M. J. Levett's elegant translation of Plato's _Theaetetus_, first published in 1928, is here revised by Myles Burnyeat to reflect contemporary standards of accuracy while retaining the style, imagery, and idiomatic speech for which the Levett translation is unparalleled. Bernard William’s concise introduction, aimed at undergraduate students, illuminates the powerful argument of this complex dialogue, and illustrates its connections to contemporary metaphysical and epistemological concerns.

A 'self-refutation argument' is any argument which aims at showing that a certain thesis is self-refuting. This study was the first book-length treatment of ancient self-refutation and provides a unified account of what is distinctive in the ancient approach to the self-refutation argument, on the basis of close philological, logical and historical analysis of a variety of sources. It examines the logic, force and prospects of this original style of argumentation within the context of ancient philosophical debates, dispelling various misconceptions (...) concerning its nature and purpose and elucidating some important differences which exist both within the ancient approach to self-refutation and between that approach, as a whole, and some modern counterparts of it. In providing a comprehensive account of ancient self-refutation, the book advances our understanding of influential and debated texts and arguments from philosophers like Democritus, Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, the Stoics, the Academic sceptics, the Pyrrhonists and Augustine. (shrink)

Plato's Theaetetus is an acknowledged masterpiece, and among the most influential texts in the history of epistemology. Since antiquity it has been debated whether this dialogue was written by Plato to support his familiar metaphysical doctrines, or represents a self-distancing from these. David Sedley's book offers a via media, founded on a radical separation of the author, Plato, from his main speaker, Socrates. The dialogue, it is argued, is addressed to readers familiar with Plato's mature doctrines, and sets out to (...) show how these doctrines, far from being an abandonment of his Socratic heritage, are its natural outcome. The Socrates portrayed here is the same Socrates as already portrayed in Plato's early dialogues. While not a Platonist, he is exhibited - to put it in terms of an image made famous by this dialogue - as having been Platonism's midwife. In a comprehensive rereading of the text, Sedley tracks the ways in which Socrates is shown unwittingly preparing the ground for Plato's mature doctrines, and reinterprets the dialogue's individual arguments from this perspective. The book is addressed to all readers interested in Plato, and does not require knowledge of Greek. (shrink)

"A complete and unified account of Plato's epistemology... scholarly, historically sensitive, and philosophically sophisticated. Above all it is sensible.... White's strength is that he places Plato's preoccupation in careful historical perspective, without belittling the intrinsic difficulties of the problems he tackled.... White's project is to find a continuous argument running through Plato's various attacks on epistemological problems. No summary can do justice to his remarkable success." --Ronald B. De Sousa, University of Toronto, in Phoenix.

The Statesman is Plato's neglected political work, but it is crucial for an understanding of the development of his political thinking. In some respects it continues themes from the Republic, particularly the importance of knowledge as entitlement to rule. But there are also changes: Plato has dropped the ambitious metaphysical synthesis of the Republic, changed his view of the moral psychology of the citizen, and revised his position on the role of law and institutions. In its presentation of the statesman's (...) expertise, the Statesman modifies, as well as defending in original ways, this central theme of the Republic. (shrink)

CONTRASTING PREJUDICES TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD How can one say something false? How can one even think such a thing? Since, for example, all men are mortal, ...

In der 1968 gegr ndeten Reihe erscheinen Monographien aus den Gebieten der Griechischen und Lateinischen Philologie sowie der Alten Geschichte. Die B nde weisen eine gro e Vielzahl von Themen auf: neben sprachlichen, textkritischen oder gattungsgeschichtlichen philologischen Untersuchungen stehen sozial-, politik-, finanz- und kulturgeschichtliche Arbeiten aus der Klassischen Antike und der Sp tantike. Entscheidend f r die Aufnahme ist die Qualit t einer Arbeit; besonderen Wert legen die Herausgeber auf eine umfassende Heranziehung der einschl gigen Texte und Quellen und deren (...) sorgf ltige kritische Auswertung. (shrink)

The Cyrenaic school of philosophy (named after its founder Aristippus’ native city of Cyrene in North Africa) flourished in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE. Ugo Zilioli’s book provides the first book-length introduction to the school in English. The book begins by introducing the main figures of the Cyrenaic school beginning with Aristippus and by setting them into their historical context. Once the reader is familiar with those figures and with the genealogy of the school, the book offers an overview (...) of ancient and modern interpretations of the Cyrenaics, to provide readers with alternative accounts of the doctrines they endorsed and of the role they played in the context of ancient thought. Finally, the book offers a reconstruction of Cyrenaic philosophy and shows how the ethical side of their speculation connected with the epistemology and ontology they endorsed and that, as a result, the Cyrenaics were able to offer a quite sophisticated philosophy. Indeed, Zilioli demonstrates that they represented, in ancient philosophy, an important and original metaphysical position and alternative to the kind of realism endorsed by Plato and Aristotle. (shrink)

The Theaetetus provides Plato's fullest discussion of human knowledge and is a rich vehicle for reflection upon its topic. Polansky's commentary demonstrates that the dialogue in fact holds the complete Platonic account of knowledge -- an account which is as sophisticated as any offered by contemporary philosophers.

The Cyrenaic school was a fourth-century BC philosophical movement, related both to the Socratic tradition and to Greek Scepticism. In ethics, Cyrenaic hedonism can be seen as one of many attempts made by the associates of Socrates and their followers to endorse his ethical outlook and to explore the implications of his method. In epistemology, there are close philosophical links between the Cyrenaics and the Sceptics, both Pyrrhonists and Academics. There are further links with modern philosophy as well, for the (...) Cyrenaics introduced a form of subjectivism which in some ways preannounces Cartesian views, endorsed by Malebranche and Hume and developed by Kant. This 1998 book reconstructs Cyrenaic epistemology, explains how it depends on Cyrenaic hedonism, locates it in the context of ancient debates, and discusses its connections with modern and contemporary epistemological positions. (shrink)

Protagoras believes that all beliefs are true. Since Protagoras' belief that all beliefs are true is itself a belief, it follows from Protagoras' belief that all beliefs are true that Protagoras' belief is true. But what about the belief that Protagoras' belief is false? Doesn't it follow, by parallel reasoning and not at all trivially, that if all beliefs are true and there is a belief that Protagoras' belief is false, then Protagoras' belief is false?

I compare the two main readings of the argument against Protagorean relativism that 'Socrates' presents at Theaetetus 170-171, argue against both of them, and present a third alternative reading.

Emanuele Maffi argues that the Theaetetus, one of the most difficult dialogues of Plato, demonstrates the unbridgeable distance between philosophy and sophia, confirmed by the aporetic outcome of the dialogue. The purpose of this work is to demonstrate that this distance is not necessarily an evil, because in the impossibility of reaching sophia lies the very condition of the existence of philosophy. While all other Platonic works attempt to explain the best ways to inhabit the space of philosophy, the Theaetetus (...) sets the conditions for what constitutes the space of philosophy. (shrink)

Plato's Theaetetus develops an inquiry concerning the definition of knowledge. Famously, after Socrates and Theaetetus have discussed the three candidates for the definition of knowledge, the end of the dialogue seems to leave us in a situation of aporia. The present article focuses on the last hypothesis raised in the dialogue and tries to determine whether this hypothesis can be seen, under appropriate qualification, as acceptable within a Platonic framework. This hypothesis is connected with a dream theory that unfolds two (...) crucial factors for understanding the definition of knowledge, i.e. elements and logos. So the aim of this paper is twofold: on the one hand, to make clear what elements properly are; on the other hand, to find an account of logos suitable to make it a necessary condition for the definition of knowledge. As will emerge from this paper, the first two candidates for the definition of knowledge are indeed not sufficient for gaining an adequate definition, but they nonetheless foreshadow the third hypothesis and are necessary conditions for understanding the third one. (shrink)

This chapter intends to explain knowledge according to the aviary model proposed in Plato’s Theaetetus (195c5-200d4), calling attention to the risk of employing some Aristotelian assumptions in its reading. In section 1, I claim that the argument is committed to provide an account on both conceptual mistakes (or false beliefs) and dispositional knowledge. In section 2, I show that the argument develops along three different cases: (i) the coat model introduces the distinction between having knowledge and using it, intermediated by (...) the power of choice; (ii) the aviary model adds a variety of objects of knowledge as well as the power of ceasing to use them; (iii) the arithmetic model introduces an art of choosing among the objects of knowledge. This leads us to the description of dispositional knowledge as learning from oneself, i.e., as specification of items from previously known kinds. I show that this is incompatible with Aristotle’s notion of potential knowledge for three basic reasons: (i) it involves a power of selection of the right items, which would correspond to an Aristotelian rational power and not to the activation of a potential knowledge; (ii) it involves individuation of items learnt in general and not simply the update of a latent item of memory; (iii) it involves inquiry and learning, and not simply knowing. In section 3, I turn to the reason Socrates gives to dismiss the model: that the knowledge of an item cannot be the explanation of a mistake concerning this item (199d2). I offer three arguments against its cogency, emphasizing that mistakes should be explained as a failure in knowing how to select an item, instead of not having the knowledge of it. In section 4, I respond to the objection that the model leads to a regress regarding truth-makers. I argue that Socrates’s midwifery turns the dialogue into a performative argument against the objection, for that cross-examination provided the truth-makers. (shrink)