The utilisation of quantum theories within social science and biology is often reasonably met with dubiety. It would be even more controversial should such theories be applied to concepts under the domain of eugenics. Nonetheless, this can open up a fresh and unique understanding of theories that are usually understood by their classical structure. We will provide quantum interpretations of dysgenics and dysgenic traits from different scopes and procedures. The way dysgenic traits are in a flux with the environment that (...) they interact will be analysed as well as how they interact with each other under quantum conditions. We will also take into account of factors such as intelligence, genetic heritability, and other biological and cognitive factors and try to study their frameworks in non-classical ways. Using what we have theorised, we will also attempt to create numerical and empirical analyses of some of the theories that we have proposed. (shrink)

We introduce a new theorem in social choice theory built on a path integral approach which will show that, under some reasonable conditions, there is a unique way to aggregate individual preferences based on fuzzy sets into a social preference based on probabilities, and that this way is invariant under any permutation of alternatives. We then apply this theorem to the case of democratic decision making with data of the behaviour and voting preferences of voting agents and show that there (...) is a tradeoff between fairness and efficiency and that no voting system can achieve both simultaneously. (shrink)

The utilisation of quantum theories within social science and biology is often reasonably met with dubiety. It would be even more controversial should such theories be applied to concepts under the domain of eugenics. Nonetheless, this can open up a fresh and unique understanding of theories that are usually understood by their classical structure. We will provide quantum interpretations of dysgenics and dysgenic traits from different scopes and procedures. The way dysgenic traits are in a flux with the environment that (...) they interact will be analysed as well as how they interact with each other under quantum conditions. We will also take into account of factors such as intelligence, genetic heritability, and other biological and cognitive factors and try to study their frameworks in non-classical ways. Using what we have theorised, we will also attempt to create numerical and empirical analyses of some of the theories that we have proposed. (shrink)

Inductively defined structures are ubiquitous in mathematics; their specification is unambiguous and their properties are powerful. All fields of mathematical logic feature these structures prominently: the formula of a language, the set of theorems, the natural numbers, the primitive recursive functions, the constructive number classes and segments of the cumulative hierarchy of sets. -/- This dissertation gives a mathematical characterization of a species of inductively defined structures, called accessible domains, which include all of the above examples except the set of (...) theorems. The concept of an accessible domain comes from Wilfried Sieg's analysis of proof-theoretic practices, starting with his dissertation. In particular, he noticed the special epistemological character of elements of an accessible domain: they can always be uniquely identified with their build-up. Generally, the unique build-up of elements justifies the principles of induction and recursion. -/- I use category theory to give an abstract characterization of accessible domains. I claim that accessible domains are all instances of initial algebras for endofunctors. Grounded in the historical roots of Sieg's discussions, this dissertation shows how the properties of initial algebras for endofunctors and accessible domains coincide in a satisfying and natural way. -/- Filling out this characterization, I show how important examples of accessible domains fit into this broad characterization. I first characterize some accessible domains by relatively simple functors (e.g. finite, polynomial, those that preserve certain colimits) where we can see how iterating the functor can produce the accessible domain. Then I describe accessible domains that result from more involved specifications (e.g. ordinals and segments of the cumulative hierarchies associated with CZF, IZF, and ZF) by relying heavily on algebraic set theory. I end with a discussion of some of the methodological features of category theory in particular that helped characterize accessible domains. (shrink)

Gödel's incompleteness theorems establish the stunning result that mathematics cannot be fully formalized and, further, that any formal system containing a modicum of number or set theory cannot establish its own consistency. Wilfried Sieg and Clinton Field, in their paper Automated Search for Gödel's Proofs, presented automated proofs of Gödel's theorems at an abstract axiomatic level; they used an appropriate expansion of the strategic considerations that guide the search of the automated theorem prover AProS. The representability conditions that (...) allow the syntactic notions of the metalanguage to be represented inside the object language were taken as axioms in the automated proofs. The concrete task I am taking on in this project is to extend the search by formally verifying these conditions. Using a formal metatheory defined in the language of binary trees, the syntactic objects of the metatheory lend themselves naturally to a direct encoding in Zermelo's theory of sets. The metatheoretic notions can then be inductively defined and shown to be representable in the object-theory using appropriate inductive arguments. Formal verification of the representability conditions is the first step towards an automated proof thereof which, in turn, brings the automated verification of Gödel's theorems one step closer to completion. (shrink)

Der Rezension versucht den Versuch des Autors zu bewerten, die Möglichkeiten und Grenzen gegenwärtigen philosophischen Systemdenkens aufzuzeigen. Dabei wird einerseits der Ansatz sowie die Auswahl der Schwerpunkte in die Kritik genommen, während andererseits eine Einordnung dessen erfolgt, was der Autor hätte untersuchen können, um seine vorgeschlagene Idee in die richtige Richtung zu lenken.

The 2016-17 Iraqi offensive that recaptured the city of Mosul from the Islamic State have demonstrated the inability of contemporary armed forces to retake urban areas from a determined and ruthless enemy without either suffering debilitating casualties or causing thousands of civilian deaths and virtually destroying the city itself. The enemy’s willingness to refuse civilian evacuation via a humanitarian corridor and effectively take the inhabitants hostage is all it takes to impose this tragic dilemma on an attacking force. The civilian (...) death toll of the battle of Mosul alone is estimated to have reached between seven and forty thousand, with almost one million people internally displaced and large portions of the city levelled. Avoiding another such tragedy should be a priority for all practitioners and theorists of urban warfare. Indeed, confronting and defeating this challenge may be the most important task for ethics, theory and practice of urban combat in the coming decade. I argue that the only viable way of escaping the hostage siege dilemma consists of incorporating large numbers of unmanned and autonomous weapon systems into the blue force structure and using these to substitute for artillery and aerial fires presently being used to overpower defenders. While other measures may be used to marginally improve the outcome of hostage city assaults, only the automatization of the assault can dramatically change the calculus and in result either discourage rogue actors from creating hostage city dilemmas or defeat them decisively while suffering unequivocally proportional casualties. I proceed as follows: first, I provide an account of the 2016-17 Coalition assault on Mosul, giving special attention to the events and features relevant to the hostage city dilemma. I then use this case study to introduce the theoretical concept of the hostile city and the ethical dilemma it creates, discussing possible objections and making the case that the circumstances of the Battle of Mosul are bound to repeatedly transpire in the future. This generates a duty to find a way out of the hostage city dilemma. I argue that widespread use of unmanned and autonomous weapon platforms constitutes a viable way of assaulting hostage cities in a manner that assures respect for the ius in bello principles, proposing several ways in which such weapons may be designed and used to drastically limit both military and civilian casualties. Concluding that it may be not only permissible but morally required to employ autonomous weapons in the hostage city scenario, I briefly discuss the implications of this conclusion for a wider debate concerning the moral feasibility of autonomous weapons. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Beitrag ist als ein Versuch zu verstehen, dem polnischen Leser eine recht seltsame Position aus der Reihe der deutschsprachigen Lodzaica, nämlich die 1913 im Verlag August Grüning in Pabianice herausgegebene Sammlung von Witzen und Anekdoten mit dem Titel 'Ne Mütze voll Witze aus Lodz und Pabianice’, näherzubringen. Der Verfasser des schmalen Bändchens, der sich hinter dem Pseudonym Wilfried Spectator verbirgt, ist Reinhold Piel, ein Deutscher aus Pabianice. Als Satelitenstadt von Łódź, der sich damals sehr rasch entwickelnden Textilmetropole, (...) bildete auch Pabianice in jenen Jahren zweifelsohne ein Teil des in ganz Europa einmaligen und eigenartigen multikulturellen und multiethnischen Tigcls. Reinhold Piel stellte sich mit seinem Büchlein die Aufgabe, ein Sammelporträt der Mentalität des typischen Vertreters jenes Tigels von Kulturen und Sprachen zu zeichnen. In der mehrere disparate Elemente integrierenden Gemeinschaft funktionierte der Humor sicherlich als eine Art Sicherheitsventil, mit dessen Hilfe man bestrebt war, Fremdes zu „zähmen“ und Konflikte zu entschärfen. Scheinbar abstrakte, „auslachende“ Beispiele haben sich wahrscheinlich ebenfalls vortrefflich als Methode bewährt, andere diplomatisch zu sensibilisieren, aber auch eigene Nachteile und Unzulänglichkeiten mit Abstand zu sehen. Der universale Charakter der Anekdote als literarisches Genre beruht u.a. auf ihrer Ahistorizität und Konkretheit zugleich, ihr narratives Werkzeug hingegen - die individualisierte Sprache des multiethnischen Milieus - liefert hervorragenden StolT für sprachwissenschaftliche Forschung. Ein besonders interessanter Aspekt ist dabei vor allem die Frage nach der Übersetzbarkeit bzw. Unübersetzbarkeit von Kulturidiomatik. Um dem Leser entgegenzukommen und ihm den historischen und informativen Wert der besprochenen Sammlung bewusst zu machen, wird im Anhang - zum ersten Mal in der polnischen Sprache - eine Auswahl von besonders charakteristischen Witzen der genannten Sammlung von R. Piel präsentiert. (shrink)

What is to be learned from the chaotic downfall of the Weimar Republic and the erosion of European liberal statehood in the interwar period vis-a-vis the ongoing European crisis? This book analyses and explains the recurrent emergence of crises in European societies. It asks how previous crises can inform our understanding of the present crisis. The particular perspective advanced is that these crises not only are economic and social crises, but must also be understood as crises of public power, order (...) and authority. In other words, it argues that substantial challenges to the functional and normative setup of democracy and the rule of law were central to the emergence and the unfolding of these crises. The book draws on and adds to the rich ’crises literature’ developed within the critical theory tradition to outline a conceptual framework for understanding what societal crises are. The central idea is that societal crises represent a discrepancy between the unfolding of social processes and the institutional frameworks that have been established to normatively stabilize such processes. The crises at issue emerged in periods characterized by strong social, economic and technological transformations as well as situations of political upheaval. As such, the crises represented moments where the existing functional and normative grid of society, as embodied in notions of public order and authority, were severely challenged and in many instances undermined. Seen in this perspective, the book reconstructs how crises unfolded, how they were experienced, and what kind of responses the specific crises in question provoked. -/- Table of Contents -/- Introduction: European Crises of Public Power: From Weimar until Today, Poul F. Kjaer & Niklas Olsen / Part I: Semantics, Notions and Narratives of Societal Crisis / 1. What Time Frame Makes Sense for Thinking About Crises?, David Runciman / 2. The Stakes of Crises, Janet Roitman / Part II: Weimar and the Interwar Period: Ideologies of Anti-Modernism and Liberalism / 3. The Crisis of Modernity – Modernity as Crisis: Towards a Typology of Crisis Discourses in Interwar East Central Europe and Beyond, Balázs Trencsényi / 4. European Legitimacy Crisis – Weimar and Today: Rational and Theocratic Authority in the Schmitt-Strauss Exchange, John P. McCormick / 5. Crisis and the Consumer: Reconstructions of Liberalism in Twentieth Century Political Thought , Niklas Olsen / Part III: The Causes of Crises: From Corporatism to Governance / 6. The Constitutionalization of Labour Law and the Crisis of National Democracy , Chris Thornhill / 7. The Crisis in Labour Law: From Weimar to Austerity Ruth Dukes / 8. From the Crisis of Corporatism to the Crisis of Governance, Poul F. Kjaer / Part IV: The Euro and the Crisis of Law and Democracy / 9. What is left of the European Economic Constitution II? From Pyrrhic Victory to Cannae Defeat Christian Joerges / 10. Reflections on Europe’s “Rule of Law Crisis”, Jan-Werner Müller. 11. Democracy under Siege: The Decay of Constitutionalisation and the Crisis of Public Law and Public Opinion, Hauke Brunkhorst/ Part V: The Consequences of Crises and the Future of Europe / 12. Crises and Extra-Legality: From Above and From Below, William E. Scheuermann / 13. “We could all go Down the Road of Lebanon” – Crisis Thinking on the Anti-Muslim Far Right, Mikkel Thorup / 14. Conclusions and Perspectives: The Re-Constitution of Europe, Poul F. Kjaer & Niklas Olsen Index . (shrink)

● Sergio Cremaschi, The non-existing Island. I discuss the way in which the cleavage between the Continental and the Anglo-American philosophies originated, the (self-)images of both philosophical worlds, the converging rediscoveries from the Seventies, as well as recent ecumenic or anti-ecumenic strategies. I argue that pragmatism provides an important counter-instance to both the familiar self-images and to the fashionable ecumenic or anti-ecumenic strategies. My conclusions are: (i) the only place where Continental philosophy exists (as Euro-Communism one decade ago) is America; (...) (ii) less obviously, also analytic philosophy does not exist, or does no more exist as a current or a paradigm; what does exist is, on the one hand, philosophy of language and, on the other, philosophy of mind, that is, two disciplines; (iii) the dissolution of analytic philosophy as a school has been extremely fruitful, precisely in so far as it has left room for disciplines and research programmes; (iv) what is left, of the Anglo-American/Continental cleavage is primarily differences in styles, depending partly on intellectual traditions, partly owing to sociology, history, institutional frameworks; these differences should not be blurred by rash ecumenism; besides, theoretical differences are alive as ever, but within both camps; finally, there is indeed a lag (not a difference) in the appropriation of intellectual techniques by most schools of 'Continental' philosophy, and this should be overcome through appropriation of what the best 'analytic' philosophers have produced. ● Michael Strauss, Language and sense-perception: an aspect of analytic philosophy. To test an assertion about one fact by comparing it with perceived reality seems quite unproblematic. But the very possibility of such a procedure is incompatible with the intellectualistic basis of logical positivism and atomism (as it is for example to be found in Russell's Analysis of Mind). According to the intellectualistic approach pure sensation is meaningless. Sensation receives its meaning and order from the intellect through interpretation, which is performed with the help of linguistic tools, i.e. words and sentences. Before being interpreted, sensation is not a picture or a representation, it is neither true nor false, neither an illusion nor knowledge; it does not tell us anything; it is a lifeless and order-less matter. But how can a thought (or a proposition) be compared with such a lifeless matter? This difficulty confronts the intellectualist, if on the one hand he admits the necessity of comparing thought with sense-perception, and on the other hand presupposes that we possess only intellectual and no immediate perceptual understanding of what we see and hear. In this paper I give a critical exposition of three attempts, made by Russell, Neurath and Wittgenstein, to solve this problem. The first attempt adheres to strict conventionalism, the second tends to naturalism and the third leads to an amended, very moderate version of conventionalism. This amended conventionalism looks at sense impressions as being a peculiar language, which includes primary symbols, i.e. symbols not founded on convention and not being in need of interpretation. ● Ernst Tugendhat, Phenomenology and language analysis. The paper, first published in German in 1970, by which Tugendhat gave a start to the German rediscovery of analytic philosophy. The author stages a confrontation between phenomenology and language analysis. He argues that language analysis does not differ from phenomenology as far as the topics dealt with are concerned; instead, both currents are quite different in method. The author argues that language-analytic philosophy does not simply lay out of the mainstream of transcendental philosophy, but that instead it challenges this tradition on the very level of foundations. The author criticizes the linguistic-analytic approach centred on the subject as well as any object-centred approach, while proposing inter-subjective understanding through language as the new universal framework. This is, when construed in so general terms, the same program of hermeneutics, though in a more basic version. ● Jürgen Habermas, Language game, intention and meaning. On a few suggestions by Sellars and Wittgenstein. The paper, first published in German in 1975, in which Habermas announces his own linguistic turn through a discovery of speech acts. In this essay the author wants to work out a categorical framework for a communicative theory of society; he takes Wittgenstein's concept of language game as a Leitfade and, besides, he takes advantage also of Wilfried Sellars's quasi-transcendental account of the genesis of intentionality. His goal is to single out the problems connected with a theory of consciousness oriented in a logical-linguistic sense. ● Zvie Bar-On, Isomorphism of speech acts and intentional states. This essay presents the problem of the formal relationship between speech acts and intentional states as an essential part of the perennial philosophical question of the relation between language and thought. I attempt to show how this problem had been dealt with by two prominent philosophers of different camps in our century, Edmund Husserl and John Searle. Both of them wrote extensively about the theory of intentionality. I point out an interesting, as it were unintended, continuity of their work on that theory. Searle started where Husserl left off 80 years earlier. Their meeting point could be used as the first clue in our search. They both adopted in effect the same distinction between two basic aspects of the intentional experience: its content or matter, and its quality or mode. Husserl did not yet have the concept of a speech act as contradistinguished from an intentional state. The working hypothesis, however, which he suggested, could be used as a second clue for the further elaboration of the theory. The relationship of the two levels, the mental and the linguistic, which remained for Husserl in the background only, became the cornerstone of Searle' s inquiry. He employed the speech act as the model and analysed the intentional experience by means of the conceptual apparatus of his own theory of speech acts. This procedure enabled him to mark out a number of parallelisms and correlations between the two levels. This procedure explains the phenomenon of the partial isomorphism of speech acts and intentional states. ● Roberta de Monticelli, Ontology. A dialogue among the linguistic philosopher, the naturalist, and the phenomenological philosopher. This paper proposes a comparison between two main ways of conceiving the role and scope of that fundamental part of philosophy (or of "first" philosophy) which is traditionally called "ontology". One way, originated within the analytic tradition, consists of two main streams, namely philosophy of language and (contemporary) philosophy of mind, the former yielding "reduced ontology" and the latter "neo-Aristotelian ontology". The other way of conceiving ontology is exemplified by "phenomenological ontology" (more precisely, the Husserlian, not the Heideggerian version). Ontology as a theory of reference ("reduced" ontology, or ontology as depending on semantics) is presented and justified on the basis of some classical thesis of traditional philosophy of language (from Frege to Quine). "Reduced ontology" is shown to be identifiable with one level of a traditional, Aristotelian ontology, namely the one which corresponds to one of the four "senses of being" listed in Aristotle's Metaphysics: "being" as "being true". This identification is justified on the basis of Franz Brentano's "rules for translation" of the Aristotelian table of judgements in terms of (positive and negative) existential judgments such as are easily translatable into sentences of first order predicate logic. The second part of the paper is concerned with "neo-Aristotelian ontology", i.e. with naturalism and physicalism as the main ontological options underlying most of contemporary discussion in the philosophy of mind. The qualification of such options as "neo-Aristotelian" is justified; the relationships between "neo-Aristotelian ontology" and "reduced ontology" are discussed. In the third part the fundamental tenet of "phenomenological ontology" is identified by the thesis that a logical theory of existence and being does capture a sense of "existing" and "being" which, even though not the basic one, is grounded in the basic one. An attempt is done of further clarifying this "more basic" sense of "being". An argument making use of this supposedly "more basic" sense is advanced in favour of a "phenomenological ontology". ● Kuno Lorenz, Analytic Roots in Dialogic Constructivism. Both in the Vienna Circle ad in Russell's early philosophy the division of knowledge into two kinds (or two levels), perceptual and conceptual, plays a vital role. Constructivism in philosophy, in trying to provide a pragmatic foundation - a knowing-how - to perceptual as well as conceptual competences, discovered that this is dependent on semiotic tools. Therefore, the "principle of method" had to be amended by the "principle of dialogue". Analytic philosophy being an heir of classical empiricism, conceptually grasping the "given", and constructive philosophy being an heir of classical rationalism, perceptually providing the "constructed", merge into dialogical constructivism, a contemporary development of ideas derived especially from the works of Charles S. Peirce (his pragmatic maxim as a means of giving meaning to signs) and of Ludwig Wittgenstein (his language games as tools of comparison for understanding ways of life). 7. Albrecht Wellmer, "Autonomy of meaning" and "principle of charity" from the viewpoint of the pragmatics of language. In this essay I present an interpretation of the principle of the autonomy of meaning and of the principle of charity, the two main principles of Davidson's semantic view of truth, showing how both principles may fit in a perspective dictated by the pragmatics of language. I argue that (I) the principle of the autonomy of meaning may be thoroughly reformulated in terms of the pragmatics of language, (ii) the principle of charity needs a supplement in terms of pragmatics of language in order to become really enlightening as a principle of interpretation. Besides, I argue that: (i) on the one hand, the fundamental thesis of Habermas on the pragmatic theory of meaning ("we understand a speech act when we know what makes it admissible") is correlated with the seemingly intentionalist thesis according to which we understand a speech act when we know what a speaker means; (ii) on the other hand, to say that the meaning competence of a competent speaker is basically a competence about a potential of reasons (or also of possible justifications) which is inherently connected with the meaning of statements, or with their use in utterances. ● Rüdiger Bubner, The convergence of analytic and hermeneutic philosophy This paper argues that the analytic philosophy does not exist, at least as understood by its original programs. Differences in the analytic camp have always been bigger than they were believed to be. Now these differences are coming to the fore thanks to a process of dissolution of dogmatism. Philosophical analysis is led by its own inner logic towards questions that may be fairly qualified as hermeneutic. Recent developments in analytic philosophy, e.g. Davidson, seem to indicate a growing convergence of themes between philosophical analysis and hermeneutics; thus, the familiar opposition of Anglo-Saxon and Continental philosophy might soon belong to history. The fact of an ongoing appropriation of analytical techniques by present-day German philosophers may provide a basis for a powerful argument for the unity of philosophizing, beyond its strained images privileging one technique of thinking and rejecting the remainder. Actual philosophical practice should take the dialogue between the two camps more seriously; in fact, the processes described so far are no danger to philosophical work. They may be a danger for parochial approaches to philosophizing; indeed, contrary to what happens in the natural sciences, Thomas Kuhn's "normal science" developing within the framework of one fixed paradigm is not typical for philosophical thinking. And in philosophy innovating revolutions are symptoms more of vitality than of crisis. ● Karl-Otto Apel, The impact of analytic philosophy on my intellectual biography. In my paper I try to reconstruct the history of my Auseinandersetzung mit - as I called it - "language-analytical" philosophy (including even Peircean semiotics) since the late Fifties. The heuristics of my study was predetermined by two main motives of my beginnings: the hermeneutic turn of phenomenology and the transformation of "transcendental philosophy" in the light of the "language a priori". Thus, I took issue with the early and the later Wittgenstein, logical positivism, and post-Wittgensteinian and post-empiricist philosophy of science (i.e. G.H. von Wright and the renewal of the "explanation vs understanding controversy" as well as the debate between Th. Kuhn and Popper/Lakatos); besides, with speech act theory and the debate about "transcendental arguments" since Strawson. The "pragmatic turn", started already by C.L. Morris and the later Carnap, led me to study also the relationship between Wittgensteinian "use" theory of meaning and of truth. This resulted on my side in something like a program of "transcendental semiotics", i.e. "transcendental pragmatics" and "transcendental hermeneutics". ● Ben-Ami Scharfstein, A doubt on both their houses: the blindness to non-western philosophies. The burden of my criticism is that contemporary European philosophers of all kinds have continued to think as if there were no true philosophy but that of the West. For the most part, the existentialists have been oblivious of their Eastern congeners; the hermeneuticians have yet to stretch their horizons beyond the most familiar ones; and the analysts remain unaware of the analyses and linguistic sensitivities of the ancient non-European philosophers. Briefly, ignorance still blinds almost all contemporary Western philosophers to the rich, variegated philosophical traditions outside of their familiar orbit. Both Continental and Anglo-Americans have lost the breadth of view that once characterized such thinkers as Herder and the Humboldts. The blindness that has resulted is not simply that of individual Western philosophers but of our whole, still parochial philosophical culture. (shrink)

Synthetic biology is often seen as the engineering turn in biology. Philosophically speaking, entities created by synthetic biology, from synthetic cells to xenobots, challenge the ontological divide between the organic and inorganic, as well as between the natural and the artificial. Entities such as synthetic cells can be seen as hybrid or transitory objects, or neo–things. However, what has remained philosophically underexplored so far is the impact these hybrid neo–things will have on (our phenomenological experience of) the living world. By (...) extrapolating from Walter Benjamin’s account of how technological reproducibility affects the aura of art, we embark upon an exploratory inquiry that seeks to fathom how the technological reproducibility of life itself may influence our experience and understanding of the living. We conclude that, much as technologies that enabled reproduction corroded the aura of original artworks (as Benjamin argued), so too will the aura of life be under siege in the era of synthetic lifeforms. This article zooms in on a specific case study, namely the research project Building a Synthetic Cell (BaSyC) and its mission to create a synthetic cell–like entity, as autonomous as possible, focusing on the properties that differentiate organic from synthetic cells. (shrink)

One of the ṣaḥābīs of Prophet Muḥammad is ʿUrwa b. Masʿūd from the Ṭāʾif tribe of Thaqīf. He belongs to the Ahlâf part of the Thaqīf tribe and he is the ruler of this part. ʿUrwa’s ancestry is known without any controversy until Kasî (Thaqīf). According to a narrative his epithet was Abū Yaʿfur and another of his epithet was Abū Masʿūd. Father of ʿUrwa an important person too. He is one of the leaders of his tribe and he commanded (...) his part (Aḥlāf) in wars of Fijār. Mother of ʿUrwa is Subay’a bt. ʿAbd Shams from Banū Umayya. In this way ʿUrwa has kinship both with Banū Umayya and Prophet Muḥammad. So ʿUrwa has a very important position because of his lineage, his mother and father. Thefore, his connections with Mecca and Quraysh strengthens his position. In our sources there is no information about his dates of birth and death. It is likely to be over middle age when he became a muslim, considering that he was the leader of his tribe and his son become a muslim after he died. There is too little information about weddings of ʿUrwa. According to narratives, he had ten wives before becoming Muslim. After becoming a Muslim Prophet Muḥammad warned from him to prefer four out of ten wives. One of his four wives is the daughter of Abū Sufyān. Howev-er, there is no information about the names of his wives. Names of his sons: ʿĀṣim, Abū Murra, Abū Mulayḥ, Dāwūd, Hammām and Hishām and names of his daughters: Umm Saʿīd (married with Ḥaẓrat ʿAlī) and Ḥalīma. We could see he served as embassy before the treaty of Hudaybiyah. His embassy duty shows us the superiority of his position. Also, this embassy duty was very effective at peace negotiations. He mentioned kinship relations which connects about Mecca. He said that it could be beneficial to talk to Prophet Muḥammad himself. The Meccans mentioned about their trust in ʿUrwa. During the time of his embassy, he expressed that both sides should be away from war. In this context, he told the Meccans: The people around Prophet Muḥammad are very loyal to him and he told to Prophet Muḥammad: People around him could disintegrate easily. This mission shows us he is intelligent, respectable and had high persuasion skills. ʿUrwa, observed loyalty of ṣaḥābīs to Prophet Muḥammad. He confessed this loyalty can not be for any ruler. This observa-tion probably affected ʿUrwa’s conversion to Islam. Because of the conquest of Meccah and the events that followed, the people of Ṭāʾif were very worried. Because of this reason people of Ṭāʾif took part in the side of Hawāzin’s and they bat-tled with Muslims. In this time they sent ʿUrwa b. Masʿūd and Ghaylān b. Salama to the city of D̲j̲aras̲h̲ of Yemen, to learn about some war machines and techniques. Therefore they did not join wars of Hunayn and Ṭāʾif. Prophet Muḥammad ended the siege of Ṭāʾif and went to Medina. Meanwhile, ʿUrwa and his friend returned from Yemen. According to narratives when the Prophet Muḥammad returned Medina or he was way in Medina ʿUrwa visited him and became Muslim. Some people tell about the date of ʿUrwa’s being Muslim at before or after Abū Bakr’s emirate of Hadj. However, when the narrations are examined, it can be said he became Muslim after four or five months from Prophet’s siege of Ṭāʾif and before three or four months from Tabūk expedition of Rabīʿ al-awwal or “Rabīʿ al-ākhir” (July or August) in the year 9/630. As for the conversion of ʿUrwa, basic sources report that “Allah, inspired Islam to the heart of ʿUrwa and he changed his situation. He went to the Messenger of Allah and he became Muslim.” They do not give a specific reason. But after this period the narratives tell the reason for ʿUrwa’s becoming a Muslim as due to an experience he had while travelling to Najrān for trade. In this travel, two mysterious young girls and the priest in Najrān said the last prophet came and ʿUrwa must be subject to him and ʿUrwa became Muslim after he returned. But this narrative is prob-lematic with regard to evidence and text. After being Muslim, ʿUrwa wanted permission from the Prophet to invite his tribe to accept Islam. The prophet did not want to accept this at first. Because the people of Ṭāʾif had an arro-gant stance against Islam, and he said that the people of Thaqīf could kill ʿUrwa. Eventually ʿUrwa went to his hometown with permission of Prophet and invited people to Islam and they did not accept this invitation and cursed ʿUrwa. The next morning ʿUrwa read adhan of fajr and people of Ṭāʾif killed him. ʿUrwa b. Masʿūd was likened to Prophet Jesus by the Prophet Muḥammad. It is generally accept-ed that ʿUrwa b. Masʿūd el-Thaqafī is “one of the biggest from two cities” expressed in sūra Zukhruf. Only two weak narrations were reported of Urwa who could live as a Muslim for a few days and was matyred by his tribe. (shrink)

Both professors and institutions of higher education benefit from a vision of academic life that is grounded more firmly in myth than in history. According to the myth created by that traditional vision, scholars pursue research wherever their drive to knowledge takes them, and colleges and universities transmit the fruits of that research to contemporary and future generations as the accumulated wisdom of the ages. Yet the economic and social forces operating on colleges and universities as institutions, as well as (...) on the interests of faculty members within them, are making the myth embodied in the traditional ideal of the academy more and more difficult to sustain. Questions about what an institution of higher education ought to be, about what professors ought to do, and about what relations professors ought to have to the institutions which employ them are being raised and pushed to the fore. These are not theoretical questions, but practical questions of immediate import that must be answered relatively quickly -- and wisely -- if institutions of higher education and professors are not to find themselves inextricably in the grip of forces they cannot change. The myth of disinterested academic research-however beautiful -- and however beneficial -- is under siege. (shrink)

The history of the interpretation of Psalm 46 has been articulated around the search for its context. Some commentators have sought to pin its historical circumstance to certain events in Israel's past, such as the siege of Sennacherib's army over Judah or a major geological event such as an earthquake. Others have asserted that the author of the Psalm did not have in mind a past event, but a future one, namely, a time of peace and cessation of wars. But (...) is this search for the context of the author's day really essential for the modern reader? Shouldn't the diligent reading of any text culminate in merging the past with the present?And, finally, shouldn't the reader's horizons be called into question when interpreting a text? This research will seek to analyze these questions from the dialogue with authors such as Franz Delitzsch, Hermann Gunkel, Hans Georg Gadamer, G. Heinrich Ewald and Arie Folger; authors who contributed to the reflection of this research. -/- . (shrink)

contents -/- i. death and the mask ii. shifts in the TTC ad-space iii. a virus in a superposition iv. this virus has totally hacked us v. a test of Bayesian competence vi. a siege on the Local, by the Global vii. re lab-leak theory: God did it viii. we held ourselves apart by this telescope ix. Google knows we'll all be dead x. Uber gets us all to surveil xi. Netflix pretends to be my friend xii. can teleCOMM map (...) my interior? xiii. Library's a hi-rise, in lockdown xiv. so could the A.I. announce itself xv. N_BossTRON, Surveillance Daemon xvi. prediction markets make War Profiteers xvii. hide Fish in sea, Bird in forest xviii. the DJ and the human, too much credit xix. dumb TV, an ingenious production xx. WE THE NORTH xxi. Debt: The First 5,000 Years xxii. Theses on Kingship xxiii. when i google Zeus xxiv. your Hardcore History xxv. consumerism a pacification campaign xxvi. fascism is quiet now xxvii. a Chomsky need keep record. (shrink)

Economic sanctions are envisaged as a sort of punishment, based on what should be an institutional decision not unlike a court ruling. Hence, the conditions for their lifting should be clearly stated and once those are met sanctions should be lifted. But this is generally not what happens, and perhaps is precluded by the very nature of international sanctioning. Sanctions clearly have political, economic, military and strategic consequences, but the question raised here is whether sanctions can also have moral justification. (...) Illustrated by the example of international sanctions against Yugoslavia, the authors show how the process of escalating demands on a target country, inherent to the very process of sanctioning, can lead ultimately even to overt aggression. As a result of this logic of escalation, economic sanctions cannot be articulated properly in any law-like system. Economic sanctions have much more in common with war than legal punishment, and in fact represent a form of siege. As such, they cannot be ended simply on the basis of their initial rationale, for the very process of sanctions implementation opens up possibilities for setting new goals and a continuous redefinition of the goal that sanctions are seen to have. (shrink)

Sanctions such as those applied by the United Nations against Yugoslavia, or rather the actions of implementing and maintaining them, at the very least implicitly purport to have moral justification. While the rhetoric used to justify sanctions is clearly moralistic, even sanctions themselves, as worded, often include phrases indicating moral implication. On May 30, 1992, United Nation Security Council Resolution 757 imposed a universal, binding blockage on all trade and all scientific, cultural and sports exchanges with Serbia and Montenegro. In (...) addition to expressing the usual "concern' and "dismay" regarding various events, the language of this Resolution also includes, on three occasions, unmistakably moral language "deploring" failures in meeting the demands of earlier resolutions.' There is no question that sanctions have political, economic, military and trategic consequences for the sanctioned state, perhaps exactly as desired by the sanctioning party. However, the question raised in this essay is whether in addition to these consequences, sanctions also produce morally reprehensible consequences that undermine their often-cited moral justification. If so, international economic sanctions are an immoral means of achieving primarily political goals. Six morally significant consequences are: 1) The unethical, elevated susceptibility of the sanctioned to olitical (and other forms of) manipulation, 2) the inherent and unjust paternalism in the process of sanctioning, 3) the abandonment of strict moral criteria on virtually all levels of evaluation, primarily inside the sanctioned country, but also in sanctioning states best exhibited in the attitudes toward the sanctioned, 4) the general decline in moral consciousness, 5) the subsequent rise of many forms of violence within the sanctioned state in connection with the increase in lawlessness, and a general decline of expectations in all areas of life, and 6) the continual, arbitrary redefining of conditions for a final lifting of sanctions. In light of this moral phenomenology we shall argue that sanctions, lacking in moral justification, are simply a means for achieving the mentioned immoral goals. Furthermore, the argument will be that sanctions are a form of siege and, as such, an act of war, requiring the sort of justification that would be needed to justify a war. (shrink)

Popper's account of refutation is the linchpin of his famous view that the method of science is the method of conjecture and refutation. This thesis critically examines his account of refutation, and in particular the practice he deprecates as avoiding a refutation. I try to explain how he comes to hold the views that he does about these matters; how he seeks to make them plausible; how he has influenced others to accept his mistakes, and how some of the ideas (...) or responses to Popper of such people are thus similarly mistaken. I draw some distinctions necessary to the provision of an adequate account of the so-called practice of avoiding a refutation, and try to rid the debate about this practice of at least one red herring. I analyse one case of 'avoiding' a refutation in detail to show how the rationality of scientific practice eludes both Popper and many of his commentators. Popper's skepticism about contingent knowledge prevents him from providing an acceptable account of contingent refutation, and so his method is really the method of conjecture and conjecture. He cannot do without the concepts of knowledge and refutation, however, if his account of science is to be plausible or persuasive, and so he equivocates between, amongst other things, refutation as disproof and refutation as the weaker notion of discorroboration. I criticise David Stove's account of this matter, in particular to show how he misses this point. An additional advantage Popper would secure from this equivocation is that if refutations were mere discorroborations they would be easier to achieve, and hence more common in science, than is the case. On Popper's weak notion of refutation, it would be possible to refute true theories since corroboration does not entail truth. There are two other related doctrines Popper holds about refutation which, if accepted, make some refutations seem easier to obtain than is the case. I call these doctrines 'Strong Popperian Falsificationism' (SPF) and 'Weak Popperian Falsificationism' (WPF). SPF is the false doctrine that if a prediction from some theory is refuted then that theory is refuted. Popper does not always endorse SPF. In particular, when confronted with a counterexample to it, he retreats to WPF, which is the false doctrine that if a prediction from some theory is refuted then that theory is prima facie refuted. WPF , or even SPF, can seem plausible if one has in mind predictions derived from theories in strong or conclusive tests of those theories, which I suggest Popper characteristically does. v Popper is disposed to describe any such case of predictive failure which does not lead to the refutation of the theory concerned as one in which that refutation has been avoided. To reinforce his portrayal of the refutation, or the attempted refutation, of major scientific theories as the rational core of scientific practice, Popper treats the so-called practice of avoiding a refutation as untypical of science, and much so-called avoidance he dismisses as unscientific or pseudo-scientific. I argue that his notion of avoiding a refutation is incoherent. Popper is further driven to believe that such avoidance is possible, however, because he conflates sentences with propositions and propositions with propositional beliefs. Also, he wishes to avoid being saddled with the relativisim that is a consequence of his weak account of refutation as discorroboration. Popper believes that ad hoc hypotheses are the most important of the unscientific means of avoiding a refutation. I argue that his account of such hypotheses is also incoherent, and that several hypotheses thought to be ad hoc in his sense are not. Such hypotheses appear to be so largely because of Popper's use of rhetoric and partly because these hypotheses are unacceptable for other reasons. I conclude that to know that a hypothesis is ad hoc in Popper's sense does not illuminate scientific practice. Popper has also attempted to explicate ad hocness in terms of some undesirable, or allegedly undesirable, properties of hypotheses or the explanations they would provide. The first such property is circularity, which is undesirable; the second such property is reduction in empirical content, which is not. In the former case I argue that non-circularity is clearly preferable to non-ad hocness as a criterion for a satisfactory explanation or explanans, as the case may be, and in the latter case that Popper is barking up the wrong tree. Some cases of so-called avoidance are obviously not unscientific. The discovery of Neptune from a prediction based on the reasonable belief that there were residual perturbations in the motion of Uranus is an important case in point, and one that is much discussed in the literature. The manifest failure of astronomers to account for Uranus's motion did not lead to the refutation of Newton's law of gravitiation, yet significant scientific progress obviously did result. Retreating to WPF, Popper claims that Newton's law was prima facie refuted. In general, astronomers have never shared this view, and they are correct in not doing so. I argue that the law of gravitation would have been prima facie refuted only if there had been good reason at the time to believe as false what is true, namely, that an unknown trans-Uranian planet was the cause of those Uranian residuals. Knowledge of the trans-Uranian region was then so slight that it was merely a convenient assumption, one which there was little reason to believe was false, that the known influences on Uranus's motion were the only such influences. I conclude that in believing vi or supposing that it was this assumption that was false, rather than the law of gravitation, Leverrier and Adams, the co-predictors of Neptune, were acting rationally and intelligently. Popper's commentators offer a variety of accounts of the alleged practice of avoiding a refutation, and of this case in particular. I analyse a sample of their accounts to show how common is the acceptance of some of Popper's basic mistakes, even amongst those who claim to reject his falsificationism, and to display the effects on their accounts of this acceptance of his mistakes. Many commentators recognize that anomalies are typically dealt with by changes in the boundary conditions or in other of the auxiliary propositions employed. Where many still go wrong, however, is in retaining the presupposition of WPF which encouraged Popper to hold the contradictory view about anomalies in the first place. Thus Imre Lakatos and others, for example, have developed a 'siege mentality' about major scientific theories; they see them as under continual threat of refutation from anomalies, and so come to believe that dogmatism is essential in science if such theories are to survive as they do. I examine various such doomed attempts to reconcile Popper with the history of science. It is a common failure in this literature to conflate or to fail to see the need to distinguish a belief from a supposition, and an epistemic reason from a pragmatic reason. I argue that only if one does draw these distinctions can one give an adequate account of how anomalies are rationally dealt with in science. The other important strand in Popper's thinking about 'avoidance' of refutation which has seriously misled some of his commentators is his unfounded belief in the dangers of ad hoc hypotheses. I examine the accounts that a sample of such commentators provide of the trans-Uranian planet hypotheses of Leverrier and Adams. These commentators imply or assert what Popper only hints at, namely, that there is something fishy about this hypothesis. I provide a further defence of the rationality of entertaining this hypothesis at the time. I conclude with a few remarks about Popper's dilemma in respect of scientific practice and his long standing emphasis on refutations. (shrink)

Während in griechisch-römischer Antike Arbeit und Freiheit einander ausschlossen, gilt heute den Nicht-Wohlhabenden der Ausschluss aus der Erwerbsarbeit als Verlust von Selbstbestimmung. Funktion und Wert von Arbeit sind abhängig von der Machtstreuung vs. -konzentration der jeweiligen Gesellschaften. Nicht-kapitalistische Machtstrukturen erzwingen Arbeit durch materielle Not bzw. außerökonomisch zum Zwecke der Sozialdisziplinierung. Kapitalismus ist zum Siege gelangt, wo Arbeit knapp und daher teuer – für die Armen zum Modus der Teilhabe am Wohlstand – werden konnte. Zuerst erkannten Nietzsche und Lafargue, dass die (...) aus Not zur Tugend gelogene „Arbeitsmoral“ die Arbeitenden in ihrem Kampfe um die Preissteigerung für Arbeit nie mehr als hindern kann. -/- Seit Keynes ist die Funktionsweise des Kapitalismus bekannt: Vollbeschäftigung ist Bedingung der Möglichkeit, damit Arbeit im Konflikt mit dem Kapital zu Verhandlungsmacht gelangen kann. Die von Marxisten ersehnten Krisen des Kapitalismus sind durch staatliche Maßnahmen und wohlfahrtsstaatliche Umverteilung prinzipiell politisch regulierbar. Aber wer öffentlich der politökonomischen Aufklärung dient, befähigt auch deren Widersacher dazu, sich an ihr zu bilden, die Konter-Strategie entlang ihrer Erkenntnisse gegenläufig auszurichten. -/- Neoliberalismus lässt sich als politischer Anti-Liberalismus verstehen, offensiv gegen den Sozialstaat wie den gesamten Kulturbereich gerichtet, der mehr als nur boulevardeske Unterhaltung ist. Ob Schrumpfung des öffentlichen Dienstes, Privatisierung kollektiver Güter oder Steuersenkungen für Vermögende, letztlich geht es um die Steigerung ungleicher Verteilung finanzieller Verfügungsrechte. Dem korrespondiert die Zersetzung demokratischer Steuerung durch Entpolitisierung: Wenn es gelingt vermeintliche Sachzwänge politisch glaubwürdig zu inszenieren, erscheint gleichgültig, welche Regierung angeblich nichts mehr zu entscheiden hat, weil sie den Haushalt konsolidieren müsse etc. etc. Hohe Arbeitslosigkeit ist für den Erfolg neoliberaler Strategie entscheidend. Sie spaltet die abhängig Beschäftigten in realiter machtlose Arbeitslose (sie können nicht einmal streiken) und angesichts der Arbeitslosigkeit verängstigte Arbeitende (die sich aller Forderungen enthalten). Arbeit und Lohn bleiben Verteilungsprobleme. Die Zukunft bietet die Alternativen, hinter den bewussten kapitalistischen Fortschritt zurückzufallen oder auf dessen Grundlage das Otium der Edlen für alle zu erkämpfen. (shrink)

Near-death experiences have been described with a variety of forms and narratives. Different medical conditions leading to loss of consciousness or causing a restriction in the perceptive field have been related with the appearance of near-death experiences. A few literary narratives of these experiences are available, with fictional characters exposed to helplessness and despair during the impending death. A situation of near-death experience is described in the last part of the seventh chapter of an Albanian novel „The castle‟ of Ismail (...) Kadare. The last two pages of this chapter describe the confusion following the crash of a tunnel dug deep underground from Turkish soldiers, which aimed to reach inside a besieged castle. Darkness-related hallucinations and restriction of cognitive field due to environmental factors will be responsible of the aftermath following the deliberate crash of the tunnel, caused from the castle inhabitants, after fierce fighting during the siege. A fictional description of these experiences and of the psychological and physical agony will complete the rest. Near-death moments and respective descriptions have been an important field of medicine, humanities and forensic sciences. Only some writers have hazarded into describing such personal experiences of despair and helplessness during the agony and impending death. (shrink)

Que diriez-vous d’une autre prise sur les riches et célèbres? Tout d’abord l’évidence - les romans de Harry Potter sont la superstition primitive qui encourage les enfants à croire en la fantaisie plutôt que d’assumer la responsabilité du monde - la norme bien sûr. JKR est tout aussi désemparé sur elle-même et le monde que la plupart des gens, mais environ200 fois plus destructeur que l’Américain moyen et environ 800 fois plus que le Chinois moyen. Elle a été responsable de (...) la destruction de peut-être 30.000 hectares de forêt pour produire ces romans trash et toute l’érosion qui s’ensuit (pas trivial car il est au moins 6 et peut-être 12 tonnes / an de sol dans l’océan pour tout le monde sur terre ou peut-être 100 tonnes par Américain, et donc environ 5000 tonnes par an pour les livres de Rowling et films et ses 3 enfants). La terre perd au moins 1% de sa terre maximale chaque année, de sorte qu’il approche de 2100, la plupart de sa capacité de culture alimentaire aura disparu. Ensuite, il ya l’énorme quantité de carburant brûlé et les déchets faits pour faire et distribuer les livres et les films, poupées en plastique, etc. Elle montre son manque de responsabilité sociale en produisant des enfants plutôt que d’utiliser ses millions pour encourager la planification familiale ou acheter la forêt tropicale, et en promouvant la stupidité libérale conventionnelle de la suprématie du 3e monde qui détruit la Grande-Bretagne, l’Amérique, le monde et l’avenir de son descendant. Bien sûr, elle n’est pas si différente des 7 autres. 8 milliards désemparés - juste plus bruyant et plus destructeur. C’est le problème de déjeuner gratuit bref grand. La foule ne peut tout simplement pas voir qu’il n’y a pas une telle chose comme aider une personne sans nuire à d’autres. Les droits ou privilèges accordés aux nouveaux arrivants dans un monde surpeuplé ne peuvent que s’affaiblir dans ceux des autres. Malgré les catastrophes écologiques massives qui se produisent partout tous les jours, ils ne peuvent pas les épingler à la maternité effrénée de "la diversité", qui explique la majeure partie de l’augmentation de la population du siècle dernier et tout cela dans celui-ci. Ils manquent d’une combinaison d’intelligence, d’éducation, d’expérience et de santé mentale nécessaires pour extrapoler les assauts quotidiens sur les ressources et le fonctionnement de la société à l’effondrement éventuel de la civilisation industrielle. Chaque repas, chaque voyage en voiture ou en bus, chaque paire de chaussures est un autre clou dans le cercueil de la terre. Il n’a probablement jamais traversé son esprit qu’un siège dans un avion de Londres à San Francisco produit environ une tonne de carbone qui fond environ 3 mètres carrés de glace de mer et comme l’un des surprivileged, elle a probablement volé des centaines de ces vols. Non seulement les riches et les célèbres, mais presque n’importe quelle personnalité publique du tout, y compris pratiquement tous les enseignants, sont poussés à être politiquement corrects, ce qui dans les démocraties occidentales, signifie maintenant social-démocrate (néomarxiste, c’est-à-dire communiste dilué) suprémacistes du tiers monde travaillant pour la destruction de leurs propres sociétés et de leurs propres descendants. Ainsi, ceux dont le manque d’éducation, d’expérience, d’intelligence (et de bon sens de base), qui devrait leur interdire de faire des déclarations publiques du tout, domine totalement tous les médias, créant l’impression que l’intelligent et civilisé doit favoriser la démocratie, la diversité et l’égalité, alors que la vérité est que ce sont les problèmes et non les solutions, et qu’ils sont eux-mêmes les principaux ennemis de la civilisation. Voir mon Suicide by Democracy 4th ed (2020). (shrink)

Comment en arrive-t-on à proposer comme oeuvre d’art une relation sexuelle tarifée avec un collectionneur? En 2003, l’artiste en art conceptuel et performeuse américaine, Andrea Fraser, commettra l’impensable de « coucher » avec un collectionneur afin de critiquer le milieu et surtout le marché de l’art contemporain. L’article qui suit propose une analyse thématique de l’aspect sexuel et éthique de cette oeuvre intitulée Untitled. Il sera d’abord question des significations possibles de cette performance et ses questionnements artistiques plus autoréférentiels. Je (...) compte ensuite aborder plus précisément la position trouble de la subjectivité de l’artiste qui oscille entre une posture d’objet sexuel et d’artiste. De même, le texte fera état de la position novatrice que l’oeuvre présente sur les enjeux éthiques du travail du sexe en déconstruisant les arguments paternalistes généralement invoqués pour criminaliser le travail du sexe. Et finalement, j’aborderai la question de savoir comment la nature sexuelle de l’oeuvre vient désacraliser à la fois l’art et la sexualité, et par le fait même critiquer l’idée que la sexualité soit le siège de la subjectivité. En désacralisant ainsi la sexualité, je postule qu’Untitled offre la possibilité de concevoir le travail du sexe de manière plus neutre.How can a sexual act in exchange of money with an art collector be offered as a work of art? In 2003, performer and conceptual artist Andrea Fraser committed the unthinkable of sleeping with an art collector in order to critique the contemporary art milieu and market. The following article proposes a thematic analysis of sexual and ethical components of this work of art entitled Untitled. I will first discuss possible meanings of such a performance and its artistic considerations. I will then address more precisely the troubled position of the artist’s subjectivity, which vacillates between a sexual object and an artist. Moreover, the article will highlight the innovative position presented by this work of art on ethical issues regarding sex work by deconstructing paternalistic claims generally used to support the criminalization of sex work. Finally, I will discuss how the sexual nature of this work of art comes to desecrate art, along with sexuality, thereby criticizing the idea that sexuality is the main site of subjectivity. Through this desecration of sexuality, I argue that Untitled offers the possibility to apprehend sex work in a more neutral way. (shrink)

La plupart des études psychosociologiques et des travaux psychanalytiques sur la psychologie sociale admettent l'existence des groupes et des individus, que leurs rapports soient pensés sur un mode idéologique ou analogique comme dans Totem et tabou par exemple (1). Cette existence, qui paraît aller de soi, nous semble être à préciser, sinon à discuter. (1) Voici l'hypothèse de Freud : "Il n'a sans doute échappé à personne que nous postulons l'existence d'une âme collective dans laquelle s'accomplissent les mêmes processus que (...) ceux ayant leur siège dans l'âme humaine" (S.Freud 1912, 1970, Payot). Une phrase critique de Jacques Lacan, écrite à propos de la dissolution de l'École Freudienne, va nous servir de fil conducteur pour commenter les trois termes qui figurent dans notre titre : "Le groupe se définit d'être une unité synchrone dont les éléments sont les individus. Mais un sujet n'est pas un individu". (shrink)

What is so special and mysterious about the Continuum, this ancient, always topical, and alongside the concept of integers, most intuitively transparent and omnipresent conceptual and formal medium for mathematical constructions and the battle field of mathematical inquiries ? And why it resists the century long siege by best mathematical minds of all times committed to penetrate once and for all its set-theoretical enigma ? -/- The double-edged purpose of the present study is to save from the transfinite deadlock of (...) higher set theory the jewel of mathematical Continuum -- this genuine, even if mostly forgotten today raison d'etre of all set-theoretical enterprises to Infinity and beyond, from Georg Cantor to W. Hugh Woodin to Buzz Lightyear, by simultaneously exhibiting the limits and pitfalls of all old and new reductionist foundational approaches to mathematical truth: be it Cantor's or post-Cantorian Idealism, Brouwer's or post-Brouwerian Constructivism, Hilbert's or post-Hilbertian Formalism, Goedel's or post-Goedelian Platonism. -/- In the spirit of Zeno's paradoxes, but with the enormous historical advantage of hindsight, we claim that Cantor's set-theoretical methodology, powerful and reach in proof-theoretic and similar applications as it might be, is inherently limited by its epistemological framework of transfinite local causality, and neither can be held accountable for the properties of the Continuum already acquired through geometrical, analytical, and arithmetical studies, nor can it be used for an adequate, conceptually sensible, operationally workable, and axiomatically sustainable re-creation of the Continuum. -/- From a strictly mathematical point of view, this intrinsic limitation of the constative and explicative power of higher set theory finds its explanation in the identified in this study ultimate phenomenological obstacle to Cantor's transfinite construction, similar to topological obstacles in homotopy theory and theoretical physics: the entanglement capacity of the mathematical Continuum. (shrink)

In the 5th century BCE, Sophocles wrote a tragedy about the rivalry between the Greek heroes Ajax and Odysseus. The two competed for the title of most valuable man in the army that was laying siege to Troy. The prize was Achilles’ armor (he was dead, you know), which was forged by none other than the god Hephaestus. The Greeks’ leader, Agamemnon, was a bit of a coward, and he made a jury of soldiers decide the contest instead of taking (...) responsibility for the decision himself. The soldiers unanimously awarded the armor to Odysseus (who eventually did lead them to victory, via his Trojan Horse stratagem), even though Ajax had arguably been the more valiant soldier, and many owed their life to his bravery in battle. As a result of the decision against him, Ajax was irreparably wounded in his honor, became temporarily mad, attacked his superiors, and ended up committing suicide. (shrink)

Fake news is a topic that we all know well, and that continues to play a prominent role in the social harms besieging the globe today. From the recent storming of the Capitol Hill in the United States to the siege of Red fort over Farm-laws in India, online disinformation via social media platforms was the main driving force catapulting the protestors far and wide. In the backdrop of such social harms, this Research Article examines the epistemic, legal and regulatory (...) discourse surrounding the disinformation bubble in India and asks for the deployment of ‘Lessig’s Decentred Regulatory Model’ — the potential Framework solution to regulate social media platforms in order to curb the menace of ‘fake news’. (shrink)

To what extend does David Hume's argument about miracles inform modern skepticism about pseudoscience?

Intelligent Design proponents want to distinguish themselves from creationists. But the distinction appears to be without a difference.

Descartes laid the philosophical groundwork for the modern scientific period by separating subjective cognition from objective bodies, thereby also dividing epistemology from ontology reducing knowing to indifferent “observation.” This is the perspective of consciousness and its object, of which material science only imperfectly studies the object. In reality these two are not separated but dialectically related and sublated in the higher comprehending original unity of self-consciousness. Physical scientists fail to study these higher categories of reality and are therefore left with (...) an incomplete understanding of a mere superficial nature that is inadequate to comprehend the core truth. But scientific, rational inquiry will not stop until a comprehensive idea is reached that is coherent with the full range of our knowledge of life. That spectrum of knowledge is not circumscribed merely by chemistry, physics and mathematics. Thus Vedanta-sutra advises, that you will have to continue your search, athatho brahma jijnasa, until you reach brahma, the underlying spiritual source, janmady asy yatah, the fountainhead where all inquiry will reach its purpose. Then beyond knowledge Bhagavatam will guide us to the ultimate search – raso vai sah, the search for our highest fulfillment, sweetness and love. (shrink)

“Indeed, we now know that the proportion of genetic sequences on earth that belongs to visible organisms is negligible. Furthermore, only 15% of the genetic sequences found in the samples from the environment and from feces analyzed in metagenomic studies belong to the three domains of microbes currently recognized in the tree-of-life framework – bacteria, archaea, and eukaryotes. Viruses contain another 15-30% of these genetic sequences.” This means that the majority of unidentified genetic sequences pose an unresolved problem. Where do (...) they come from? New genes suddenly appear, called ORFans (“orphan genes”) without any precursors. They may be produced by gene duplication, or fusion, or some other unknown process. Yet, Darwin’s tree of life concept would make it impossible to consider such processes. The transfer of genetic sequences from parasites to hosts could involve hundreds of genes for bacteria or viruses. But, as Raoult writes, “the current classification of the domains of life is based on the ribosome – the production apparatus of proteins – which does not exist in these viruses.” Adherence to the dogmatism of Darwin thus prevents these new discoveries, that overturn his century-and-a-half old teachings, from ever reaching the new generation of scientists. Raoult concludes, "Genetic research, in particular, must be free to find new models to explain, and enhance, twenty-first-century scientific discovery. Today, Darwin’s theory of evolution is more a hindrance than a help, because it has become a quasi-theological creed that is preventing the benefits of improved research from being fully realized.". (shrink)

The neo-Darwinian theory of genetic random mutation and Natural Selection, does nothing to explain speciation. Thus, what has been called "natural selection" has come under much scrutiny and critique in recent times. The problem is that natural selection requires the existence of a stable array of species from which selection can be made. So natural selection does not perform the speciation, only the selection after speciation has occurred. The activity of creating new species must therefore lie in the random mutations (...) of the genome. But this raises the problem that such mutations are generally always fatal to the organism, plus a whole host of other problems that modern advances in molecular biology have revealed about the detailed mechanisms occurring in DNA replication processes, including such things as intrinsic error correcting mechanisms during DNA transcription. Thus a theory of how species arise (speciation) does not currently exist in biology. The Vedantic/Bhagavat paradigm rejects the objectivist theory of evolution as not only wrong but an impediment to the actual scientific comprehension of Nature. The Vedantic conception of Life is a fully differentiated/determinate one that displays its variety in and as an dynamic organic whole. The crucial element of interdependence that is missing in modern theories of insular organism life is fully embraced in what we may call the Post-Darwinian, post-reductionist, post-modern conception of Life the Vedantic/Bhagavat conception offers. (shrink)

The analytical understanding cannot deal with integral wholes and therefore cannot understand the soul or God. The material body is illusory in the sense that it cannot be understood in its true identity without knowing its relationship to God. Analyzing its composition in terms of separated molecules or neurons is also illusory. To understand how to go from an untrue or partially true part to its truth in the whole a method developed by Hegel called conceptual thinking is required. Reproduction (...) is not merely concerned with individuals, it involves the genus or genus process. The universal that determines the species is not changed when particulars under the universal change, die, reproduce according to their “own kind” or species. Without connecting the individual organisms with their species we may wrongly think they can evolve into any species by chance. But this is not how individual and species are related to each other. The species determines how the individuals will appear and controls their reproduction, growth, and so on. They are not independent to become what they want by choice or by chance. Everyone calls themselves “I” so “I” is a universal, although each means only oneself. In the same way each organism is identified with its species, although we mean its own particular organism – for example, a dog and not canine in general. Thus the universal and particular cannot be separated from each other. Similarly individuals who identify only personal reason independent of universal Reason are misconceiving their true identity. At the same time universal and particular are related, they are not the same but a unity in difference. The universal by itself is as abstract as the particular by itself. At the same time their relation can only be comprehended within a higher unity, the higher Self or Supreme Individual. (shrink)

There is a nested hierarchy of wholes that characterizes reality, and especially life. The most fundamental principle is that Reality in the Vedantic/Bhagavat conception is based on Personality, as mentioned in the very first aphorism of the Bhagavat Purana, “janmady asya yatho nvayat itaratas charteshu abhijnah svarat.” Here and in many other scriptures the foundation or origin of everything is centered upon the abhijna or cognizant (conscious) primordial Personality of Godhead. Modern science in the West has become centered on matter (...) as the foundation of everything, and this is called materialism. But matter is impersonal. The question is: how can a person come from what is impersonal? We consider such an approach to be backward. Person cannot come from an impersonal material substratum. It is very difficult to conceive how a rock can give rise to a concept of rock. But it is quite natural to understand that a rock exists as a concept for a conscious person. So too can the concept of objectivity, concreteness and perception arise from a personal substratum, and historically, this has been demonstrated by the detailed philosophical study of these ideas by numerous philosophers. (shrink)

The Western world has led the development of material science for over 200 years. But they have reached an impasse in confronting the problem of consciousness. Scientific knowledge requires a scientist, but regarding knowledge concerning the scientist, they must remain silent. India has always emphasized knowledge of the conscious self or atma. Vedanta-sutra begins with the aphorism “athatho brahma jijnasa” – now, therefore, inquire about brahma (pure consciousness). Even in the West, the Greek philosopher Socrates stated, “Above all else know (...) the self.” But since the time of Newton, the objective world became the focus of science to the exclusion of the conscious observer or scientist. (shrink)

It is not that scientists make an hypothesis first, and then try to find the data to fit that hypothesis. Rather, the process is first observation, then an hypothes is made to describe the data, then conclude that the data has been described by the hypothesis. But this is not an explanation of the phenomenon. It is merely a description of the data in different terms, usually mathematics. It is essentially a tautology. Thus to observe various points and connect them (...) by a line or curve, then to find the mathematical formula that will construct that curve is said to be the law of the curve or the law governing the data points. If those data points happen to be the positions of a planet in space at different times, then the mathematical equation that produces the points on that curve is called the law of motion of the planets. Now, in origin of life studies, observation reveals that life comes from life only. There is no evidence whatsoever to indicate that life is produced out of non-living matter. It was Louis Pasteur who disproved this theory of abiogenesis. From a purely empirical viewpoint, therefore, we have no justification for stating that life comes from inanimate matter. The evidence is that throughout the entire history of modern science such a production of life from matter has never been observed. The question is: Why make a hypothesis about something that has never been observed? If we want to be scientific, then our hypothesis must match the data. Life comes from life is observed all over the Earth, and we might say, all over the universe as far as we have observed it. So where is the justification for claiming otherwise? Rather, we must conclude that the claim that life comes from matter is completely unscientific because it is not a conclusion based on any empirical observation at all. It is purely wishful thinking — a “naturalistic” or materialistic ideology that is masquerading as science. It is thus doubly deceitful since it is not only an unproven belief but an ideology that poses as a scientific theory. (shrink)

In addition to any content, another essential element must be the order or form of that content. Content implies a container. Generally, the container is not thought of as having any determinate influence upon the content. This is a mistake. If we have a bowl-shaped container, the marbles at the bottom will form a concave shape. A square-shaped container will exhibit the marbles in a planar pattern. Thus the container does influence the order or form of its content. Similarly, the (...) Concept (container) of an object (content), shows a similar influence. Thus there is a causal influence of the concept on the content, and as far as the form the content takes is intrinsic, the Concept is not only externally causitive but intrinsically constitutive of the object as well, i.e. its essence. (shrink)