John Forrester’s book Thinking in Cases does not provide one ultimate definition of what it means to ‘think in cases’, but rather several alternatives: a ‘style of reasoning’ (Hacking), ‘paradigms’ or ‘exemplars’ (Kuhn), and ‘language games’ (Wittgenstein), to mention only a few. But for Forrester, the stories behind each of the figures who suggested these different models for thinking (in cases) are as important as the models themselves. In other words, the question for Forrester is not only what ‘thinking in (...) cases’ is, but also who might be considered a ‘thinker in cases’. Who could serve as a case study for such a thinker? The major candidates that Forrester considers in his book to be ‘thinkers in cases’ are Kuhn, Foucault, Freud, and Winnicott. In what follows, I will argue that one name is missing from this list, as well as from Forrester’s book more generally: Michael Balint. This name is missing not only because Balint was a great ‘thinker in cases’, but also because we have some reasons to believe that Forrester himself thought so and wished to add him to the list. Forrester, I will argue, found in Balint an exemplar for a thinker in cases that combined elements from Winnicott’s psychoanalytic theory and Foucault’s philosophy of the case-based sciences. (shrink)

A scientific community cannot practice its trade without some set of received beliefs. These beliefs form the foundation of the "educational initiation that prepares and licenses the student for professional practice". The nature of the "rigorous and rigid" preparation helps ensure that the received beliefs are firmly fixed in the student's mind. Scientists take great pains to defend the assumption that scientists know what the world is like...To this end, "normal science" will often suppress novelties which undermine its foundations. Research (...) is therefore not about discovering the unknown, but rather "a strenuous and devoted attempt to force nature into the conceptual boxes supplied by professional education". (shrink)

Thomas S. Kuhn's classic book is now available with a new index.

We cannot understand contemporary psychology without first researching its history. Unlike other books on the history of psychology, which are chronologically ordered, this Handbook is organized topically. It covers the history of ideas in multiple areas of the field and reviews the intellectual history behind the major topics of investigation. The evolution of psychological ideas is described alongside an analysis of their surrounding context. Readers learn how eminent psychologists draw on the context of their time and place for ideas and (...) practices, and also how innovation in psychology is an ongoing dialogue between past, present, and anticipated future. (shrink)

In their meta-scientific studies of psychology, psychologists often use what they take to be the views of Thomas Kuhn. Although a critical examination of psychology or aspects of psychology is laudatory, psychologists' also need to accurately understand and to assume a critical stance toward the meta-scientific views that they employ. In this paper the views of the historian of science, Thomas Kuhn, are examined. The following questions are addressed: What were Kuhn's investigative methods? What are his views of science? What (...) exactly do Kuhn's conclusions about science mean? How does Kuhn rely on psychology? and, What does Kuhn have to say about psychology? The extent to which psychologists find Kuhn so attractive is puzzling given the significant ambiguities and inconsistencies in Kuhn's views, his informal and unsystematic use of psychology, and his disparaging comments about psychology. It is recommended that psychologists adopt a more critical stance toward Kuhn and that they consider other meta-scientific theories in their studies of psychology. (shrink)

First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Freud may never have set foot in Cambridge - that hub for the twentieth century's most influential thinkers and scientists - but his intellectual impact there in the years between the two World Wars was immense. This is a story that has long languished untold, buried under different accounts of the dissemination of psychoanalysis. John Forrester and Laura Cameron present a fascinating and deeply textured history of the ways in which a set of Freudian ideas about the workings of the (...) human mind, sexuality and the unconscious affected Cambridge men and women - from A. G. Tansley and W. H. R. Rivers to Bertrand Russell, Bernal, Strachey and Wittgenstein - shaping their thinking across a range of disciplines, from biology to anthropology, and from philosophy to psychology, education and literature. Freud in Cambridge will be welcomed as a major intervention by literary scholars, historians and all readers interested in twentieth-century intellectual and scientific life. (shrink)

Thomas Kuhn's _The Structure of Scientific Revolutions_ is one of the best known and most influential books of the twentieth century. Whether they adore or revile him, critics and fans alike have tended to agree on one thing: Kuhn's ideas were revolutionary. But were they? Steve Fuller argues that Kuhn actually held a profoundly conservative view of science and how one ought to study its history. Early on, Kuhn came under the influence of Harvard President James Bryant Conant, who had (...) developed an educational program intended to help deflect Cold War unease over science's uncertain future by focusing on its illustrious past. Fuller argues that this rhetoric made its way into _Structure,_ which Fuller sees as preserving and reinforcing the old view that science really is just a steady accumulation of truths about the world. Fuller suggests that Kuhn, deliberately or not, shared the tendency in Western culture to conceal possible negative effects of new knowledge from the general public. Because it insists on a difference between a history of science for scientists and one suited to historians, Fuller charges that _Structure_ created the awkward divide that has led directly to the "Science Wars" and has stifled much innovative research. In conclusion, Fuller offers a way forward that rejects Kuhn's fixation on paradigms in favor of a conception of science as a social movement designed to empower society's traditionally disenfranchised elements. Certain to be controversial, _Thomas Kuhn_ must be read by anyone who has adopted, challenged, or otherwise engaged with _The Structure of Scientific Revolutions._ "Structure will never look quite the same again after Fuller. In that sense, he has achieved one of the main aims of his ambitious and impressively executed project."—Jon Turney, _Times Higher Education Supplement_ "Philosophies like Kuhn's narrow the possible futures of inquiry by politically methodizing and taming them. More republican philosophies will leave the future open. Mr. Fuller has amply succeeded in his program of distinguishing the one from the other."—William R. Everdell, _Washington Times_. (shrink)

Contributors from the fields of philosophy, history of science, linguistics, logic, and economics take inspiration from the work of the late Thomas Kuhn, scholar of history and the philosophy of science, to address a variety of research lines in the pragmatical dimension of language, the internal ambiguity of linguistic standards, and the critical role of constructive translation as a bridge between seemingly incommensurable paradigms and cultures. The volume's 28 contributions are divided into four sections: incommensurability, translation, and theory change; communicating (...) science; cognition and formal reconstruction; and lexicon and semantics and primarily consist of articles which emerged from the International Conference on Languages of Science, organized by the University of Bologna in October 1995. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR. (shrink)

"Based upon the authors' presentations at the plenary sessions of the fifth annual symposium of the Jean Piaget Society." Includes bibliographies and indexes.

The main conclusion drawn in this text is that Piaget's accounts of the construction of necessary knowledge continue to have an intelligible and respectable bases.

First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.