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Lying, Liars and Language.David Simpson - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (3):623-639.details
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Jackson's Empirical Assumptions.Stephen Stich & Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):637-643.details
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The Concept of Moral Obligation.Lou Goble - 1996 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):242-244.details
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Modal thinking.Alan R. White - 1975 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.details
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I Ought, Therefore I Can.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):167-216.details
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Reasons and Impossibility.Bart Streumer - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):351-384.details
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Does 'ought' conversationally implicate 'can'?Bart Streumer - 2003 - European Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):219–228.details
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'Ought' and 'can'.Michael Stocker - 1971 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):303 – 316.details
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On what's in the head.Robert Stalnaker - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:287-319.details
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Neural sufficiency, reductionism, and cognitive neuropsychiatry.Mark Sprevak - 2011 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (4):339-344.details
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Ought to Have' and 'Could Have.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1985 - Analysis 45 (1):44 - 48.details
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`Ought' conversationally implies `can'.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (2):249-261.details
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Lying, liars and language.David Simpson - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (3):623-639.details
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Philosophy's New challenge: Experiments and Intentional Action.N. Ángel Pinillos, Nick Smith, G. Shyam Nair, Peter Marchetto & Cecilea Mun - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (1):115-139.details
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Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.details
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Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Moral responsibility and determinism: The cognitive science of folk intuitions.Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):663–685.details
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A case for extrinsic dispositions.Jennifer McKitrick - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):155 – 174.details
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Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions.Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe - 2008 - In Joshua Michael Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Experimental Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Freedom and reason.Richard Mervyn Hare - 1963 - Oxford,: Clarendon Press.details
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'Ought' and Ability.P. A. Graham & Peter Graham - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (3):337-382.details
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Philosophical Studies.G. E. Moore - 1922 - Mind 32 (125):86-92.details
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Promises, obligations, and abilities.Julia Driver - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 44 (2):221 - 223.details
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Embodied Cognitive Science and its Implications for Psychopathology.Zoe Drayson - 2009 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 16 (4):329-340.details
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Defending the principle of alternate possibilities: Blameworthiness and moral responsibility.David Copp - 1997 - Noûs 31 (4):441-456.details
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Blame, not ability, impacts moral “ought” judgments for impossible actions: Toward an empirical refutation of “ought” implies “can”.Vladimir Chituc, Paul Henne, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Felipe De Brigard - 2016 - Cognition 150 (C):20-25.details
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Philosophical Studies.G. E. Moore - 1922 - Paterson, N.J.,: Routledge.details
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The Disordered Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Mental Illness.George Graham - 2010 - New York City, NY: Routledge.details
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The Concept of Moral Obligation.Michael J. Zimmerman - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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The Methods of Ethics.Henry Sidgwick - 1907 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 30 (4):401-401.details
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The Methods of Ethics.Henry Sidgwick - 1903 - International Journal of Ethics 13 (2):251-254.details
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Addiction is not a brain disease (and it matters).Neil Levy - 2013 - Frontiers in Psychiatry 4 (24):1--7.details
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Critique of Pure Reason.I. Kant - 1787/1998 - Philosophy 59 (230):555-557.details
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Ought, Can, and Presupposition: An Experimental Study.Moti Mizrahi - 2015 - Methode 4 (6):232-243.details
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Modal Thinking.Alan R. White - 1977 - Philosophy 52 (199):111-113.details
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