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  1. Vision.David Marr - 1982 - W. H. Freeman.
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  • Computation and Cognition: Toward a Foundation for Cognitive Science.Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1984 - Cambridge: MIT Press.
    This systematic investigation of computation and mental phenomena by a noted psychologist and computer scientist argues that cognition is a form of computation, that the semantic contents of mental states are encoded in the same general way as computer representations are encoded. It is a rich and sustained investigation of the assumptions underlying the directions cognitive science research is taking. 1 The Explanatory Vocabulary of Cognition 2 The Explanatory Role of Representations 3 The Relevance of Computation 4 The Psychological Reality (...)
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  • The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 1983 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
    One of the most notable aspects of Fodor's work is that it articulates features not only of speculative cognitive architectures but also of current research in ...
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  • The Modularity of Mind.Robert Cummins & Jerry Fodor - 1983 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):101.
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  • The Visual Brain in Action.A. David Milner & Melvyn A. Goodale - 1995 - Oxford University Press.
    Although the mechanics of how the eye works are well understood, debate still exists as to how the complex machinery of the brain interprets neural impulses...
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  • The Mind Doesn’T Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 2000 - MIT Press.
    Jerry Fodor argues against the widely held view that mental processes are largely computations, that the architecture of cognition is massively modular, and...
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  • The Architecture of the Mind:Massive Modularity and the Flexibility of Thought: Massive Modularity and the Flexibility of Thought.Peter Carruthers - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press UK.
    This book is a comprehensive development and defense of one of the guiding assumptions of evolutionary psychology: that the human mind is composed of a large number of semi-independent modules. The Architecture of the Mind has three main goals. One is to argue for massive mental modularity. Another is to answer a 'How possibly?' challenge to any such approach. The first part of the book lays out the positive case supporting massive modularity. It also outlines how the thesis should best (...)
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  • (1 other version)Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification.Susanna Siegel - 2011 - Noûs 46 (2).
    In this paper I argue that it's possible that the contents of some visual experiences are influenced by the subject's prior beliefs, hopes, suspicions, desires, fears or other mental states, and that this possibility places constraints on the theory of perceptual justification that 'dogmatism' or 'phenomenal conservativism' cannot respect.
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  • Seeing and Visualizing: It's Not What You Think.Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 2003 - Bradford.
    How we see and how we visualize: why the scientific account differs from our experience.
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  • (1 other version)Is vision continuous with cognition?: The case for cognitive impenetrability of visual perception.Zenon Pylyshyn - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):341-365.
    Although the study of visual perception has made more progress in the past 40 years than any other area of cognitive science, there remain major disagreements as to how closely vision is tied to general cognition. This paper sets out some of the arguments for both sides and defends the position that an important part of visual perception, which may be called early vision or just vision, is prohibited from accessing relevant expectations, knowledge and utilities - in other words it (...)
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  • Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience: Rethinking the Issue in Light of an Indirect Mechanism.Fiona Macpherson - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):24-62.
    Can the phenomenal character of perceptual experience be altered by the states of one's cognitive system, for example, one's thoughts or beliefs? If one thinks that this can happen then one thinks that there can be cognitive penetration of perceptual experience; otherwise, one thinks that perceptual experience is cognitively impenetrable. I claim that there is one alleged case of cognitive penetration that cannot be explained away by the standard strategies one can typically use to explain away alleged cases. The case (...)
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  • The Visual Brain in Action.David Milner & Mel Goodale - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
    First published in 1995, The Visual Brain in Action remains a seminal publication in the cognitive sciences. For this new edition, a very substantial and illustrated epilogue has been added to the book in which Milner and Goodale review the key developments that support or challenge the views that were put forward in the first edition.
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  • Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.Dustin Stokes - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):646-663.
    Perception is typically distinguished from cognition. For example, seeing is importantly different from believing. And while what one sees clearly influences what one thinks, it is debatable whether what one believes and otherwise thinks can influence, in some direct and non-trivial way, what one sees. The latter possible relation is the cognitive penetration of perception. Cognitive penetration, if it occurs, has implications for philosophy of science, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. This paper offers an analysis of the phenomenon, (...)
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  • How direct is visual perception? Some reflections on Gibson's 'ecological approach'.Jerry A. Fodor & Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1981 - Cognition 9 (2):139-96.
    Examines the theses that the postulation of mental processing is unnecessary to account for our perceptual relationship with the world, see turvey etal. for a criticque.
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  • The visual brain in action (precis).David Milner - 1998 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 4.
    First published in 1995, The Visual Brain in Action remains a seminal publication in the cognitive sciences. It presents a model for understanding the visual processing underlying perception and action, proposing a broad distinction within the brain between two kinds of vision: conscious perception and unconscious 'online' vision. It argues that each kind of vision can occur quasi-independently of the other, and is separately handled by a quite different processing system. In the 11 years since publication, the book has provoked (...)
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  • Neural mechanisms of selective visual attention.R. Desimone & J. Duncan - 1995 - Annual Review of Neuroscience 18 (1):193-222.
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  • Perceiving and Desiring: A New Look at the Cognitive Penetrability of Experience.Dustin Stokes - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (3):479-92.
    This paper considers an orectic penetration hypothesis which says that desires and desire-like states may influence perceptual experience in a non-externally mediated way. This hypothesis is clarified with a definition, which serves further to distinguish the interesting target phenomenon from trivial and non-genuine instances of desire-influenced perception. Orectic penetration is an interesting possible case of the cognitive penetrability of perceptual experience. The orectic penetration hypothesis is thus incompatible with the more common thesis that perception is cognitively impenetrable. It is of (...)
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  • Circularity, reliability, and the cognitive penetrability of perception.Jack Lyons - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):289-311.
    Is perception cognitively penetrable, and what are the epistemological consequences if it is? I address the latter of these two questions, partly by reference to recent work by Athanassios Raftopoulos and Susanna Seigel. Against the usual, circularity, readings of cognitive penetrability, I argue that cognitive penetration can be epistemically virtuous, when---and only when---it increases the reliability of perception.
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  • The epistemic impact of the etiology of experience.Susanna Siegel - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):697-722.
    In this paper I offer a theory of what makes certain influences on visual experiences by prior mental states (including desires, beliefs, moods, and fears) reduce the justificatory force of those experiences. The main idea is that experiences, like beliefs, can have rationally assessable etiologies, and when those etiologies are irrational, the experiences are epistemically downgraded.
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  • Perceptual plasticity and theoretical neutrality: A reply to Jerry Fodor.Paul M. Churchland - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (June):167-87.
    The doctrine that the character of our perceptual knowledge is plastic, and can vary substantially with the theories embraced by the perceiver, has been criticized in a recent paper by Fodor. His arguments are based on certain experimental facts and theoretical approaches in cognitive psychology. My aim in this paper is threefold: to show that Fodor's views on the impenetrability of perceptual processing do not secure a theory-neutral foundation for knowledge; to show that his views on impenetrability are almost certainly (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Epistemology of Perception.Susanna Siegel & Nicholas Silins - 2015 - In Mohan Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. New York, NY: Oxford University Press UK.
    An overview of the epistemology of perception, covering the nature of justification, immediate justification, the relationship between the metaphysics of perceptual experience and its rational role, the rational role of attention, and cognitive penetrability. The published version will contain a smaller bibliography, due to space constraints in the volume.
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  • The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology.Jerry Fodor - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):549-552.
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  • Cognition and Perception: How Do Psychology and Neural Science Inform Philosophy?Athanassios Raftopoulos - 2009 - MIT Press.
    An argument that there are perceptual mechanisms that retrieve information in cognitively and conceptually unmediated ways and that this sheds light on various ...
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  • A Reply to Churchland’s “Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality‘.Jerry A. Fodor - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (June):188-98.
    Churchland's paper "Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality" offers empirical, semantical and epistemological arguments intended to show that the cognitive impenetrability of perception "does not establish a theory-neutral foundation for knowledge" and that the psychological account of perceptual encapsulation that I set forth in The Modularity of Mind "[is] almost certainly false". The present paper considers these arguments in detail and dismisses them.
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  • (1 other version)Sight Unseen: An Exploration of Conscious and Unconscious Vision.Melvyn A. Goodale & A. David Milner - 2004 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by A. D. Milner.
    Vision, more than any other sense, dominates our mental life. Our visual experience is just so rich, so detailed, that we can hardly distinguish that experience from the world itself. Even when we just think about the world and don't look at it directly, we can't help but 'imagine' what it looks like. We think of 'seeing' as being a conscious activity--we direct our eyes, we choose what we look at, we register what we are seeing. The series of events (...)
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  • Visual spatial constancy and modularity: Does intention penetrate vision?Wayne Wu - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):647-669.
    Is vision informationally encapsulated from cognition or is it cognitively penetrated? I shall argue that intentions penetrate vision in the experience of visual spatial constancy: the world appears to be spatially stable despite our frequent eye movements. I explicate the nature of this experience and critically examine and extend current neurobiological accounts of spatial constancy, emphasizing the central role of motor signals in computing such constancy. I then provide a stringent condition for failure of informational encapsulation that emphasizes a computational (...)
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  • Modular architectures and informational encapsulation: A dilemma.Dustin Stokes & Vincent Bergeron - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (3):315-38.
    Amongst philosophers and cognitive scientists, modularity remains a popular choice for an architecture of the human mind, primarily because of the supposed explanatory value of this approach. Modular architectures can vary both with respect to the strength of the notion of modularity and the scope of the modularity of mind. We propose a dilemma for modular architectures, no matter how these architectures vary along these two dimensions. First, if a modular architecture commits to the informational encapsulation of modules, as it (...)
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  • Is perception informationally encapsulated? The issue of the theory‐ladenness of perception.Athanassios Raftopoulos - 2001 - Cognitive Science 25 (3):423-451.
    Fodor has argued that observation is theory neutral, since the perceptual systems are modular, that is, they are domain‐specific, encapsulated, mandatory, fast, hard‐wired in the organism, and have a fixed neural architecture. Churchland attacks the theoretical neutrality of observation on the grounds that (a) the abundant top‐down pathways in the brain suggest the cognitive penetration of perception and (b) perceptual learning can change in the wiring of the perceptual systems. In this paper I introduce a distinction between sensation, perception, and (...)
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  • Visual attention, conceptual content, and doing it right.Wayne Wu - 2008 - Mind 117 (468):1003-1033.
    Reflection on the fine-grained information required for visual guidance of action has suggested that visual content is non-conceptual. I argue that in a common type of visually guided action, namely the use of manipulable artefacts, vision has conceptual content. Specifically, I show that these actions require visual attention and that concepts are involved in directing attention. In acting with artefacts, there is a way of doing it right as determined by the artefact’s conventional use. Attention must reflect our understanding of (...)
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  • Reentrant neural pathways and the theory-ladenness of perception.Athanassios Raftopoulos - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (3):S187-S199.
    In this paper I argue for the cognitive impenetrability of perception by undermining the argument from reentrant pathways. To do that I will adduce psychological and neuropsychological evidence showing that (a) early vision processing is not affected by our knowledge about specific objects and events, and (b) that the role of the descending pathways is to enable the early-vision processing modules to participate in higher-level visual or cognitive functions. My thesis is that a part of observation, which I will call (...)
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  • (1 other version)Visual attention.Marvin Chun & Jeremy Wolfe - 2001 - In E. Bruce Goldstein (ed.), Blackwell Handbook of Perception. Blackwell. pp. 2--335.
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  • The Psychology of Attention.Elizabeth A. Styles - 1997 - Psychology Press.
    Research on attention has evolved dramatically since the early work of the 1950s, and even in the few years since the publication of the first edition of this ...
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  • Indexing the World? Visual Tracking, Modularity, and the Perception–Cognition Interface.Santiago Echeverri - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (1):215-245.
    Research in vision science, developmental psychology, and the foundations of cognitive science has led some theorists to posit referential mechanisms similar to indices. This hypothesis has been framed within a Fodorian conception of the early vision module. The article shows that this conception is mistaken, for it cannot handle the ‘interface problem’—roughly, how indexing mechanisms relate to higher cognition and conceptual thought. As a result, I reject the inaccessibility of early vision to higher cognition and make some constructive remarks on (...)
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  • Cognitive Penetrabiity of Perception: Attention, Strategies and Bottom-Up Constraints.Athanassios Raftopoulos (ed.) - 2005 - New York: Nova Science.
    The chapters in this book address directly the issue of the cognitive penetrability of perception.
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