The Perestroika movement recently reopened longstanding debates about the scholarly and political implications of orienting political science research around a scientific ideal derived from the natural sciences. Many Perestroikans, like earlier critics of “naturalized” political science, turned to ontology, opposing the political world to the natural world to espouse what I call a two-sciences settlement: a separate-but-equal arrangement in which political science and natural science would each operate according to distinct methodological imperatives dictated by their distinctive objects. In this article, (...) I critically appraise this divided settlement and the two-worlds ontology that underwrites it. I recover an alternative, less dualistic vision of politics and nature from Giambattisa Vico, challenging received views of him as an early architect of the two-sciences settlement. Vico’s vision of ontological hybridity, I argue, offers more robust support to the Perestroikan goals of methodological pluralism and political engagement than the two-worlds ontology Perestroikans often invoked. (shrink)

The Perestroika movement recently reopened longstanding debates about the scholarly and political implications of orienting political science research around a scientific ideal derived from the natural sciences. Many Perestroikans, like earlier critics of “naturalized” political science, turned to ontology, opposing the political world to the natural world to espouse what I call a two-sciences settlement: a separate-but-equal arrangement in which political science and natural science would each operate according to distinct methodological imperatives dictated by their distinctive objects. In this article, (...) I critically appraise this divided settlement and the two-worlds ontology that underwrites it. I recover an alternative, less dualistic vision of politics and nature from Giambattisa Vico, challenging received views of him as an early architect of the two-sciences settlement. Vico’s vision of ontological hybridity, I argue, offers more robust support to the Perestroikan goals of methodological pluralism and political engagement than the two-worlds ontology Perestroikans often invoked. (shrink)

I discuss Arendt’s claim that science and its uses should become a matter of political discussion. The suggestion that science can be discussed and monitored by lay people is based on her interpretation of modern science. Modern science results from a flight from the human condition, which in her view should be reversed by means of the public debate. I conclude that Arendt’s political approach should in fact be called a moral approach. Arendt’s arguments can be reduced to a traditional (...) humanistic critique of science, interpreted as a version of Kant’s antinomy between the cognitive and the moral interests of reason, according to which scientists must be prevented from treating human beings as a natural species like any other. (shrink)

Critics of Hannah Arendt's Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy argue that Arendt fails to address the most important problem of political judgment, namely, validity. This essay shows that Arendt does indeed have an answer to the problem that preoccupies her critics, with one important caveat: she does not think that validity is the all-important problem of political judgment--the affirmation of human freedom is.