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  1. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.John Von Neumann & Oskar Morgenstern - 1944 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.
    This is the classic work upon which modern-day game theory is based. What began as a modest proposal that a mathematician and an economist write a short paper together blossomed, when Princeton University Press published Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. In it, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern conceived a groundbreaking mathematical theory of economic and social organization, based on a theory of games of strategy. Not only would this revolutionize economics, but the entirely new field of scientific inquiry (...)
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  • (6 other versions)Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Lewis - 1969 - Synthese 26 (1):153-157.
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  • Newcomb’s problem and two principles of choice.Robert Nozick - 1970 - In Carl G. Hempel, Donald Davidson & Nicholas Rescher (eds.), Essays in honor of Carl G. Hempel. Dordrecht,: D. Reidel. pp. 114–46.
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  • Coordination.David Gauthier - 1975 - Dialogue 14 (2):195-221.
    In the days when the Great Central and the Midland ran competitive services from Leicester to London, I agreed to meet your train when you came up from Leicester. “It arrives at 12.5”, you said in your letter. But you neglected to mention which station, and only on the morning of your journey did each of us realize that this matter had been left open. You intended to travel from Leicester Central, it being more convenient for you than London Road, (...)
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  • (1 other version)Thinking as a Team: Towards an Explanation of Nonselfish Behavior.Robert Sugden - 1993 - Social Philosophy and Policy 10 (1):69-89.
    For most of the problems that economists consider, the assumption that agents are self-interested works well enough, generating predictions that are broadly consistent with observation. In some significant cases, however, we find economic behavior that seems to be inconsistent with self-interest. In particular, we find that some public goods and some charitable ventures are financed by the independent voluntary contributions of many thousands of individuals. In Britain, for example, the lifeboat service is entirely financed by voluntary contributions. In all rich (...)
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  • Newcomb's problem, prisoners' dilemma, and collective action.S. L. Hurley - 1991 - Synthese 86 (2):173 - 196.
    Among various cases that equally admit of evidentialist reasoning, the supposedly evidentialist solution has varying degrees of intuitive attractiveness. I suggest that cooperative reasoning may account for the appeal of apparently evidentialist behavior in the cases in which it is intuitively attractive, while the inapplicability of cooperative reasoning may account for the unattractiveness of evidentialist behaviour in other cases. A collective causal power with respect to agreed outcomes, not evidentialist reasoning, makes cooperation attractive in the Prisoners' Dilemma. And a natural (...)
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  • A theory of rational decision in games.Michael Bacharach - 1987 - Erkenntnis 27 (1):17 - 55.
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  • Prisoners' dilemma is a newcomb problem.David K. Lewis - 1979 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 8 (3):235-240.
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  • Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.) - 1982 - Cambridge University Press.
    The thirty-five chapters in this book describe various judgmental heuristics and the biases they produce, not only in laboratory experiments but in important...
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  • Focal points in pure coordination games: An experimental investigation.Judith Mehta, Chris Starmer & Robert Sugden - 1994 - Theory and Decision 36 (2):163-185.
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  • Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected Utility.Allan Gibbard & William L. Harper - 1978 - In A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.), Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory: Vol.II: Epistemic and Social Applications. D. Reidel. pp. 125-162.
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