As the second part of a research agenda addressing the idea and meaning of Sustainable Development, this paper responds to the challenges set in the first paper. Using a Foucaudian perspective, we uncover and highlight the importance of discourse in the development of societal context which could lead to the radical change in our epistemological thought necessary for Sustainable Development to reach its potential. By developing an argument for an epistemological change, we suggest that business organizations have an ethical responsibility (...) towards revaluating Sustainable Development, leading to a discourse based on an integrated inclusive process of celebrating diversity in all its forms. The paper goes on to explore the argument for such a change. This exploration is based on three issues: the notion of over simplification in the promotion of development; the idea of an imbalance in the interaction of business and government operating in the larger context of society; and the notion of increasing responsibility with increasing influence in terms of the business organization within society. Having established the argument for an ethical choice by business organizations, we then reflect on how such a change could be incorporated into an organization. (shrink)

Hannah Arendt's theory of judgment has been the object of considerable interest in the last three decades. Political theorists in particular have hoped to find in her theory of judgment a viable account of how diverse modern societies can sustain a commitment to dialogue in the absence of shared basic principles. A number of scholars, however, have critiqued Arendt's account of judgment in various ways. This article examines criticisms from Richard Bernstein, Ronald Beiner, George Kateb, Jürgen Habermas, and Linda Zerilli. (...) On the basis of early sources from Arendt's manuscripts and Denktagebuch that have not been used in these debates, this article contends that Arendt's position on judgment can be defended against these critics and that her account warrants further exploration. (shrink)

PRETENDE-SE, NESTE ARTIGO, MOSTRAR DE QUE MODO ARENDT, MANTENDO-SE FIEL À SUA POSIÇÃO ANTIMARXISTA E À CRÍTICA CONTUNDENTE DA DEMOCRACIA FORMAL, COMBINA ELEMENTOS LIBERAIS E DEMOCRÁTICOS PARA DEFENDER UM MODELO DE ESTADO CONSTITUCIONAL, ONDE OS DIREITOS INDIVIDUAIS SEJAM GARANTIDOS AO MESMO TEMPO EM QUE SEJAM MANTIDOS ESPAÇOS DE LIBERDADE QUE PERMITAM AOS CIDADÃOS TORNAREM-SE, DE ALGUM MODO, PARTICIPANTES DA GESTÃO GOVERNAMENTAL E DAS QUESTÕES PÚBLICAS EM GERAL. PARA TANTO, ME CONCENTRAREI, NÃO NOS TEXTOS EM QUE ARENDT SE VOLTA PARA O (...) TOTALITARISMO OU PARA A DITADURA, MAS NAQUELES EM QUE SE DEDICA A REFLETIR SOBRE OS MODOS DE GERAR E AMPLIAR ESPAÇOS DE LIBERDADE EM UM CONTEXTO POLÍTICO EM QUE AS CONDIÇÕES PARA TANTO ESTÃO, EM CERTA MEDIDA, JÁ ESTABELECIDAS, COMO É O CASO DA REPÚBLICA AMERICANA. (shrink)

Para Hannah Arendt, a modernidade configura um período histórico de obscurecimento das determinações políticas democráticas, pois, onde a política não foi reduzida ao plano da violência, como no caso dos fenômenos totalitários, ela foi reduzida ao plano da administração burocrática dos interesses econômicos da sociedade. Neste artigo, pretendo discutir a constituição argumentativa desse diagnóstico, referindo-o à sua raiz de inspiração, isto é, as críticas de Nietzsche e Heidegger à modernidade. Finalmente, procuro demonstrar que Arendt não se limitou a uma concepção (...) negativa das possibilidades políticas modernas, pois vislumbrou nos modernos eventos revolucionários a possibilidade de uma revitalização da política em suas determinações democráticas originárias, dado que aí se restabeleceram os laços entre a ação política, a liberdade e a felicidade pública. (shrink)

This article explores Hannah Arendt's insights into the forms of social control operating especially in democracies, together with the possibility of resistance to such control. Since the way in which one defines freedom informs one's understanding of the techniques that suppress, regulate, and modify behaviour, the article begins by sketching Arendt's notion of freedom, and compares this to its liberal counterpart. That discussion leads to Arendt's conception of power, whose corollary is freedom, and whose suppression amounts to control. The institutional (...) and ideological infrastructure that accompanies the encroachment of ?the social? ? which Arendt links to the hegemony of liberalism ? is conceived as rendering the individual both powerless and apathetic. The article concludes with suggestions regarding resistance to modern forms of control, viewing Arendt's ontology as a source of tenable strategies for the deepening of democracy. (shrink)

Arendt’s theoretical influence is generally traced to Heidegger and experientially to the traumatic events that occurred in Europe during the Second World War. Here, we suggest that Arendt’s conception of politics may be usefully enriched via a proto-anthropic principle found in Augustine and adopted by Arendt throughout her writings. By appealing to this anthropic principle; that without a spectator there could be no world; a profound connection is made between the ‘cosmic jackpot’ of life in the universe and the uniquely (...) human activity that takes place in the political realm. By making this connection we suggest that solutions present themselves to a central puzzle arising in Arendt’s thought: namely, what it is that people actually do in the political realm. The first solution directly addresses the issue of content: what people talk about in Arendt’s public space. The second addresses the importance of ‘maintaining’ a space of appearances. The third considers the effect of participating in and observing the public domain. Consequently, we conclude that, for Arendt, action is nothing less than the activity of ‘world-making.’. (shrink)

Intérpretes importantes costumam enfatizar o diálogo de Arendt com Heideggerquando buscam as fontes do pensamento político arendtiano. Sem recusar a relevânciade Heidegger, a tese central da minha interpretação é a de que Arendt formula eresponde a pergunta basilar da sua filosofia política dialogando, sobretudo, com Marx.Este artigo pretende apontar para o fato de que é recusando a teoria das classes e seusdesdobramentos na utopia marxiana que ela formula a noção de natalidade, na qualfundamenta a pluralidade humana. E que é recusando (...) a definição de homem comoanimal laborans que ela encontra a especificidade do homem na sua capacidade para aação e comunicação. (shrink)

In this article, I argue for bringing the work of Michel Foucault and Hannah Arendt into dialogue with respect to the links between power, subjectivity, and agency. Although one might assume that Foucault and Arendt come from such radically different philosophical starting points that such a dialogue would be impossible, I argue that there is actually a good deal of common ground to be found between these two thinkers. Moreover, I suggest that Foucault's and Arendt's divergent views about the role (...) that power plays in the constitution of subjectivity and agency should be seen as complementary rather than opposed. (shrink)

Criticized as a nostalgic anachronism by those who oppose her version of political theory and lauded as symbol of direct democratic participation by those who favor it, the Athenian polis features prominently in Hannah Arendt's account of politics. This essay traces the origin and development of Arendt's conception of the polis as a space of appearance from the early 1950s onward. It makes particular use of the Denktagebuch, Arendt's intellectual diary, in order to shed new light on the historicity of (...) one of her central concepts. The article contends that both critics and partisans of Arendt's use of the polis have made the same mistake: they have presumed that the polis represents a space of face-to-face immediacy. In fact, Arendt compared the polis to a series of analogues, many of which are not centered on direct exchanges between political actors and spectators. As a result, Arendt's early work on the polis turns out to anticipate many of the concerns of her later work on judgment, and her theory of the polis becomes a theory of topics. (shrink)

In Eichmann in Jerusalem , Hannah Arendt struggled to defend the possibility of judgment against the obvious problems encountered in attempts to offer legally valid and morally meaningful judgments of those who had committed crimes in morally bankrupt communities. Following Norrie, this article argues that Arendt’s conclusions in Eichmann are equivocal and incoherent. Exploring her perspectival theory of judgment, the article suggests that Arendt remains trapped within certain Kantian assumptions in her philosophy of history, and as such sees the question (...) of freedom in a binary way. The article argues that Adorno’s philosophy of freedom provides the resources to diagnose and overcome Arendt’s shortcomings. Adorno’s position provides a way of embracing the antinomical character of judgment, by emphasising the need for elements of reason and nature in the phenomenon of freedom. In Adorno’s lights, judgment becomes an attempt to express a ‘spirit of solidarity’ with the tragic status of the potentially free but actually unfree subject of modernity. (shrink)

Arendt claimed that violence is not part of the political because it is instrumental. Her position has generated a vast corpus of scholarship, most of which falls into the context of the realist-liberal divide. Taking these discussions as a starting point, this essay engages with violence in Arendt’s work from a different perspective. Its interest lies not in Arendt’s theory of violence in the world, but in the function that violence performed in her work, namely, in the constitutive role of (...) violence in her thought. It argues that the concept of violence allowed Arendt to make important distinctions serving to catalyze the categories that constitute her political philosophy and, in particular, the categories of public and private. More specifically, it claims that the concept of violence in Arendt’s work is the a priori background against which both the public and private realms should be defined. (shrink)

Jürgen Habermas’s theory of ‘discourse ethics’ has been an important source of inspiration for theories of deliberative democracy and is typically contrasted with agonistic conceptions of democracy represented by theorists such as Chantal Mouffe. In this article I show that this contrast is overstated. By focusing on the different philosophical traditions that underpin Mouffe’s and Habermas’s respective approaches, commentators have generally overlooked the political similarities between these thinkers. I examine Habermas’s and Mouffe’s respective conceptions of democratic politics and argue that (...) they cannot be so neatly distinguished from each other. I show that much of Mouffe’s criticism of Habermas’s theory does not hold up to careful scrutiny, and discourse ethics shares important points of similarity with her own democratic theory. By using critical republican theory to show the similarities in their work, I push beyond the agonistic versus deliberative debate, and show that at the heart of both of these approaches is a critical republican emphasis on the need for civic solidarity, on the constructive role of conflict in democratic politics and on the vital importance of self-government. These are crucial ingredients for the regeneration of democracy in contemporary pluralistic societies. (shrink)

This paper examines Hannah Arendt’s reception of the Aristotelian philía. First, we expose the notes of the philía in his Nicomachean Ethics and the political projection of friendship as synaísthesis. Secondly, we argue that in a relevant fragment of “Truth and Politics” and in Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, Arendt finishes clarifying her notion of friendship as a political and worldly bond. There she does not allude to Aristotle, but to Kant and his reflections on the sense of taste.

This essay explores the phenomenon of common sense through a contextual analysis of Hannah Arendt’s political application of Kant’s Critique of Judgment. I begin by tracing the development of Arendt’s thinking on judgment and common sense during the 1950s which led her to turn to the third Critique. I then consider the justification of her move by examining the philosophical context and political applications of the third Critique, arguing that within it Kant made an original and profound discovery: that the (...) phenomenon of common sense contains a hidden faculty that may anchor moral and political judgments. I conclude by arguing that Arendt was on firmer ground than is often thought in adapting Kantian common sense to politics, a fact that may afford new possibilities for the practice of moral and political thought. (shrink)

Este trabajo parte de una suposición simple: que existe una afinidad profunda entre lo que podemos llamar de un modo aproximativo los movimientos o revueltas de la indignación y los análisis arendtianos del fenómeno revolucionario, en especial en lo que respecta al “tesoro perdido” de las revoluciones: sociétés populaires, distritos y secciones comunales, Soviets o Räte. Estas formas de poder colectivo han sido según Arendt las únicas que han mostrado ser capaces de dar un espacio perdurable al espíritu de la (...) Revolución —“un espíritu nuevo, y el espíritu de dar origen a algo nuevo”—, pero han sido no sólo derrotadas por todas partes sino también malentendidas y olvidadas. Nuestro propósito a este respecto es mostrar, aparte de las razones de esta afinidad, que la perplejidad política que los movimientos recientes han generado no se diferencia de la que no ha dejado de provocar este “tesoro perdido”. (shrink)

This article traces a discontinuous tradition of council thought from the Dutch and German council communist tendencies of the 1920s to its re-emergence in the writings of three important mid-twentieth-century political theorists: Cornelius Castoriadis, Claude Lefort, and Hannah Arendt. It connects an intellectual history of the council concept in post-war Europe with a political history of the small revolutionary groups that fostered council-related political activity during this era. It claims that, as the experience of the European council movements began to (...) be interpreted within a new political context, this gave rise to several radically altered forms of council thought. In this more subjectivist and praxis-oriented tradition, the councils became a utopian placeholder for theorists to explore their particular interests in human creativity (Castoriadis), self-limiting power (Lefort), and political freedom (Arendt). This analysis develops our understanding of the continuities and ruptures of the council tradition within political thought. (shrink)

Extant literature on Political CSR and the role of governments in the governance of business conduct tends to neglect key implications of the political-institutional macro-context for public deliberation. Contextual assumptions often remain rather implicit, leading to the need for a more nuanced, explicit and context-sensitive exploration of the theoretical and practical boundary conditions of Political CSR. In non-democratic political-institutional contexts, political pluralism and participation are limited, and governmental agencies continue to play the most central role in regulation and its enforcement. (...) Drawing on a qualitative case study on a nuclear energy project in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, we show how both governments and MNCs co-create a context hostile to socially responsible business conduct in the sense of Political CSR. Utilizing rich qualitative data derived from interviews, public documents, and participant observation between 2008 and 2018, we specifically illuminate how—through which interactions and strategies—the multiple governmental and corporate actors involved counter civil society demands for public deliberation, indicating the limitations of Political CSR in non-democratic political-institutional contexts. We particularly contribute to the development of Political CSR by analysing the role of coercive and discursive forms of power. We thus offer a more nuanced perspective on the role of governments in constraining the room for public deliberation in the sense of Political CSR. (shrink)

This article explores the role of reflective judgement in international relations through the lens of the Rwandan genocide in 1994. It argues that Hannah Arendt's writings on reflective judgement, and the dual perspectives of actor and spectator she articulates, offer us a set of conceptual tools with which to examine the failure of the international community to respond to the genocide as well as more broadly to understand the moral dilemmas posed by such crimes against humanity. Having identified elements which (...) form part of Arendt's concept of judgement, parallels in the case of Rwanda are found, drawing on both empirical evidence and recent interpretations of the genocide. Reflective judgement is offered as both a means of critique and as a source of normative guidance for political actors. (shrink)

This article critically examines Jürgen Habermas’s theory of democracy as developed in Between Facts and Norms. In particular, it focuses on the concept of communicative power and argues that there is a crucial ambiguity in Habermas’s use of this concept. Since communicative power is the key normative resource that is supposed to counter the norm-free steering media of money and administrative power, its role within the theory must be made clear. The article begins by explaining the normative and social-theoretic foundations (...) of the theory. Then it highlights the normative importance of the public sphere in Habermas’s two-track model of deliberative politics, before turning to the problems with the concept of communicative power. Two alternative readings of its role are provided in order to demonstrate how it needs to be further clarified. (shrink)

In this paper, I am arguing for hermeneutic responsibility in political judgment, as it can be attributed to Arendt’s work. Political judgment is reflective judgment relying on representation by imagination and therefore only has exemplary validity. Along the line of Arendt’s Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, I point out her argument for a different generality in politics than the generality of concepts. This generality of political judgment always refers back to the particular. Only by this reference to the particular, namely (...) to facts and situations of direct interaction, can the spectator, who undertakes the political judgment, create the public realm where action takes place. However, this task attributed to the spectator also implies the task of reshaping the public realm. These acts of giving an account of and reconsidering all over again facts handed over by narration and testimony imply the hermeneutic responsibility to unceasingly retrieve factual truth which is rooted in direct interaction. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question of 'What is technology?' in order to develop a framework for the assessment and regulation of technology. I suggest that technology is how we build our world, drawing on the distinctions between the world and the earth, and between the human activities of labour, work and action, made by Hannah Arendt. Arendt's thought has a number of implications for how we should think about and assess the world, and thus technology: the world should not be (...) judged instrumentally, but in terms of whether it provides a place for human action. A model of a possible framework for technology assessment is provided by the UK planning system. (shrink)