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Is There Progress in Philosophy? The Case for Taking History Seriously.Peter P. Slezak - 2018 - Philosophy 93 (4):529-555.details
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Philosophical expertise under the microscope.Miguel Egler & Lewis Dylan Ross - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1077-1098.details
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"Click!" Bait for Causalists.Huw Price & Yang Liu - 2018 - In Arif Ahmed (ed.), Newcomb's Problem. Cambridge University Press. pp. 160-179.details
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Parity, prospects, and predominance.Ryan Doody - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):1077-1095.details
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Equal Opportunity and Newcomb’s Problem.Ian Wells - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):429-457.details
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Concrete Causation: About the Structures of Causal Knowledge.Roland Poellinger - 2012 - Dissertation, Lmu Munichdetails
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Making Ado Without Expectations.Mark Colyvan & Alan Hájek - 2016 - Mind 125 (499):829-857.details
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A resource-bounded agent addresses the newcomb problem.John L. Pollock - 2010 - Synthese 176 (1):57-82.details
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On the Interpretation of Decision Theory.Samir Okasha - 2016 - Economics and Philosophy 32 (3):409-433.details
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La Teoría De La Decisión De David Lewis Y La Paradoja De Newcomb.Esteban Céspedes - 2009 - Límite 4 (20):53-68.details
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Egan and agents: How evidential decision theory can deal with Egan’s dilemma.Daniel Dohrn - 2015 - Synthese 192 (6):1883-1908.details
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Decision making in the face of parity.Miriam Schoenfield - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):263-277.details
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Causal Decision Theory and EPR correlations.Arif Ahmed & Adam Caulton - 2014 - Synthese 191 (18):4315-4352.details
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Desires, beliefs and conditional desirability.H. Orri Stefánsson - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):4019-4035.details
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Bridging psychology and game theory yields interdependence theory.Paul A. M. Van Lange & Marcello Gallucci - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):177-178.details
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Truth or consequences.John Heil - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):19-20.details
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Can goals be uniquely defined?Ilana Ritov - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):28-29.details
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The consequences of taking consequentialism seriously.Philip E. Tetlock - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):31-32.details
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A response to Prelec.Luc Bovens - 2013 - In Adam Oliver (ed.), Essays in Behavioural Public Policy. Cambridge University Press. pp. 228-33.details
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Overdetermination in Intuitive Causal Decision Theory.Esteban Céspedes - 2013 - In Miguel Hoeltje, Thomas Spitzley & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), Was dürfen wir glauben? Was sollen wir tun? Sektionsbeiträge des achten internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie e.V. DuEPublico.details
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Causal Decision Theory: A Counterexample.Arif Ahmed - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (2):289-306.details
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Combinative Consequentialism and the Problem of Act Versions.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):585-596.details
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Causation, Chance, and the Rational Significance of Supernatural Evidence.Huw Price - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (4):483-538.details
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Conditionals in causal decision theory.John Cantwell - 2013 - Synthese 190 (4):661-679.details
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Idealisations in normative models.Mark Colyvan - 2013 - Synthese 190 (8):1337-1350.details
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Decision theory for agents with incomplete preferences.Adam Bales, Daniel Cohen & Toby Handfield - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):453-70.details
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Regret and instability in causal decision theory.James M. Joyce - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):123-145.details
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A New Take from Nozick on Newcomb's Problem and Prisoners' Dilemma.S. L. Hurley - 1994 - Analysis 54 (2):65 - 72.details
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Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected Utility.Allan Gibbard & William L. Harper - 1978 - In A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.), Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory: Vol.II: Epistemic and Social Applications. D. Reidel. pp. 125-162.details
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Payoff dominance and the stackelberg heuristic.Andrew M. Colman & Michael Bacharach - 1997 - Theory and Decision 43 (1):1-19.details
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Dependency Equilibria and the Causal Structure of Decision and Game Situation.Wolfgang Spohn - unknowndetails
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The 5 Questions.Wolfgang Spohn - 2005 - In Vincent F. Hendricks & John Symons (eds.), Formal Philosophy. Automatic Press/VIP.details
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Arntzenius on ‘Why ain’cha rich?’.Arif Ahmed & Huw Price - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (1):15-30.details
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Binding and its consequences.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (1):49-71.details
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Causation, Decision Theory, and Bell’s Theorem: A Quantum Analogue of the Newcomb Problem.Eric G. Cavalcanti - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (3):569-597.details
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Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.details
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Objective chance, indicative conditionals and decision theory; or, how you can be Smart, rich and keep on smoking.Thomas C. Vinci - 1988 - Synthese 75 (1):83 - 105.details
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Defenses and conservative revisions of evidential decision theories: Metatickles and ratificationism.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1988 - Synthese 75 (1):107 - 131.details
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Causal probability.John L. Pollock - 2002 - Synthese 132 (1-2):143 - 185.details
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(2 other versions)The epistemic significance of disagreement.Thomas Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-196.details
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Some counterexamples to causal decision theory.Andy Egan - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (1):93-114.details
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Newcomb's paradox and compatibilism.Yemima Ben-Menahem - 1986 - Erkenntnis 25 (2):197 - 220.details
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Newcomb’s Problem and Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemmas.Christoph Schmidt-Petri - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1160-1173.details
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Gandalf’s solution to the Newcomb problem.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - Synthese 190 (14):2643–2675.details
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Probabilistic causality and the question of transitivity.Ellery Eells & Elliott Sober - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (1):35-57.details
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No expectations.Mark Colyvan - 2006 - Mind 115 (459):695-702.details
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Evidence, Causality, and Sequential Choice.Gerard Rothfus - forthcoming - Theory and Decision.details
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Instrumental Divergence.J. Dmitri Gallow - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-27.details
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Counterfactual Decision Theory Is Causal Decision Theory.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2024 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 105 (1):115-156.details
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