Mezes, but his severest critic at the podium was the organizer of the event, Royce’s friend and rival, George Holmes Howison. In this “battle of the giants,” as the newspaper descriptions characterized it,1 Howison criticized (...) Royce for an inadequate treatment of the individual, person-alist strictures that Royce took to heart. By December the four contributions had been printed as a pamphlet, but they appeared in 1897 in book... (shrink)

Our fellows furnish us the constantly needed supplement to our own fragmentary meanings. That is, they help is find out what our own true meaning is.Very little has been written on Royce’s reception and mentions of Nietzsche that engage the issues of the early dissemination of Nietzsche’s texts in the United States, Royce’s study and knowledge of the range of Nietzsche’s texts, or the mentions of Nietzsche in Royce’s texts from 1906, and up to the posthumously published article “Nietzsche”. This (...) leaves one on a jetty between purely speculative approaches to Nietzsche’s presence in the philosophical works of whoever might strike the fancy of the moment, or... (shrink)

I cannot here withhold the statement that optimism, where it is not merely the thoughtless talk of those who harbor nothing but words under their shallow foreheads, seems to me to be not merely an absurd, but also a really wicked, way of thinking, a bitter mockery of the unspeakable sufferings of mankind.1I am now, and always shall be, in that very sense no optimist, but a maintainer of the sterner view that life is forever tragic. In so far as (...) Schopenhauer has sought to make this plain, I follow him unhesitatingly, and honor him for his mercilessness.2Josiah Royce’s lifelong battle with the pessimism of Arthur Schopenhauer supplies valuable insight into the development of one of the central concepts of his system... (shrink)