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In Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (eds.), Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. MIT Press (2009)

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  1. The Epistemic Conception of Hallucination.Susanna Siegel - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action and Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 205--224.
    Early formulations of disjunctivism about perception refused to give any positive account of the nature of hallucination, beyond the uncontroversial fact that they can in some sense seem to the same to the subject as veridical perceptions. Recently, some disjunctivists have attempt to account for hallucination in purely epistemic terms, by developing detailed account of what it is for a hallucinaton to be indiscriminable from a veridical perception. In this paper I argue that the prospects for purely epistemic treatments of (...)
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  • A Disjunctivist Conception of Acting for Reasons.Jennifer Hornsby - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    A disjunctivist conception of acting for reasons is introduced by way of showing that a view of acting for reasons must give a place to knowledge. Two principal claims are made. 1. This conception has a rôle analogous to that of the disjunctive conception that John McDowell recommends in thinking about perception; and when the two disjunctivist conceptions are treated as counterparts, they can be shown to have work to do in combination. 2. This conception of acting for reasons safeguards (...)
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  • Disjunctivism About Visual Experience.Scott Sturgeon - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 112--143.
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  • On Being Alienated.Michael G. F. Martin - 2006 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.
    Disjunctivism about perceptual appearances, as I conceive of it, is a theory which seeks to preserve a naïve realist conception of veridical perception in the light of the challenge from the argument from hallucination. The naïve realist claims that some sensory experiences are relations to mind-independent objects. That is to say, taking experiences to be episodes or events, the naïve realist supposes that some such episodes have as constituents mind-independent objects. In turn, the disjunctivist claims that in a case of (...)
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  • Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
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  • What the Disjunctivist is Right About.Alan Millar - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):176-198.
    There is a traditional conception of sensory experience on which the experiences one has looking at, say, a cat could be had by sorneone rnerely hallucinating a cat. Disjunctivists take issue with this conception on the grounds that it does not enable us to understand how perceptual knowledge is possible. In particular, they think, it does not explain how it can be that experiences gained in perceptionenable us to be in ‘cognitive contact’ with objects and facts. I develop this challenge (...)
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  • Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man.Thomas Reid & A. D. Woozley - 1942 - Philosophy 17 (66):189-190.
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  • The Nature of Perception.John Foster - 2000 - Mind 110 (438):455-460.
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  • The Puzzle of Experience.J. J. VALBERG - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (178):125-127.
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  • The Puzzle of Experience.J. J. VALBERG - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):246-248.
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  • Identity and Discrimination.Timothy WILLIAMSON - 1990 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (166):95-98.
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  • Identity and Discrimination.Timothy WILLIAMSON - 1990 - Wiley-Blackwell.
    _Identity and Discrimination_, originally published in 1990 and the first book by respected philosopher Timothy Williamson, is now reissued and updated with the inclusion of significant new material. Williamson here proposes an original and rigorous theory linking identity, a relation central to metaphysics, and indiscriminability, a relation central to epistemology.__ Updated and reissued edition of Williamson’s first publication, with the inclusion of significant new material Argues for an original cognitive account of the relation between identity and discrimination that has been (...)
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  • Sense and Sensibilia.J. L. AUSTIN - 1962 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 25 (4):600-600.
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  • Sense and Sensibilia.J. L. Austin & G. J. Warnock - 1962 - Philosophical Quarterly 13 (51):162-170.
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  • Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):490-494.
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  • The Formulation of Disjunctivism: A Response to Fish.Paul F. Snowdon - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (1):129-141.
    Fish proposes that we need to elucidate what 'disjunctivism' stands for, and he also proposes that it stands for the rejection of a principle about the nature of experience that he calls the decisiveness principle. The present paper argues that his first proposal is reasonable, but then argues, in Section II, that his positive suggestion does not draw the line between disjunctivism and non-disjunctivism in the right place. In Section III, it is argued that disjunctivism is a thesis about the (...)
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  • The Theory of Appearing.Charles A. Baylis & Roderick M. Chisholm - 1951 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 16 (4):299.
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  • The Transparency of Experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.
    A common objection to sense-datum theories of perception is that they cannot give an adequate account of the fact that introspection indicates that our sensory experiences are directed on, or are about, the mind-independent entities in the world around us, that our sense experience is transparent to the world. In this paper I point out that the main force of this claim is to point out an explanatory challenge to sense-datum theories.
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  • Berkeley's Puzzle.John Campbell - 2002 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. MIT Press.
    But say you,surely there is nothing easier than to imagine trees,for instance,in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobody by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no dif?culty in it:but what is all this,I beseech you,more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of anyone that may perceive them? But do you not yourself perceive or think of (...)
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  • Introduction: Varieties of Disjunctivism.Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    Inspired by the writings of J. M. Hinton (1967a, 1967b, 1973), but ushered into the mainstream by Paul Snowdon (1980–1, 1990–1), John McDowell (1982, 1986), and M. G. F. Martin (2002, 2004, 2006), disjunctivism is currently discussed, advocated, and opposed in the philosophy of perception, the theory of knowledge, the theory of practical reason, and the philosophy of action. But what is disjunctivism?
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  • Back to the Theory of Appearing.William P. Alston - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):181--203.
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  • Either/Or.Alex Byrne & Heather Logue - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 314-19.
    This essay surveys the varieties of disjunctivism about perceptual experience. Disjunctivism comes in two main flavours, metaphysical and epistemological.
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  • Indiscriminability and the Phenomenal.Susanna Siegel - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):91-112.
    In this paper, I describe and criticize M.G.F. Martin's version of disjunctivism, and his argument for it from premises about self-knowledge.
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  • The Myth of Sense-Data.Winston H. F. Barnes - 1944 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 45 (1):89-118.
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  • What is Disjunctivism?Michael Thau - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):193-253.
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  • Sense-Experience Revisited.J. M. Hinton - 1996 - Philosophical Investigations 19 (3):211-236.
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  • The Nonconceptual Content of Experience.Tim Crane - 1992 - In The Contents of Experience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 136-57.
    Some have claimed that people with very different beliefs literally see the world differently. Thus Thomas Kuhn: ‘what a man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon what his previous visual—conceptual experience has taught him to see’ (Kuhn 1970, p. ll3). This view — call it ‘Perceptual Relativism’ — entails that a scientist and a child may look at a cathode ray tube and, in a sense, the first will see it while the second won’t. The (...)
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  • The Origins of Qualia.Tim Crane - 2000 - In Tim Crane & Sarah Patterson (eds.), The History of the Mind-Body Problem. London: Routledge.
    The mind-body problem in contemporary philosophy has two parts: the problem of mental causation and the problem of consciousness. These two parts are not unrelated; in fact, it can be helpful to see them as two horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, the causal interaction between mental and physical phenomena seems to require that all causally efficacious mental phenomena are physical; but on the other hand, the phenomenon of consciousness seems to entail that not all mental phenomena are (...)
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  • Disjunctivism.John Hawthorne & Karson Kovakovich - 2006 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 80 (1):145-83.
    [John Hawthorne] We examine some well-known disjunctivist projects in the philosophy of perception, mainly in a critical vein. Our discussion is divided into four parts. Following some introductory remarks, we examine in part two the link between object-dependent contents and disjunctivism. In part three, we explore the disjunctivist's use of discriminability facts as a basis for understanding experience. In part four, we examine an interesting argument for disjunctivism that has been offered by Michael Martin. /// [Scott Sturgeon] The paper aims (...)
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  • The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument.J. Mcdowell - 2006 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 25 (1).
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  • Singular Thought and the Extent of 'Inner Space'.John McDowell - 1986 - In John McDowell & Philip Pettit (eds.), Subject, Thought, and Context. Clarendon Press.
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  • Reflective Disjunctivism.Scott Sturgeon - 2006 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 80 (1):185–216.
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  • Perceptual Experience.T. S. Gendler & J. Hawthorne - 2009 - Critica 41 (122):124-132.
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  • Experiences: An Enquiry Into Some Ambiguities.J. M. Hinton - 1974 - Philosophical Quarterly 24 (95):174-179.
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  • The Content of Perceptual Experience.John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (175):190.
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  • The Problems of Philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1912 - Mind 21 (84):556-564.
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  • Back to the Theory of Appearing.William P. Alston - 1999 - Noûs 33 (s13):181-203.
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  • In Defense of Disjunctivism.Ram Neta - 2008 - In Fiona Macpherson & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 311--29.
    Right now, I see a computer in front of me. Now, according to current philosophical orthodoxy, I could have the very same perceptual experience that I’m having right now even if I were not seeing a computer in front of me. Indeed, such orthodoxy tells us, I could have the very same experience that I’m having right now even if I were not seeing anything at all in front of me, but simply suffering from a hallucination. More generally, someone can (...)
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  • McDowellian Neo-Mooreanism.Duncan Pritchard - 2006 - In Fiona Macpherson & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 283--310.
    It is claimed that McDowell’s treatment of scepticism offers a potential way of resurrecting the much derided ‘Moorean’ response to scepticism in a fashion that avoids the problems facing classical internalist and externalist construals of neo-Mooreanism. I here evaluate the prospects for a McDowellian neo-Mooreanism and, in doing so, offer further support for the view.
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  • Emotion and Force.York H. Gunther - 2003 - In Essays on Nonconceptual Content. MIT Press. pp. 279--88.
    Any satisfactory model of the emotions must at once recognize their place within intentional psychology and acknowledge their uniqueness as mental causes. In the first half of the century, the James-Lange model had considerable influence on reinforcing the idea that emotions are non-intentional (see Lange 1885 and James 1890). The uniqueness of emotions was therefore acknowledged at the price of denying them a place within intentional psychology proper. More recently, cognitive reductionists (including identity theorists) like Robert Solomon and Joel Marks (...)
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