- Indeterministic Choice and Ability.Ishtiyaque Haji & Ryan Hebert - 2018 - The Journal of Ethics 22 (2):191-203.details
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Ability, Frankfurt Examples, and Obligation.Ishtiyaque Haji & Ryan Hebert - 2018 - The Journal of Ethics 22 (2):163-190.details
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Contrary-to-Duty Scenarios, Deontic Dilemmas, and Transmission Principles.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2018 - Ethics 129 (1):98-115.details
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Moral Responsibility, Voluntary Control, and Intentional Action.Kyle G. Fritz - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (4):831-855.details
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Being More Realistic About Reasons: On Rationality and Reasons Perspectivism.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):605-627.details
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Supererogation.Alfred Archer - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (3):e12476.details
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Does Ought Imply Ought Ought?Daniel Immerman - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (273):702-716.details
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An Analysis of Recent Empirical Data on ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’.Yishai Cohen - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (1):57-67.details
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Maximalism and Moral Harmony.Douglas W. Portmore - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):318-341.details
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‘Ought Implies Can’: Not So Pragmatic After All.Alex King - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):637-661.details
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Subjective Rightness and Minimizing Expected Objective Wrongness.Kristian Olsen - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (3):417-441.details
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The Function of Normative Process-Requirements.Julian Fink - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (1):115-136.details
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The Russellian Retreat.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):293-320.details
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Modelo de reciprocidad democrática: una justificación de la continuidad de tratamiento beneficioso en la investigación clínica.Ignacio Mastroleo - 2016 - Journal of Science Humanities and Arts 3 (7):1-33.details
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The Obligation Dilemma.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (1):37-61.details
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Two Thesis about the Distinctness of Practical and Theoretical Normativity.Andrew Reisner - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 221-240.details
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Maximalism vs. Omnism about Permissibility.Douglas W. Portmore - manuscriptdetails
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The denial of moral dilemmas as a regulative ideal.Michael Cholbi - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):268-289.details
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Freedom and Practical Reason.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (2):169-179.details
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A New Argument Against Rule Consequentialism.Christopher Woodard - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (3):247-261.details
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What's wrong with possibilism.C. Woodard - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):219-226.details
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I Ought, Therefore I Can.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):167-216.details
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Moral Obligations: Actualist, Possibilist, or Hybridist?Travis Timmerman & Yishai Cohen - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):672-686.details
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Mill's Antirealism.Christopher Macleod - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (263):261-279.details
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'Along an imperfectly-lighted path': practical rationality and normative uncertainty.Andrew Sepielli - unknowndetails
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Essentially Shared Obligations.Gunnar Björnsson - 2014 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 38 (1):103-120.details
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Does scrupulous securitism stand-up to scrutiny? Two problems for moral securitism and how we might fix them.Travis Timmerman - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1509-1528.details
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‘Ought’, ‘Can’, and Fairness.Rob van Someren Greve - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (5):913-922.details
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‘Ought’ Does Not Imply ‘Can’.Moti Mizrahi - 2009 - Philosophical Frontiers 4 (1):19-35.details
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Right, Equality, and the Fairness Obligation.Dong-il Kim - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (3):795-807.details
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Combinative Consequentialism and the Problem of Act Versions.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):585-596.details
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Reason, Responsibility, and Free Will: Reply to My Critics. [REVIEW]Ishtiyaque Haji - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (2):175-209.details
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Ability-based objections to no-best-world arguments.Brian Kierland & Philip Swenson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):669-683.details
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Group Agency and Overdetermination.David Killoren & Bekka Williams - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2):295-307.details
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Reasons for Action and Psychological Capacities.Rosemary Lowry - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (4):521 - 531.details
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Actualism, Possibilism, and Beyond.Jacob Ross - 2012 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics.details
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Moral distance in dictators games.Fernando Aguiar, Pablo Brañas-Garza & Luis Miller - 2008 - Judgment and Decision Making 3 (4):344-354.details
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Normative conflicts and the logic of 'ought'.Lou Goble - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):450-489.details
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Reasons, impossibility and efficient steps: reply to Heuer.Bart Streumer - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (1):79 - 86.details
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Defending a possibilist insight in consequentialist thought.Jean-Paul Vessel - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (2):183 - 195.details
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I won’t do it! Self-prediction, moral obligation and moral deliberation.Jennie Louise - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (3):327 - 348.details
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Authentic Springs of Action and Obligation.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):239 - 261.details
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Consequentialism and Decision Procedures.Toby Ord - 2005 - Dissertation, University of Oxforddetails
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Does 'ought' conversationally implicate 'can'?Bart Streumer - 2003 - European Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):219–228.details
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Rationality and the Unit of Action.Christopher Woodard - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):261-277.details
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Freedom, obligation, and responsibility: Prospects for a unifying theory.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):106-125.details
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The No Act Objection: Act‐Consequentialism and Coordination Games.Simon Rosenqvist - 2019 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):179-189.details
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“Ought” Implies “Can” but Does Not Imply “Must”: An Asymmetry between Becoming Infeasible and Becoming Overridden.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2018 - Philosophical Review 127 (4):487-514.details
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Collective moral obligations: ‘we-reasoning’ and the perspective of the deliberating agent.Anne Schwenkenbecher - 2019 - The Monist 102 (2):151-171.details
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Maximalism versus Omnism about Permissibility.Douglas Portmore - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):427-452.details
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