In this multi-disciplinary investigation we show how an evidence-based perspective of quantification---in terms of algorithmic verifiability and algorithmic computability---admits evidence-based definitions of well-definedness and effective computability, which yield two unarguably constructive interpretations of the first-order Peano Arithmetic PA---over the structure N of the natural numbers---that are complementary, not contradictory. The first yields the weak, standard, interpretation of PA over N, which is well-defined with respect to assignments of algorithmically verifiable Tarskian truth values to the formulas of PA under the interpretation. (...) The second yields a strong, finitary, interpretation of PA over N, which is well-defined with respect to assignments of algorithmically computable Tarskian truth values to the formulas of PA under the interpretation. We situate our investigation within a broad analysis of quantification vis a vis: * Hilbert's epsilon-calculus * Goedel's omega-consistency * The Law of the Excluded Middle * Hilbert's omega-Rule * An Algorithmic omega-Rule * Gentzen's Rule of Infinite Induction * Rosser's Rule C * Markov's Principle * The Church-Turing Thesis * Aristotle's particularisation * Wittgenstein's perspective of constructive mathematics * An evidence-based perspective of quantification. By showing how these are formally inter-related, we highlight the fragility of both the persisting, theistic, classical/Platonic interpretation of quantification grounded in Hilbert's epsilon-calculus; and the persisting, atheistic, constructive/Intuitionistic interpretation of quantification rooted in Brouwer's belief that the Law of the Excluded Middle is non-finitary. We then consider some consequences for mathematics, mathematics education, philosophy, and the natural sciences, of an agnostic, evidence-based, finitary interpretation of quantification that challenges classical paradigms in all these disciplines. (shrink)

We show that for every intermediate \ s-degree there exists an incomparable \ s-degree. As a consequence, for every intermediate \ Q-degree there exists an incomparable \ Q-degree. We also show how these results can be applied to provide proofs or new proofs of upper density results in local structures of s-degrees and Q-degrees.

For a computable structure \, if there is a computable infinitary Scott sentence, then the complexity of this sentence gives an upper bound for the complexity of the index set \\). If we can also show that \\) is m-complete at that level, then there is a correspondence between the complexity of the index set and the complexity of a Scott sentence for the structure. There are results that suggest that these complexities will always match. However, it was shown in (...) Knight and McCoy that there is a structure ) for which the index set is m-complete \, though there is no computable \ Scott sentence. In the present paper, we give an example of a particular equivalence structure for which the index set is m-complete \ but for which there is no computable \ Scott sentence. There is, however, a computable \ pseudo-Scott sentence for the structure, that is, a sentence that acts as a Scott sentence if we only consider computable structures. (shrink)

Computational complexity theory is a subfield of computer science originating in computability theory and the study of algorithms for solving practical mathematical problems. Amongst its aims is classifying problems by their degree of difficulty — i.e., how hard they are to solve computationally. This paper highlights the significance of complexity theory relative to questions traditionally asked by philosophers of mathematics while also attempting to isolate some new ones — e.g., about the notion of feasibility in mathematics, the $\mathbf{P} \neq \mathbf{NP}$ (...) problem and why it has proven hard to resolve, and the role of non-classical modes of computation and proof. (shrink)

Infinite time Turing machines represent a model of computability that extends the operations of Turing machines to transfinite ordinal time by defining the content of each cell at limit steps to be the lim sup of the sequences of previous contents of that cell. In this paper, we study a computational model obtained by replacing the lim sup rule with an ‘eventually constant’ rule: at each limit step, the value of each cell is defined if and only if the content (...) of that cell has stabilized before that limit step and is then equal to this constant value. We call these machines weak infinite time Turing machines. We study different variants of wITTMs adding multiple tapes, heads, or bidimensional tapes. We show that some of these models are equivalent to each other concerning their computational strength. We show that wITTMs decide exactly the arithmetic relations on natural numbers. (shrink)

This paper explores the relationship borne by the traditional paradoxes of set theory and semantics to formal incompleteness phenomena. A central tool is the application of the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem to systems of second-order arithmetic and set theory in which various “paradoxical notions” for first-order languages can be formalized. I will first discuss the setting in which this result was originally presented by Hilbert & Bernays (1939) and also how it was later adapted by Kreisel (1950) and Wang (1955) in (...) order to obtain formal undecidability results. A generalization of this method will then be presented whereby Russell’s paradox, a variant of Mirimanoff’s paradox, the Liar, and the Grelling–Nelson paradox may be uniformly transformed into incompleteness theorems. Some additional observations are then framed relating these results to the unification of the set theoretic and semantic paradoxes, the intensionality of arithmetization (in the sense of Feferman, 1960), and axiomatic theories of truth. (shrink)

La cognition humaine paraît étroitement liée à la structure de l'espace et du temps relativement auxquels le corps, le geste, l'intelligibilité semblent devoir se déterminer. Pourtant, ce qui, après les approches physico-mathématiques de Galilée et de Newton, fut caractérisé par Kant comme formes de l'intuition sensible, n'a cessé au cours des siècles qui suivirent de se trouver remis en cause dans leur saisie première par les développements théoriques. En mathématiques d'abord, avec les géométries non-euclidiennes, en physique ensuite, où relativité générale (...) puis théories quantiques et critiques ont dû remanier profondément l'objectivité de ces concepts pour en faire des catégories, certes toujours aussi essentielles, mais de plus en plus contre-intuitives, et maintenant en biologie où la temporalité, notamment, et la causalité se révèlent largement différentes de celles de la physique. C'est ce que nous tentons de présenter et de discuter dans ce texte en vue d'en dégager la pertinence pour la cognition elle-même. (shrink)

This article bears on four topics: observational predicates and phenomenal properties, vagueness, strict finitism as a philosophy of mathematics, and the analysis of feasible computability. It is argued that reactions to strict finitism point towards a semantics for vague predicates in the form of nonstandard models of weak arithmetical theories of the sort originally introduced to characterize the notion of feasibility as understood in computational complexity theory. The approach described eschews the use of nonclassical logic and related devices like degrees (...) of truth or supervaluation. Like epistemic approaches to vagueness, it may thus be smoothly integrated with the use of classical model theory as widely employed in natural language semantics. But unlike epistemicism, the described approach fails to imply either the existence of sharp boundaries or the failure of tolerance for soritical predicates. Applications ofmeasurement theory(in the sense of Krantz, Luce, Suppes, & Tversky (1971)) to vagueness in the nonstandard setting are also explored. (shrink)

We consider the argument that Tarski's classic definitions permit an intelligence---whether human or mechanistic---to admit finitary evidence-based definitions of the satisfaction and truth of the atomic formulas of the first-order Peano Arithmetic PA over the domain N of the natural numbers in two, hitherto unsuspected and essentially different, ways: (1) in terms of classical algorithmic verifiabilty; and (2) in terms of finitary algorithmic computability. We then show that the two definitions correspond to two distinctly different assignments of satisfaction and truth (...) to the compound formulas of PA over N---I_PA(N; SV ) and I_PA(N; SC). We further show that the PA axioms are true over N, and that the PA rules of inference preserve truth over N, under both I_PA(N; SV ) and I_PA(N; SC). We then show: (a) that if we assume the satisfaction and truth of the compound formulas of PA are always non-finitarily decidable under I_PA(N; SV ), then this assignment corresponds to the classical non-finitary putative standard interpretation I_PA(N; S) of PA over the domain N; and (b) that the satisfaction and truth of the compound formulas of PA are always finitarily decidable under the assignment I_PA(N; SC), from which we may finitarily conclude that PA is consistent. We further conclude that the appropriate inference to be drawn from Goedel's 1931 paper on undecidable arithmetical propositions is that we can define PA formulas which---under interpretation---are algorithmically verifiable as always true over N, but not algorithmically computable as always true over N. We conclude from this that Lucas' Goedelian argument is validated if the assignment I_PA(N; SV ) can be treated as circumscribing the ambit of human reasoning about `true' arithmetical propositions, and the assignment I_PA(N; SC) as circumscribing the ambit of mechanistic reasoning about `true' arithmetical propositions. (shrink)

Acceptable programming systems have many nice properties like s-m-n-Theorem, Composition and Kleene Recursion Theorem. Those properties are sometimes called control structures, to emphasize that they yield tools to implement programs in programming systems. It has been studied, among others by Riccardi and Royer, how these control structures influence or even characterize the notion of acceptable programming system. The following is an investigation, how these control structures behave in the more general setting of complete numberings as defined by Mal'cev and Eršov.

A set A is m-reducible to B if and only if there is a polynomial-time computable function f such that, for all x, x∈ A if and only if f ∈ B. Two sets are: 1-equivalent if and only if each is m-reducible to the other by one-one reductions; p-invertible equivalent if and only if each is m-reducible to the other by one-one, polynomial-time invertible reductions; and p-isomorphic if and only if there is an m-reduction from one set to the (...) other that is one-one, onto, and polynomial-time invertible. In this paper we show the following characterization. Theorem The following are equivalent: P = PSPACE. Every two 1-equivalent sets are p-isomorphic. Every two p-invertible equivalent sets are p-isomorphic. (shrink)

It is proved that if 1 $\langle \mathscr{D}_{2n}, \leq, P\rangle$ and $\langle \mathscr{D}_{2n}, \leq, P\rangle$ are not elementary equivalent where P is the predicate P(a) = "a is a Π 0 1 e-degree".

I develop a theory of counterfactuals about relative computability, i.e. counterfactuals such as 'If the validity problem were algorithmically decidable, then the halting problem would also be algorithmically decidable,' which is true, and 'If the validity problem were algorithmically decidable, then arithmetical truth would also be algorithmically decidable,' which is false. These counterfactuals are counterpossibles, i.e. they have metaphysically impossible antecedents. They thus pose a challenge to the orthodoxy about counterfactuals, which would treat them as uniformly true. What’s more, I (...) argue that these counterpossibles don’t just appear in the periphery of relative computability theory but instead they play an ineliminable role in the development of the theory. Finally, I present and discuss a model theory for these counterfactuals that is a straightforward extension of the familiar comparative similarity models. (shrink)

Dominical categories are categories in which the notions of partial morphisms and their domains become explicit, with the latter being endomorphisms rather than subobjects of their sources. These categories form the basis for a novel abstract formulation of recursion theory, to which the present paper is devoted. The abstractness has of course its usual concomitant advantage of generality: it is interesting to see that many of the fundamental results of recursion theory remain valid in contexts far removed from their classic (...) manifestations. A principal reason for introducing this new formulation is to achieve an algebraization of the generalized incompleteness theorem, by providing a category-theoretic development of the concepts and tools of elementary recursion theory that are inherent in demonstrating the theorem.Dominical recursion theory avoids the commitment to sets and partial functions which is characteristic of other formulations, and thus allows for an intrinsic recursion theory within such structures as polyadic algebras. It is worthy of notice that much of elementary recursion theory can be developedwithout referencetoelements.By Gödel's generalized incompleteness theorem for consistent arithmetical systemTwe mean any statement of the following sort: if every recursive set is definable inT, thenTis essentially undecidable [41]; or if all recursive functions are definable inT, thenTis essentially undecidable [41]; or if every recursive set is definable inT, thenT0andR0 are recursively inseparable [39]; or if all re sets are representable inT, thenT0is creative [28], [39]; or ifTis a Rosser theory, thenT0andR0are effectively inseparable [39]. (shrink)

Subcreative sets, introduced by Blum, are known to coincide with the effectively speedable sets. Subcreative sets are shown to be the complete sets with respect to S-reducibility, a special case of Turing reducibility. Thus a set is effectively speedable exactly when it contains the solution to the halting problem in an easily decodable form. Several characterizations of subcreative sets are given, including the solution of an open problem of Blum, and are used to locate the subcreative sets with respect to (...) the complete sets of other reducibilities. It is shown that q-cylindrification is an order-preserving map from the r.e. T-degrees to the r.e. S-degrees. Consequently, T-complete sets are precisely the r.e. sets whose q-cylindrifications are S-complete. (shrink)

A semantics for quantified modal logic is presented that is based on Kleene's notion of realizability. This semantics generalizes Flagg's 1985 construction of a model of a modal version of Church's Thesis and first-order arithmetic. While the bulk of the paper is devoted to developing the details of the semantics, to illustrate the scope of this approach, we show that the construction produces (i) a model of a modal version of Church's Thesis and a variant of a modal set theory (...) due to Goodman and Scedrov, (ii) a model of a modal version of Troelstra's generalized continuity principle together with a fragment of second-order arithmetic, and (iii) a model based on Scott's graph model (for the untyped lambda calculus) which witnesses the failure of the stability of non-identity. (shrink)

We prove the following three theorems on the enumeration degrees of ∑20 sets. Theorem A: There exists a nonzero noncuppable ∑20 enumeration degree. Theorem B: Every nonzero Δ20enumeration degree is cuppable to 0′e by an incomplete total enumeration degree. Theorem C: There exists a nonzero low Δ20 enumeration degree with the anticupping property.

We present a model of computation for string functions over single-sorted, total algebraic structures and study some basic features of a general theory of computability within this framework. Our concept generalizes the Blum-Shub-Smale setting of computability over the reals and other rings. By dealing with strings of arbitrary length instead of tuples of fixed length, some suppositions of deeper results within former approaches to generalized recursion theory become superfluous. Moreover, this gives the basis for introducing computational complexity in a BSS-like (...) manner. Relationships both to classical computability and to Friedman's concept of eds computability are established. Two kinds of nondeterminism as well as several variants of recognizability are investigated with respect to interdependencies on each other and on properties of the underlying structures. For structures of finite signatures, there are universal programs with the usual characteristics. For the general case of not necessarily finite signature, this subject will be studied in a separate, forthcoming paper. (shrink)

This paper introduces the notion of cW10-creative set, which strengthens that of semicreative set in a similar way as complete creativity strengthens creativity. Two results are proven, both of which imply that not all semicreative sets are cW10-creative. First, it is shown that semicreative Dedekind cuts cannot be cW10-creative; the existence of semicreative Dedekind cuts was shown by Soare. Secondly, it is shown that if A ⊕ B, the join of A and B, is cW10-creative, then either A or B (...) is cW10-creative, and the same is not true with ‘cW10-creative’ replaced by ‘semicreative’. Moreover, sets A, B which provide a counterexample for can be constructed within any given nonrecursive r.e. T-degrees a, b. MSC: 03D30. (shrink)

We study the Lindenbaum algebra ${\fancyscript{A}}$ (WKL o, RCA o) of sentences in the language of second-order arithmetic that imply RCA o and are provable from WKL o. We explore the relationship between ${\Sigma^1_1}$ sentences in ${\fancyscript{A}}$ (WKL o, RCA o) and ${\Pi^0_1}$ classes of subsets of ω. By applying a result of Binns and Simpson (Arch. Math. Logic 43(3), 399–414, 2004) about ${\Pi^0_1}$ classes, we give a specific embedding of the free distributive lattice with countably many generators into ${\fancyscript{A}}$ (...) (WKL o, RCA o). (shrink)

We carry out a study of definability issues in the standard models of Presburger and Skolem arithmetics (henceforth referred to simply as Presburger and Skolem arithmetics, for short, because we only deal with these models, not the theories, thus there is no risk of confusion) supplied with free unary predicates—which are strongly related to definability in the monadic SOA (second-order arithmetic) without × or + , respectively. As a consequence, we obtain a very direct proof for ${\Pi^1_1}$ -completeness of Presburger, (...) and also Skolem, arithmetic with a free unary predicate, generalize it to all ${\Pi^1_n}$ -levels, and give an alternative description of the analytical hierarchy without × or + . Here ‘direct’ means that one explicitly m-reduces the truth of ${\Pi^1_1}$ -formulae in SOA to the truth in the extended structures. Notice that for the case of Presburger arithmetic, the ${\Pi^1_1}$ -completeness was already known, but the proof was indirect and exploited some special ${\Pi^1_1}$ -completeness results on so-called recurrent nondeterministic Turing machines—for these reasons, it was hardly able to shed any light on definability issues or possible generalizations. (shrink)

For semi-continuous real functions we study different computability concepts defined via computability of epigraphs and hypographs. We call a real function f lower semi-computable of type one, if its open hypograph hypo is recursively enumerably open in dom × ℝ; we call f lower semi-computable of type two, if its closed epigraph Epi is recursively enumerably closed in dom × ℝ; we call f lower semi-computable of type three, if Epi is recursively closed in dom × ℝ. We show that (...) type one and type two semi-computability are independent and that type three semi-computability plus effectively uniform continuity implies computability, which is false for type one and type two instead of type three. We show also that the integral of a type three semi-computable real function on a computable interval is not necessarily computable. (shrink)

Enumeration reducibility is a notion of relative computability between sets of natural numbers where only positive information about the sets is used or produced. Extending e‐reducibility to partial functions characterises relative computability between partial functions. We define a polynomial time enumeration reducibility that retains the character of enumeration reducibility and show that it is equivalent to conjunctive non‐deterministic polynomial time reducibility. We define the polynomial time e‐degrees as the equivalence classes under this reducibility and investigate their structure on the recursive (...) sets, showing in particular that the pe‐degrees of the computable sets are dense and do not form a lattice, but that minimal pairs exist. We define a jump operator and use it to produce a characterisation of the polynomial hierarchy. (shrink)

We study the structure of Σ11 equivalence relations on hyperarithmetical subsets of ω under reducibilities given by hyperarithmetical or computable functions, called h-reducibility and FF-reducibility, respectively. We show that the structure is rich even when one fixes the number of properly equation imagei.e., Σ11 but not equation image equivalence classes. We also show the existence of incomparable Σ11 equivalence relations that are complete as subsets of ω × ω with respect to the corresponding reducibility on sets. We study complete Σ11 (...) equivalence relations and show that existence of infinitely many properly Σ11 equivalence classes that are complete as Σ11 sets is necessary but not sufficient for a relation to be complete in the context of Σ11 equivalence relations. (shrink)

In this paper, the issues of computability and constructivity in the mathematics of physics are discussed. The sorts of questions to be addressed are those which might be expressed, roughly, as: Are the mathematical foundations of our current theories unavoidably non-constructive: or, Are the laws of physics computable?