It is common practice to compare the computational power of different models of computation. For example, the recursive functions are strictly more powerful than the primitive recursive functions, because the latter are a proper subset of the former . Side-by-side with this “containment” method of measuring power, it is also standard to base comparisons on “simulation”. For example, one says that the lambda calculus is as powerful—computationally speaking—as the partial recursive functions, because the lambda calculus can simulate all partial recursive (...) functions by encoding the natural numbers as Church numerals.The problem is that unbridled use of these two distinct ways of comparing power allows one to show that some computational models are strictly stronger than themselves! We argue that a better definition is that model A is strictly stronger than B if A can simulate B via some encoding, whereas B cannot simulate A under any encoding. We show that with this definition, too, the recursive functions are strictly stronger than the primitive recursive. We also prove that the recursive functions, partial recursive functions, and Turing machines are “complete”, in the sense that no injective encoding can make them equivalent to any “hypercomputational” model.1. (shrink)

There is an intensive discussion nowadays about the meaning of effective computability, with implications to the status and provability of the Church–Turing Thesis (CTT). I begin by reviewing what has become the dominant account of the way Turing and Church viewed, in 1936, effective computability. According to this account, to which I refer as the Gandy–Sieg account, Turing and Church aimed to characterize the functions that can be computed by a human computer. In addition, Turing provided a highly convincing argument (...) for CTT by analyzing the processes carried out by a human computer. I then contend that if the Gandy–Sieg account is correct, then the notion of effective computability has changed after 1936. Today computer scientists view effective computability in terms of finite machine computation. My contention is supported by the current formulations of CTT, which always refer to machine computation, and by the current argumentation for CTT, which is different from the main arguments advanced by Turing and Church. I finally turn to discuss Robin Gandy's characterization of machine computation. I suggest that there is an ambiguity regarding the types of machines Gandy was postulating. I offer three interpretations, which differ in their scope and limitations, and conclude that none provides the basis for claiming that Gandy characterized finite machine computation. (shrink)

We consider Choiceless Polynomial Time , a language introduced by Blass, Gurevich and Shelah, and show that it can express a query originally constructed by Cai, Fürer and Immerman to separate fixed-point logic with counting from image. This settles a question posed by Blass et al. The program we present uses sets of unbounded finite rank: we demonstrate that this is necessary by showing that the query cannot be computed by any program that has a constant bound on the rank (...) of sets used, even in image, an extension of image with counting. (shrink)

People usually regard algorithms as more abstract than the programs that implement them. The natural way to formalize this idea is that algorithms are equivalence classes of programs with respect to a suitable equivalence relation. We argue that no such equivalence relation exists.

The identification of an informal concept of ‘effective calculability’ with a rigorous mathematical notion like ‘recursiveness’ or ‘Turing computability’ is still viewed as problematic, and I think rightly so. I analyze three different and conflicting perspectives Gödel articulated in the three decades from 1934 to 1964. The significant shifts in Gödel's position underline the difficulties of the methodological issues surrounding the Church-Turing Thesis.

Wilfried Sieg and John Byrnes. AnModel for Parallel Computation: Gandy's Thesis.

Church's thesis asserts that a number-theoretic function is intuitively computable if and only if it is recursive. A related thesis asserts that Turing's work yields a conceptual analysis of the intuitive notion of numerical computability. I endorse Church's thesis, but I argue against the related thesis. I argue that purported conceptual analyses based upon Turing's work involve a subtle but persistent circularity. Turing machines manipulate syntactic entities. To specify which number-theoretic function a Turing machine computes, we must correlate these syntactic (...) entities with numbers. I argue that, in providing this correlation, we must demand that the correlation itself be computable. Otherwise, the Turing machine will compute uncomputable functions. But if we presuppose the intuitive notion of a computable relation between syntactic entities and numbers, then our analysis of computability is circular. (shrink)

Some of the most important developments of symbolic logic took place in the 1920s. Foremost among them are the distinction between syntax and semantics and the formulation of questions of completeness and decidability of logical systems. David Hilbert and his students played a very important part in these developments. Their contributions can be traced to unpublished lecture notes and other manuscripts by Hilbert and Bernays dating to the period 1917-1923. The aim of this paper is to describe these results, focussing (...) primarily on propositional logic, and to put them in their historical context. It is argued that truth-value semantics, syntactic ("Post-") and semantic completeness, decidability, and other results were first obtained by Hilbert and Bernays in 1918, and that Bernays's role in their discovery and the subsequent development of mathematical logic is much greater than has so far been acknowledged. (shrink)

A class of problems is called decidable if there is an algorithm which will give the answer to any problem of the class after a finite length of time. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the classes of problems that can be solved by infinitely long decision procedures in the following sense: An algorithm is given which, for any problem of the class, generates an infinitely long sequence of guesses. The problem will be said to be solved in (...) the limit if, after some finite point in the sequence, all the guesses are correct and the same. Functions, sets, and functionals which are decidable by such infinite algorithms will be calledlimiting recursive. These, together with classes of objects which can beidentified in the limit, are the subjects of this report.Without qualification,setwill mean set of numbers;functionwill mean number-theoretic function of 1 variable, possibly partial;functionalswill take numerical values and have any number of numerical and/or function variables, the latter ranging solely over total functions of 1 variable. Thus a function is a special case of a functional,xwill invariably stand for a numerical variable;φfor a function variable;gfor a guess ;nfor the numerical variable which indexes the guesses, referred to as thetime. (shrink)

The four authors present their speculations about the future developments of mathematical logic in the twenty-first century. The areas of recursion theory, proof theory and logic for computer science, model theory, and set theory are discussed independently.

One of the most important contributions of A. Church to logic is his invention of the lambda calculus. We present the genesis of this theory and its two major areas of application: the representation of computations and the resulting functional programming languages on the one hand and the representation of reasoning and the resulting systems of computer mathematics on the other hand.

Arguments to the effect that Church's thesis is intrinsically unprovable because proof cannot relate an informal, intuitive concept to a mathematically defined one are unconvincing, since other 'theses' of this kind have indeed been proved, and Church's thesis has been proved in one direction. However, though evidence for the truth of the thesis in the other direction is overwhelming, it does not yet amount to proof.