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Normative Strength and the Balance of Reasons.Joshua Gert - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (4):533-562.details
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The Moral Nexus.R. Jay Wallace - 2019 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.details
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Moral overridingness and moral theory.Sarah Stroud - 1998 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (2):170–189.details
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Shelly Kagan's The Limits of Morality. [REVIEW]Michael Slote - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4):915.details
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The Rejection of Consequentialism.Samuel Scheffler - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):220-226.details
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Moral dimensions: permissibility, meaning, blame.Thomas Scanlon - 2008 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.details
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Are Moral Reasons Morally Overriding?Douglas W. Portmore - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (4):369-388.details
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Three Paradoxes of Supererogation.Daniel Muñoz - 2021 - Noûs 55 (3):699-716.details
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The Limits of Morality.Michael Slote - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4):915-917.details
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Articulating an uncompromising forgiveness.Pamela Hieronymi - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):529-555.details
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Normative strength and the balance of reasons.Joshua Gert - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (4):533-562.details
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The Supererogatory, and How to Accommodate It.Dale Dorsey - 2013 - Utilitas 25 (3):355-382.details
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Supererogation, Sacrifice, and the Limits of Duty.Alfred Archer - 2016 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (3):333-354.details
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The normativity of rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2013 - Dissertation, Humboldt University of Berlindetails
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On What Matters: Volume Two.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options.Douglas W. Portmore - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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Contrastive Reasons.Justin Snedegar - 2017 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
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The Limits of Moral Authority.Dale Dorsey - 2016 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press UK.details
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The Second Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability.Stephen L. Darwall - 1996 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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Reasons, oughts, and requirements.Justin Snedegar - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11:155-181.details
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Bi-polar obligation.Stephen Darwall - 2012 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 7:333.details
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Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality.Douglas W. Portmore - 2011 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press USA.details
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Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.details
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