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  1. The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and the Phenomenal Concept Strategy.E. Diaz-Leon - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):62-73.
    The hard problem of consciousness is about how we could explain in physicalist terms why we are conscious. The meta-problem of consciousness is about how we could explain why we have a hard problem of consciousness. In this note I argue that the phenomenal concept strategy can in principle provide a satisfactory solution to the meta-problem.
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  • Ignorance and the Meta-Problem of Consciousness.T. McClelland - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):108-119.
    Chalmers (2018) considers a wide range of possible responses to the meta-problem of consciousness. Among them is the ignorance hypothesis -- the view that there only appears to be a hard problem because of our inadequate conception of the physical. Although Chalmers quickly dismisses this view, I argue that it has much greater promise than he recognizes. The plausibility of the ignorance hypothesis depends on how exactly one frames the 'problem intuitions' that a solution to the meta-problem must explain. I (...)
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  • Bayesing Qualia: Consciousness as Inference, Not Raw Datum.A. Clark, K. Friston & S. Wilkinson - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):19-33.
    The meta-problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 2018) is the problem of explaining the behaviours and verbal reports that we associate with the so-called 'hard problem of consciousness'. These may include reports of puzzlement, of the attractiveness of dualism, of explanatory gaps, and the like. We present and defend a solution to the meta-problem. Our solution takes as its starting point the emerging picture of the brain as a hierarchical inference engine. We show why such a device, operating under familiar forms of (...)
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  • Welcome to Strong Illusionism.Daniel C. Dennett - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):48-58.
    David Chalmers underestimates the possibility that actually answering the 'hard question' will make both the hard problem and the meta-problem of consciousness evaporate.
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  • From Sensor Variables to Phenomenal Facts.W. Schwarz - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):217-227.
    Some cognitive processes appear to have “phenomenal” properties that are directly revealed to the subject and not determined by physical properties. I suggest that the source of this appearance is the method by which our brain processes sensory information. The appearance is an illusion. Nonetheless, we are not mistaken when we judge that people sometimes fee lpain.
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  • On Chalmers on the Meta-Problem.Haoying Liu - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):91-98.
    In this commentary on Chalmers’s work on the meta-problem of consciousness, I defend an approach to the meta-problem that Chalmers finds unpromising (i.e., what Chalmers has called the “use-mention fallacy” strategy.) The core of this strategy is the idea that thinking about consciousness requires a special mode of thought that activates phenomenal consciousness itself, which then facilitates a (mistaken) intuition that a first-person thought of consciousness and a third-person thought of a brain state cannot refer to the same thing. Chalmers (...)
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  • The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and the Evidential Approach.François Kammerer - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):124-135.
    I present and I implement what I take to be the best approach to solve the meta-problem: the evidential approach. The main tenet of this approach is to explain our problematic phenomenal intuitions by putting our representations of phenomenal states in perspective within the larger frame of the cognitive processes we use to conceive of evidence.
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  • (1 other version)The Meta-Problem of Consciousness.David J. Chalmers - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (9-10):6-61.
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  • The Folk Psychology of Consciousness.Adam Arico, Brian Fiala, Robert F. Goldberg & Shaun Nichols - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (3):327-352.
    This paper proposes the ‘AGENCY model’ of conscious state attribution, according to which an entity's displaying certain relatively simple features (e.g. eyes, distinctive motions, interactive behavior) automatically triggers a disposition to attribute conscious states to that entity. To test the model's predictions, participants completed a speeded object/attribution task, in which they responded positively or negatively to attributions of mental properties (including conscious and non-conscious states) to different sorts of entities (insects, plants, artifacts, etc.). As predicted, participants responded positively to conscious (...)
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  • Underestimating the Physical.G. Strawson - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):228-240.
    Many hold that (1) consciousness poses a uniquely hard problem. Why is this so? Chalmers considers 12 main answers in 'The Meta-Problem of Consciousness'. This paper focuses on number 11, and is principally addressed to those who endorse (1) because they think that (2) consciousness can't possibly be physical. It argues that to hold (2) is to make the mistake of underestimating the physical, and that almost all who make this mistake do so because they think they know more about (...)
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  • We Are Machines That Claim to Be Conscious.M. S. A. Graziano - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):95-104.
    The attention schema theory explains how a biological, information processing machine can claim to have consciousness, and how, by introspection (by assessing its internal data), it cannot determine that it is a machine whose claims are based on computations. The theory directly addresses Chalmers' meta-problem of consciousness, the problem of why we think we have a difficult-to-explain consciousness in the first place.
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  • Response to Chalmers' 'The Meta-Problem of Consciousness'.D. Papineau - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):173-181.
    I am glad that David Chalmers has now come round to the view that explaining the 'problem intuitions' about consciousness is the key to a satisfactory philosophical account of the topic. I find it surprising, however, given his previous writings, that Chalmers does not simply attribute these intuitions to the conceptual gap between physical and phenomenal facts. Still, it is good that he doesn't, given that this was always a highly implausible account of the problem intuitions. Unfortunately, later in his (...)
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  • The Epistemic View of Subjectivity.Scott Sturgeon - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (5):221-235.
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  • Generating Explanatory Gaps.B. Fiala & S. Nichols - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):71-82.
    We develop a partial solution to the meta-problem of consciousness that builds on our previous psychological account of an apparent explanatory gap. Drawing from empirical work on explanatory cognition and conceptual development, we sketch a profile of cognitive systems for which primitive concepts facilitate explanatory gaps. This account predicts that there will be multiple explanatory gaps. We suggest that this is borne out by the existence of primitivist theories in multiple philosophical domains.
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  • First-Person Interventions and the Meta-Problem of Consciousness.C. Klein & A. B. Barron - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):82-90.
    Chalmers' (2018) meta-problem of consciousness emphasizes unexpected common ground between otherwise incompatible positions. We argue that the materialist should welcome discussion of the meta-problem. We suggest that the core of the metaproblem is the seeming arbitrariness of subjective experience. This has an unexpected resolution when one moves to an interventionist account of scientific explanation: the same interventions that resolve the hard problem should also resolve the meta-problem.
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  • Why Does the Brain-Mind (Consciousness) Problem Seem So Hard?J. F. Storm - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):174-189.
    Why is there a 'hard problem' of consciousness? Why do we seem unable to grasp intuitively that physical brain processes can be identical to experiences? Here I comment on the 'meta-problem' (Chalmers, 2018), based on previous ideas (Storm, 2014; 2018). In short: humans may be 'inborn dualists' ('neuroscepticism'), because evolution gave us two (types of) brain systems (or functional modes): one (Sp) for understanding relatively simple physical phenomena, and another (Sm) specialized for mental phenomena. Because Sp cannot deal with the (...)
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  • Explaining the Intuition of Revelation.Michelle Liu - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):99-107.
    This commentary focuses on explaining the intuition of revelation, an issue that Chalmers (2018) raises in his paper. I first sketch how the truth of revelation provides an explanation for the intuition of revelation, and then assess a physicalist proposal to explain the intuition that appeals to Derk Pereboom’s (2011, 2016, 2019) qualitative inaccuracy hypothesis.
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  • Easy Does It: A Soft Landing for Consciousness.N. Humphrey - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):105-114.
    Problem reports result from several misunderstandings about the nature and functions of phenomenal consciousness. I discuss some philosophical and scientific correctives that, taken together, can make the hard problem seem less hard.
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  • Russellian Monism, Introspective Inaccuracy, and the Illusion Meta- Problem of Consciousness.D. Pereboom - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):182-193.
    Proposed is a two-factor explanation for our resistance to illusionism about phenomenal consciousness. The first is that we lack, and can't easily imagine, ways of checking the accuracy of introspective phenomenal representation. The second is that illusions of phenomenal consciousness would themselves appear to be phenomenally conscious. The illusionist's defence is to apply illusionism to illusions of consciousness, but the result, even if formally coherent, resists imaginative conception.
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  • Headlessness without Illusions: Phenomenological Undecidability and Materialism.K. Williford - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):190-200.
    I argue that there is a version of (quasi-Armstrongian) weak illusionism that intelligibly relates phenomenal concepts and introspective opacity, accounts for the (hard) problem intuitions Chalmers highlights (modal, epistemic, explanatory, and metaphysical), and undermines the most important arguments Chalmers deploys against type-B and type-C materialisms. If this is successful, we can satisfactorily account for the meta-problem of consciousness, mollify our hard problem intuitions, and remain genuine realists about phenomenal experience.
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