In this paper, the problem of illusory perception, as approached by the Nyāya and Advaita Vedānta schools of philosophy, is discussed from the standpoint of the Parimala. This seminal work belonging to the Bhāmatī tradition of Advaita Vedānta was composed in the sixteenth century by the polymath Appaya Dīkṣita. In the context of discussing various theories of illusion, Dīkṣita dwells upon the Nyāya theory of anyathākhyāti, and its connection with jñānalakṣaṇapratyāsatti as a causal factor for perception, and closely examines if (...) such an extraordinary (alaukika) perception is tenable to explain illusory perception. He then proceeds to point out the deficiencies of this model and thereby brings to the fore the anirvacanīyakhyāti of Advaitins as the only theory which stands scrutiny. (shrink)

Elucidation of the Mīmāṃsā doctrines; includes Tantrarahasya by Rāmānujācārya and Mīmāṃsābhāṣyapariśiṣṭa of Śālikanāthamiśra.

This collection of articles and review essays, including many hard to find pieces, comprises the most important and fundamental studies of Indian logic and linguistics ever undertaken. Frits Staal is concerned with four basic questions: Are there universals of logic that transcend culture and time? Are there universals of language and linguistics? What is the nature of Indian logic? And what is the nature of Indian linguistics? By addressing these questions, Staal demonstrates that, contrary to the general assumption among Western (...) philosophers, the classical philosophers of India were rationalists, attentive to arguments. They were in this respect unlike contemporary Western thinkers inspired by existentialism or hermeneutics, and like the ancient Chinese, Greeks, and many medieval European schoolmen, only--as Staal says--more so. Universals establishes that Asia's contributions are not only compatible with what has been produced in the West, but a necessary ingredient and an essential component of any future human science. (shrink)

Compendium of Advaita and Dvaita Vedanta philosophy; includes Yogendrānandīdīpikā Sanskrit commentary and Hindi interpretation of Gaudabrahmanandi sanskrit commentary ofand Hindi commentary.

Purvamimamsa Is One Of The Six Systems Of Indian Philosophy And A Very Ancient One. The Jaimini Sutras Consisting Of 2700 Sutras Arranged In 12 Chapters Are The Primary Source Of Purvamimamsa. It Is Developed Into Two Schools, Bhatta School Initiated By Kumarila Bhatta And Prabhakara School Initiated By Prabhakara. Mimamsa Has Made Rich Contribution To The Areas Of Epistemology, Linguistics And Programme Organization. The Concept Of The Intrinsic Validity Of Cognition Including The Impersonal Nature Of The Veda And Acceptance (...) Of The Cognition Of Certain Entities Such As Ethical Values Beyond The Empirical Means Of Cognition, Are Its Contribution To Epistemology. Considering The Language As Autonomous At Word, Sentence And Discourse Levels And Developing A Distinct Hermeneutics To Interpret The Vedic Passages And Developing The Rules Of Interpretation, Are Its Contribution To Linguistics. Developing Detailed Guidelines For Organizing The Ritual Programme Is, However, Its Most Important Contribution. The Rules Of Interpretation Evolved By Purvamimamsa For The Purpose Of Interpreting Vedic Passages Are So Fundamental And Universal That These Can Be Applied To Interpret Any Other Scripture. These Are Utilized By Other Indian Philosophical Systems, Dharmasastras And Ancient Indian Judicial System. Maxwells' Rules Of Interpretation Closely Resemble Purvamimamsa Rules. The Guidelines Laid Down For Ritual Organization Are Also Very Systematic And Could Be Applied To Any Other Programme Organization. These Aspects Of Purvamimamsa Are Highlighted In This Volume. (shrink)

This paper is a preliminary analysis of two among the five definitions of falsity ( mithyātva ) presented by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (MS) in his magnum opus , the Advaitasiddhi . It is mainly focused on the second and fourth definitions, which at first sight appear to be mere repetitions of one another. The first definition of falsity examined is Prakāśātman’s: “falsity is the property of being the counter-positive of the absolute absence of an entity in the [same] locus in which (...) it is perceived.” The other definition investigated was first given by Citsukha: “falsity is the property of being the counter-positive of the absolute absence residing in its own locus.” The mutual differences among these two definitions will be underlined following MS himself, as well as some other authors of the later Advaita Vedānta textual tradition. (shrink)