Monográfico titulado: "Yoga: Historia, filosofía y prácticas", núm. 94, 2022. Aposta.Revista de Ciencias Sociales. ISSN: 1696-7348.

The purpose of the present project is to study the Upaniṣads and Mullā Sadrā as expounders of mystical philosophy dealing with the question of the nature of Ultimate Reality and its concomitant issues. To be more specific, this study is an examination focused on the metaphysical theories propounded by them. The mystical and philosophical systems constructed by Upaniṣads and Mullā Sadrā are often viewed as being representative of absolutism found within their respective traditions. The striking differences generally perceived between aspects (...) of Hinduism and Islām have, however, somewhat prevented scholars to develop interest in the comparison of philosophies rooted in these two philosophical traditions. This study will be exploring the systems of these influential traditions to ascertain if this approach is true. (shrink)

The word excellence is derived from the Latin word excellentia, and it means the quality of being extremely good. Human excellences could be defined as those human qualities that make a person outstanding, exceptional, superior, or, in one word, the best of one's kind in any field of human activities. Frequently, it is synonymously used with the word virtue, narrowly meaning moral excellence.

Physical dimensions like “mass”, “length”, “charge”, represented by the symbols [M], [L], [Q], are not numbers, but used as numbers to perform dimensional analysis in particular, and to write the equations of physics in general, by the physicist. The law of excluded middle falls short of explaining the contradictory meanings of the same symbols. The statements like “m tends to 0”, “r tends to 0”, “q tends to 0”, used by the physicist, are inconsistent on dimensional grounds because “m”, “r”, (...) “q” represent quantities with physical dimensions of [M], [L], [Q] respectively and “0” represents just a number—devoid of physical dimension. Consequently, due to the involvement of the statement “q tends to 0'', where q is the test charge” in the definition of electric field leads to either circular reasoning or a contradiction regarding the experimental verification of the smallest charge in the Millikan–Fletcher oil drop experiment. Considering such issues as problematic, by choice, I make an inquiry regarding the basic language in terms of which physics is written, with an aim of exploring how truthfully the verbal statements can be converted to the corresponding physico-mathematical expressions, where “physico-mathematical” signifies the involvement of physical dimensions. Such investigation necessitates an explanation by demonstration of “self inquiry”, “middle way”, “dependent origination”, “emptiness/relational existence”, which are certain terms that signify the basic tenets of Buddhism. In light of such demonstration I explain my view of “definition”; the relations among quantity, physical dimension and number; meaninglessness of “zero quantity” and the associated logico-linguistic fallacy; difference between unit and unity. Considering the importance of the notion of electric field in physics, I present a critical analysis of the definitions of electric field due to Maxwell and Jackson, along with the physico-mathematical conversions of the verbal statements. The analysis of Jackson’s definition points towards an expression of the electric field as an infinite series due to the associated “limiting process” of the test charge. However, it brings out the necessity of a postulate regarding the existence of charges, which nevertheless follows from the definition of quantity. Consequently, I explain the notion of undecidable charges that act as the middle way to resolve the contradiction regarding the Millikan–Fletcher oil drop experiment. In passing, I provide a logico-linguistic analysis, in physico-mathematical terms, of two verbal statements of Maxwell in relation to his definition of electric field, which suggests Maxwell’s conception of dependent origination of distance and charge ) and that of emptiness in the context of relative vacuum. This work is an appeal for the dissociation of the categorical disciplines of logic and physics and on the large, a fruitful merger of Eastern philosophy and Western science. Nevertheless, it remains open to how the reader relates to this work, which is the essence of emptiness. (shrink)

Community forms a crux of human living. In the wake of pandemic like Covid-19 to avoid community transmission what is most required of a responsible community member is to follow physical distancing to curb the spread of the infectious disease and this may lead to a feeling of isolation and loneliness. But this essay speaks of isolation with a positive connotation. It talks of isolation as solitude as the Indian philosophy also speaks extensively about this sense of self-contemplation and reflection (...) to understand others as we need to know our own selves. The say speaks of isolation as understood in Sāṃkhya philosophy. This essay talks of isolated consciousness and the three gunas particularly of the sattvic predicaments that enables positive mental development in human beings which is much needed in these tested times as the present pandemic. (shrink)

Wisdom in Hinduism regards self-knowledge as the truth, the basis of all Creation, of Shristi. It would turn out that the wise is a person with the self-consciousness of the whole creation in all its facets and forms. There are not many studies regarding emotional intelligence from the Indian perspective, although emotional intelligence is found in every text in ancient Indian literature (Rig Veda, Yajur Veda, Ayurveda, etc.). The Indian philosophical tradition emphasizes the strong nature of emotions, which must be (...) harnessed for a harmonious life. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.30490.06086. (shrink)

Înțelepciunea în hinduism consideră cunoașterea de sine ca fiind adevărul, baza întregii Creații, a lui Shristi. Ar rezulta că înțeleaptă este o persoană cu conștiința de sine martoră a întregii creații în toate fațetele și formele sale. Nu există multe studii referitor la inteligența emoțională din perspectiva indiană, deși inteligența emoțională se regăsește în fiecare text din literatura antică indiană. Tradiția filosofică indiană pune accent pe natura puternică a emoțiilor, care trebuie valorificate pentru o viață armonioasă. Patanjali, „părintele psihologiei indiene”, (...) a studiat mintea umană cu mii de ani înaintea filosofilor occidentali. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.25425.89443. (shrink)

Une argumentation pour l'importance dualiste des émotions dans la société, individuellement et au niveau communautaire. La tendance actuelle à la prise de conscience et au contrôle des émotions grâce à l'intelligence émotionnelle a un effet bénéfique dans les affaires et pour le succès des activités sociales mais, si nous n'y prenons pas garde, elle peut conduire à une aliénation irréversible au niveau individuel et social. L'essai est composé de trois parties principales: Émotions (Modèles d'émotions, Le processus des émotions, La bonheur, (...) La philosophie des émotions, L'éthique des émotions), Intelligence émotionnelle (Modèles d'intelligence émotionnelle, L'intelligence émotionnelle dans la recherche et l'éducation, La philosophie d'intelligence émotionnelle, L'intelligence émotionnelle dans la philosophie orientale) et Intelligence émotionnelle dans les organisations (Travail émotionnel, La philosophie de l'intelligence émotionnelle dans les organisations, La critique de l'intelligence émotionnelle dans les organisations, L'éthique de l'intelligence émotionnelle dans les organisations). Dans les Conclusions, je présente un résumé des déclarations contenues dans le document. SOMMAIRE: Abstract 1. Émotions 1.1 Modèles d'émotion 1.2 Traitement des émotions 1.3 Bonheur 1.4 La philosophie des émotions 1.5 L'éthique des émotions 2. Intelligence émotionnelle 2.1 Modèles d'intelligence émotionnelle 2.1.1 Modèle d'habilités de Mayer et Salovey 2.1.2 Le modèle mixte de Goleman 2.1.3 Le modèle mixte de Bar-On 2.1.4 Modèle de traits de Petrides 2.2 Intelligence émotionnelle dans la recherche et l'éducation 2.3 La philosophie de l'intelligence émotionnelle 2.3.1 L'intelligence émotionnelle dans la philosophie orientale 3. Intelligence émotionnelle dans les organisations 3.1 Travail émotionnel 3.2 La philosophie de l'intelligence émotionnelle dans les organisations 3.3 Critique de l'intelligence émotionnelle dans les organisations 3.4 Éthique de l'intelligence émotionnelle dans les organisations Conclusions Bibliographie DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.28567.93600 . (shrink)

An argumentation for the dualistic importance of emotions in society, individually and at community level. The current tendency of awareness and control of emotions through emotional intelligence has a beneficial effect in business and for the success of social activities but, if we are not careful, it can lead to irreversible alienation at individual and social level. The paper consists of three main parts: Emotions (Emotional models, Emotional processing, Happiness, Philosophy of emotions, Ethics of emotions), Emotional intelligence (Models of emotional (...) intelligence, Emotional intelligence in research and education, Philosophy of emotional intelligence, Emotional intelligence in Eastern philosophy), Emotional intelligence in organizations (Emotional work, Philosophy of emotional intelligence in organizations, Criticism of emotional intelligence in organizations, Ethics of emotional intelligence in organizations). In the Conclusions I present a summary of the statements in the paper. CONTENTS: Abstract 1. Emotions 1.1 Models of emotion 1.2 Processing emotions 1.3 Happiness 1.4 The philosophy of emotions 1.5 The ethics of emotions 2. Emotional intelligence 2.1 Models of emotional intelligence 2.1.1 Model of abilities of Mayer and Salovey 2.1.2 Goleman's mixed model 2.1.3 The mixed model of Bar-On 2.1.4 Petrides' model of traits 2.2 Emotional intelligence in research and education 2.3 The philosophy of emotional intelligence 2.3.1 Emotional intelligence in Eastern philosophy 3. Emotional intelligence in organizations 3.1 Emotional labor 3.2 The philosophy of emotional intelligence in organizations 3.3 Critique of emotional intelligence in organizations 3.4 Ethics of emotional intelligence in organizations Conclusions Bibliography DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.32802.79041 . (shrink)

O argumentare a importanței dualiste a emoțiilor în societate, individual și la nivel de comunitate. Tendința actuală de conștientizare și control al emoțiilor prin inteligența emoțională are un efect benefic în afaceri și pentru succesul activităților sociale dar, dacă nu suntem atenți, poate duce la o alienare ireversibilă la nivel individual și social. Lucrarea se compune din trei părți principale: Emoții (Modele ale emoțiilor, Procesarea emoțiilor, Fericirea, Filosofia emoțiilor, Etica emotiilor), Inteligența emoțională (Modele ale inteligenței emoționale, Inteligența emoțională în cercetare (...) și educație, Filosofia inteligenței emoționale, Inteligența emoțională în filosofia orientală) și Inteligența emoțională în organizații (Munca emoțională, Filosofia inteligenței emoționale în organizații, Critica inteligenței emoționale în organizații, Etica inteligenței emoționale în organizații). În Concluzii prezint un rezumat al afirmațiilor din lucrare. CUPRINS: Abstract 1. Emoții 1.1 Modele ale emoțiilor 1.2 Procesarea emoțiilor 1.3 Fericirea 1.4 Filosofia emoțiilor 1.5 Etica emoțiilor 2. Inteligența emoțională 2.1 Modele ale inteligenței emoționale 2.1.1 Modelul de abilități al lui Mayer și Salovey 2.1.2 Modelul mixt al lui Goleman 2.1.3 Modelul mixt al lui Bar-On 2.1.4 Modelul de trăsături al lui Petrides 2.2 Inteligența emoțională în cercetare și educație 2.3 Filosofia inteligenței emoționale 2.3.1 Inteligența emoțională în filosofia orientală 3. Inteligența emoțională în organizații 3.1 Munca emoțională 3.2 Filosofia inteligenței emoționale în organizații 3.3 Critica inteligenței emoționale în organizații 3.4 Etica inteligenței emoționale în organizații Concluzii Bibliografie DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.32991.20640. (shrink)

Some scholars, especially almost all Indian philosophers, defined man as an ethical animal. Why do they say that man is an ethical animal? The aim of this paper is to present the concept of suffering in Sānkhya-Yoga Philosophy. The usage methods are the descriptive and evaluative method. The research finding is that principle of reciprocity can be used as an ethical principle. The moral principle in Eightfold Mean of Sānkhya-Yoga Philosophy will be used in this research paper. This paper will (...) contribute an understanding of the ethical conduct is indispensable foundation in Sānkhya-Yoga Philosophy. (shrink)

The relationship between the physical body and the conscious human mind has been a deeply problematic topic for centuries. Physicalism is the 'orthodox' metaphysical stance in contemporary Western thought, according to which reality is exclusively physical/material in nature. However, in the West, theoretical dissatisfaction with this type of approach has historically lead to Cartesian-style dualism, wherein mind and body are thought to belong to distinct metaphysical realms. In the current discussion I compare and contrast this standard Western approach with an (...) alternative form of dualism developed in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophical tradition, where matter and pure consciousness are held to belong to distinct and independent realms, but where the mind is placed on the material side of the ontological divide. I argue that this model possesses a number of theoretical advantages over Cartesian-style dualism, and constitutes a compelling theoretical framework for re-conceptualizing the mind-body problem. (shrink)

Unknown to most Western psychologists, ancient Indian scriptures contain very rich, empirically derived psychological theories that are, however, intertwined with religious and philosophical content. This article represents our attempt to extract the psychological theory of cognition and consciousness from a prominent ancient Indian thought system: Samkhya-Yoga. We derive rather broad hypotheses from this approach that may complement and extend Western mainstream theorizing. These hypotheses address an ancient personality theory, the effects of practicing the applied part of Samkhya-Yoga on normal and (...) extraordinary cognition, as well as different ways of perceiving reality. We summarize empirical evidence collected in diverse fields of research that allows for making judgments about the hypotheses, and suggest more specific hypotheses to be examined in future research. We conclude that the existing evidence for the hypotheses is substantial but that there are still considerable gaps in theory and research to be filled. Theories of cognition contained in the ancient Indian systems have the potential to modify and complement existing Western mainstream accounts of cognition. In particular, they might serve as a basis for arriving at more comprehensive theories for several research areas that, so far, lack strong theoretical grounding, such as meditation research or research on aspects of consciousness. (shrink)

This article validates James MacGregor Burns’ hypothesis that moral development is a critical qualification of transformational leaders. In India, morality is conceptualized as Karma-Yoga, a technique for performing actions such that the soul is not bound by the results of the actions. Karma-Yoga has three dimensions—duty-orientation, indifference to rewards, and equanimity—and constitutes a comprehensive model for moral development in the Indian context. We studied 205 leader–follower pairs to investigate the impact of a leader’s Karma-Yoga and a follower’s belief in Indian (...) philosophy on the follower’s perception of transformational leadership. We found that a leader’s duty-orientation was related to a leader’s charisma and inspirational motivation. The relationship was strengthened when a follower’s belief in Indian philosophy was high. The findings support a model of Indian transformational leadership built on the fundamental beliefs in Indian philosophy and duty-orientation. (shrink)

The base texts of most of the philosophical systems of ancient India are in the form of a collection of aphorisms (sūtra-s). The aphorisms are so brief and tersely worded that their significance can seldom be understood without the help of a commentary or commentaries. Sometimes, the literal meaning of an aphorism needs to be qualified or modified by an explanation found in the commentary. If a reader relies exclusively on the literal meaning of the aphorisms in the base text (...) without having recourse to any commentary or disregards all commentaries, he or she may miss the point. Contrariwise, if a reader relies exclusively on a commentary and disregards the literal meaning of an aphorism, he or she will commit another kind of blunder. Ideally, equal attention should be paid to the base text as well as the commentary or commentaries. Even then, all problems are not automatically solved, for it is an uphill task to decide when to go by the literal meaning of the aphorisms and when to follow the commentary. In their polemics against the Cārvāka/Lokāyata, Jayantabhaṭṭa (c. ninth century C.E.) and Hemacandra (eleventh century C.E.) erred because they did not follow the golden rule stated above and consequently misunderstood and misrepresented their opponents’ contentions. (shrink)

svabhāva (own being) and yadṛchhā (chance, accident) are named as two different claimants among others as the first cause (jagatkāraṇa) in the ŚvUp. But in later works, such as Aśvaghoṣa’s poems, svabhāva is synonymous with yadṛchhā and entails a passive attitude to life. Later still, svabhāva is said to be inhering in the Lokāyata materialist system, although in which sense—cosmic order or accident—is not always clearly mentioned. Svabhāva is also a part of the Sāṃkhya doctrine and is mentioned in the (...) medical compilations. It is proposed that the idea of svabhāva as cosmic order became a part of Lokāyata between the sixth and the eighth century ce and got widely accepted by the tenth century, so much so that in the fourteenth century Sāyaṇa-Mādhava aka Vidyāraṇya could categorically declare that the Cārvāka/Lokāyata upheld causality, not chance. But the other meaning of svabhāva, identical with yadṛchhā, continued to circulate along with kāla, time, which was originally another claimant for the title of the first cause and similarly had acquired several significations in course of time. Both significations of svabhāva continued to be employed by later writers, and came to be used in another domain, that of daiva (fate) vis-à-vis puruṣakāra (manliness or human endeavour). (shrink)

. Besides a philosophical exposition of the tenets of a form of Śaiva Siddhānta, the Dharma Pātañjala contains a long presentation of the yoga system that apparently follows the first three chapters of Patañjal’s Yogasūtra , either interweaving Sanskrit excerpts from an untraced versified version of the latter text with an Old Javanese commentary, or directly rendering into Old Javanese what appears to be an original Sanskrit commentary. Although the Old Javanese prose often bears a strong resemblance with the arrangement (...) and formulation of the topics treated in the Yogasūtrabhāṣya , it diverges from that commentary in several respects. The Dharma Pātañjala often presents specific doctrinal details that are found in other (sub)commentaries or in the Arabic rendering of the sūtra s-cum-commentary composed by al-Bīrūnī before 1030 AD , or adds original elements that are unattested elsewhere. The testimony of the Dharma Pātañjala turns out to be useful in order to solve some of the dilemmas posed by the selected sūtra s. It may also help us to better understand the textual cultural transmission and cultural reception of Patañjali’s work in both South and Southeast Asia, for its author, rather than freely borrowing from different Sanskrit commentaries, appear to have drawn upon an as yet unidentified, and possibly lost, ‘common source’. (shrink)

The paper continues the model I began in a previous issue of Sophia . It is argued that the predominance of purely ascending or ‘top down’ forms of spirituality which stemmed largely from the axial period and have been carried forward into modern, transpersonal theories of evolutionary spirituality is a mistake and that there exists a lost or largely ignored form of spirituality—which I name somatic—which was the predominant domain of early Neolithic and Palaeolithic experience. Aspects of what I call (...) somatic mystical experiences have certainly been acknowledged at times to a limited degree, though they have rarely been fully explored, and have usually been considered as basic to other kinds of mystical experience, rather than fully developed forms in their own right. This article offers a fuller exploration and places such states more accurately within a detailed developmental framework than has previously been the case. Other issues relating to the horizon model across the two papers are also expanded. (shrink)

In his celebrated treatise of Navya-nyāya, the Tattvacintāmaṇi, Gaṅgeśa offers a detailed formulation of the inference of God’s existence. Gaṅgeśa’s inference generated significant commentarial literature among Naiyāyikas in Mithilā, Navadvīpa and Vārāṇasī, but also attracted the attention of South Indian scholars, notably Vyāsatīrtha, who comments on it extensively in the Tarkatāṇḍava. In the wake of Vyāsatīrtha’s pioneering critique, the 16th-century Sanskrit polymath Appaya Dīkṣita developed a revised version of Gaṅgeśa’s inference in his magnum opus of Śivādvaita Vedānta, the Śivārkamaṇidīpikā. This (...) article highlights that Appaya was thoroughly acquainted with the technical idiom of Navya-nyāya and sufficiently conversant with its literature to address authoritatively one of its key problems. Appaya’s contribution sheds new light on how the Navya-nyāya tradition continued to flourish in South India during the late medieval period. (shrink)

The purpose of the present project is to study the Upaniṣads and Mullā Sadrā as expounders of mystical philosophy dealing with the question of the nature of Ultimate Reality and its concomitant issues. To be more specific, this study is an examination focused on the metaphysical theories propounded by them. The mystical and philosophical systems constructed by Upaniṣads and Mullā Sadrā are often viewed as being representative of absolutism found within their respective traditions. The striking differences generally perceived between aspects (...) of Hinduism and Islām have, however, somewhat prevented scholars to develop interest in the comparison of philosophies rooted in these two philosophical traditions. This study will be exploring the systems of these influential traditions to ascertain if this approach is true. (shrink)

Ethos and logos of the Jain thought and practice is based on reality perceived by senses. Atheistic roots of Jain Dharm have nourished growth, maintained viability and vitality, and kept it relevant for over the last five millennia. Unlike Judeo-Christian-Islam or Brahminical faith, it does not rely on omniscient supreme or god. Its atheistic and anti-theistic thrust is generally known, yet its followers do not call themselves Nastik. They emphasize action-consequence relations as guide for successful behaviors with ethical conduct. The (...) basis of their arguments follows from the Jain logic of evidence based inference with multiple orthogonal affirmed assertions. It conserves information by acknowledging the remaining doubt in an inference. It does not assume binary complementation to force closure for deduction with incomplete knowledge which leads to self-reference and loss of information. This approach offers a rational and practical alternative to conundrum of western atheism even though its arguments are logical and consistent with available evidence. It also obviates need to extract religious morality from social mores. Objective truth and knowledge of established generalizations is necessary but not sufficient for subjective searches to shape desires and for what the futureought to be. (shrink)

Materialism is considered to be an anathema to Indian philosophy. Despite this, Indian tradition boasts of a strong materialist trend predating the Vedas. This paper traces the proto-materialist ideas as found in the ancient Tantra and pre-classical or original Sāṃkhya. Representing the naturalistic trend in Indian philosophy, ancient Tantra identified the brain as the seat of human consciousness. The pre-classical Sāṃkhya considered matter as the primal non-intelligent or non-sentient first cause from which the universe was to evolve. It considers the (...) material cause to be self-sufficient for the purpose of producing the world; the principle of consciousness is potentially contained in the primeval matter. This paper aims to provide an overview of the Indian materialist viewpoint for multidisciplinary scholars. (shrink)

This paper identifies the different normative ethical arguments stated and suggested by Arjuna and Krishna in the Gītā , analyzes those arguments, examines the interrelations between those arguments, and demonstrates that, contrary to a common view, both Arjuna and Krishna advance ethical theories of a broad consequentialist nature. It is shown that Krishna’s ethical theory, in particular, is a distinctive kind of rule-consequentialism that takes as intrinsically valuable the twin consequences of mokṣa and lokasaṃgraha . It is also argued that (...) Krishna’s teachings in the Gītā gain in depth, coherence, and critical relevance what they lose in simplicity when the ethical theory underlying those teachings is understood as a consequentialism of this kind rather than as a deontology. (shrink)

This thesis is a Tamil to English translation of Tirukkaḷirruppaṭiyar, composed by Uyyavanta Tevanayanar toward the end of the twelfth century C.E. The work contains one hundred quatrains of Tamil poetry composed in veṇpa meter. It is a poetic expansion of Tiruvuntiyar, an earlier composition likely by the author's teacher's teacher. The TKP is a transitional text between the devotional religious bhakti hymns of the nayanmar, who lived between the sixth century and the twelfth, and the Saiva-Siddhanta Theo-philosophical system, which (...) developed between the thirteenth and the fourteenth centuries. TKP is the second work in the canon of fourteen texts called the Meykaṇṭa Sastra, TU being the first. The introduction in the thesis discusses the date of the author, his position in the lineage of teachers, major themes found in the work such as the importance of a teacher, types of worship, miracles of the Saiva saints and final release from the cycle of births and deaths. TKP's similarities and differences with the TU, and how the TKP provides a foundation for later Saiva Siddhanta thought are addressed. Besides translation, each verse has a gloss and there are several appendices, tables and charts with additional information. (shrink)

El artículo se centra en las relaciones entre la conciencia y la materia en la filosofía sa-mkhya, uno de los sistemas más antiguos de la tradición brahmánica. Tras una breve introducción a la cosmología sa-mkhya, se analizan la cosmogonía y el pluralismo metafísico de esta corriente de pensamiento, sirviéndose, como fuentes primarias, de los comentarios medievales sánscritos a la Sa-mkhyaka-rika- realizados por el escolástico medieval Va-caspati Mis´ra.

The Vedānta philosophy has its roots in scriptural sources, specifically, in three canonical texts, viz. the Brahmasūtra-s by Bādarāyaṇa, which is called nyāya-prasthāna or tarka-prasthāna; the Upaniṣad-s, which are called the śruti-prasthāna; and the Bhagavadgītā, which is regarded as the smṛti-prasthāna. Thus, like the first two constituents of this trio, the third one has a tangible legacy of commentarial tradition; as almost all well-known advocates of the Vedānta schools have commented on these three sourcebooks. In this paper, an attempt has (...) been made to give a brief sketch of such commentarial tradition of the Bhagavadgītā, starting with its commentary by Śaṃkara to the other major commentaries available up to the 15th–16th centuries. While each of these commentaries finds support in the text for their respective philosophical doctrines, an impartial evaluation, with support of modern scholars, shows that none of the commentaries can claim to represent faithfully the true intent of the text, and that the true import of it can only be had if the text is judged from its literary and historical point of view. (shrink)

This article aims to follow the process of adoption of Navya-Nyāya techniques of cognitive analysis in the school of Vedic hermeneutics, Mīmāṃsā, in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, in the larger context of the spread of these techniques in India. I shall argue that this process arises in Mīmāṃsā on the sidelines of the Advaita-Dvaita Vedānta controversy in South India, then subsequently flourishes in Varanasi. These techniques are adopted gradually and selectively, for not all the Mīmāṃsā thinkers choose to (...) use them. (shrink)

An absence and its locus are the same ontological entity. But the cognition of the absence is different from the cognition of the locus. The cognitive difference is caused by a query followed by a cognitive process of introspection. The moment one perceptually knows y that contains only one thing, z, one is in a position to conclude that y contains the absence of any non-z. After having a query as to whether y has x one revisits one’s knowledge of (...) y containing z and comes to know that x is absent from y. Thus the knowledge of the absence of x logically follows from the knowledge of y containing z through the mediation of a query. This analysis goes against the thesis according to which an absence is an irreducible entity that is to be known through senses, and is inspired by the Mīmāṃsā views, especially the Prābhākara views, on absence and its cognition. (shrink)

Review of Adamson, P., & Ganeri, J.. Classical Indian Philosophy: a History of Philosophy Without any Gaps. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Volume 5.

The aim of this essay is to clarify Nāgārjuna’s use of the term pratijñā in verse 29 of the Vigrahavyāvartanī as situated in its contemporaneous thriving debate culture. In contrast to the standard formulation, which interprets the term pratijñā as a reference to the thesis of śūnyatā proffered by Nāgārjuna in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, an examination of the debate culture in, and leading up to, second-century CE India shows that the term pratijñā refers to the first of five steps within the (...) Nyaya five-membered syllogism as it functions within a vitaṇḍā form of debate. Through an examination of the context in which this verse was written, the association made between Nāgārjuna’s use of pratijñā in the VV and śūnyatā within other texts becomes dislodged, thereby demonstrating the inadequacy of the standard formulation and the need for a revised understanding of the intent of the VV. (shrink)

Dharmarāja Adhvarin’s Vedānta Paribhāṣā is a well-known introduction to Advaita Vedānta, targeted to beginners who are already trained in Navya Nyāya. According to Dasgupta, the VP is so heavily indebted to Rāmādvaya’s Vedānta Kaumudī, which was composed in the middle of the 14th century and is today almost forgotten, that the VP’s “claim to originality vanishes”. The VK was, however, only edited in 1955 and then again in 1973. In the light of this improved textual basis, what is our judgement (...) about Dasgupta’s hypercritical statement? Did actually the VP ever claim to be original? Was this originality somehow superimposed on the VP later? Is the VP really so much indebted to the VK? This paper aims at comparatively analysing the textual background of these questions. I will start from the analysis of one Advaita’s epistemological tenet, namely the valid knowledge, in the VK and then compare it to the corresponding parts in the VP. (shrink)

This essay proposes to review the problems of reconstructing and interpreting ancient texts, particularly philosophical commentaries, in the context of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata system of India. Following an overview of the Indian philosophical text tradition and the ontological and epistemological positions of the Cārvākas, three cases are discussed: (1) when there is no invariance in the text and the commentary, (2) when commentators differ among themselves in their interpretations, and (3) when contradictory interpretations are offered. The paper further discusses why certain (...) commentaries are to be treated as inconsistent with the base text and concludes that innovations inconsistent with the intention of the author should be treated differently from glosses that seek to explain the author’s original intentions. (shrink)

The article considers each case of using words with the stem ‘yoga’, as well as other yogic vocabulary found in the first part of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa. In total, there are the following ten words: yoga, bhaktiyoga, yogin, yogeśvara, mahāyogin, kuyogin, yoganidrā, kriyāyogа, viyoga and yama. They are used 30 times altogether. This vocabulary forms not only the yoga glossary of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, but also the Vaiṣṇava understanding of yogic teaching. The analysis of these terms takes into account several (...) contexts, in particular: compositional, linguistic, religious and philosophical, and statistical. It has been found out that the whole vocabulary is somehow subordinated to the semantic vertical yogeśvara → mahāyogin → yogin and in various ways forms the Vaiṣṇava understanding of yoga, i.e. bhakti-yoga. The last is believed to be a human response to the challenges of the Highest reality (Heaven). This semantic vertical is conceived of as set by the Lord, who in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa appears under various names, including Viṣṇu, Kṛṣṇa, Adhokṣaja, as well as Yogeśvara, and Mahāyogin. Extraordinary people, who are called mahāyogins (Śukadeva Gosvāmī), and also yogins (Vyāsa, Śukadeva Gosvāmī, nameless yogins), are able to accept the challenge of Heaven. They are those who can achieve the highest goal of human life; they practice bhaktiyoga. The context of bhaktiyoga is present in most cases of the word yoga, and in all cases of the words yoganidra, kriyayoga, viyoga, as well as other friendly vocabulary (for example, seva), whereas the word yama does not apply to bhaktiyoga. The use of the rare word kuyogin reflects the fact that bad yogins are also mentioned in the text. The term yoga might be also considered to be a gender marker, as the yogins are exclusively men in the first part. The compositional peculiarities of the use of this yogic vocabulary include the fact that the first part begins and ends with chapters containing terms which are derived from the stem yoga (Is this some kind of semantic framing?). Moreover, the first chapter ends with the śloka, that contains the important word yogeśvara (Is it a kind of summarizing semantic marker?). (shrink)

The problem of synthesis and reconciliation of the Ramanuja and Sirhindi is of vital significance and importance, and no serious student of comparative philosophy can deliberately neglect it. Epistemologically speaking, these two philosophers have been forced to tackle the same problem(s), and in solving them, their methods and hypotheses have been noticeably similar. The emphasis of this paper is to recognize, highlight, and compare the aspects valued in Ramanuja’s epistemological views with those of the Sirhindi. I will also discuss the (...) basic postulates of Ramanuja and Sirhindi’s epistemology and underline certain epistemological approaches to knowledge and justification for formulating the arguments to find out new dimensions in outlining their fundamental epistemological positions. This paper explores certain elements in the identities of these two philosophers and attempts to demonstrate a thread of continuity, especially with regard to their methods and thoughts. This paper also brings out a brief critical account of their epistemological views. (shrink)

Arthāpatti does not depend on observation of pervasion or background belief. It is certain in the sense that when S cognizes P through postulation, no other epistemic instrument would invalidate P. The Naiyāyika tries to reduce postulation to anumāna and/or tarka. I shall argue that it is neither. Due to its explanatory role, one may think that postulation plays an essential role in lakṣaṇā or indication. But this too is a misconception. Both tarka and lakṣaṇā depend on observation and background (...) knowledge. Neither of them has the epistemic certainty postulation enjoys. I think, due to its observation-independent nature and certainty, postulation can be seen as the source of the knowledge of the truths of reason. (shrink)

Sāyaṇa-Mādhava closed his exposition of the Cārvāka philosophy in his Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha, Chap. 1 by quoting 11 and a half verses, the authorship of all of which was attributed to Bṛhaspati, the eponymous founder of materialism in India. One of these verses is presumably taken from the Viṣṇupurāṇa. However, it is not Bṛhaspati but some demons, deluded by a Jain and a Buddhist monk, who say this. Bṛhaspati does not appear at all in this Purāṇa. Variant versions of the same story (...) are found in other Purāṇas but Bṛhaspti is not invariably present in all of them. The origin of the story may be traced back to the Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad. Although Bṛhaspati plays a leading part in that story, the background is quite different. By comparing all the versions found in the Purāṇas and the subject matter of the epigrams attributed to Bṛhaspati the paper proposes to show that the Viṣṇupurāṇa story has nothing to do with the materialists, whether the Pre-Cārvākas or the Cārvākas; the Jains and the Buddhists are the target of attack. Sāyaṇa-mādhava, by placing these satirical epigrams either in their original or in altered forms, and attributing them to Bṛhaspati, has mixed up the views of all sorts of nāstikas, particularly the Jains and the Buddhists, with the Cārvākas and thereby succeeded in deceiving several generations of readers and misleading even the best of scholars. (shrink)

All individual terms listed as jāti-s (sophisticated ripostes) in Nyāyasūtra V a 1 have the peculiar uniform ending -sama. The interpretation of this ending here reveals a greater nuance of meaning than the hitherto customary understanding of it. It will be demonstrated that the observable semantic difference is due to a historical shift of signification as a result of an enlarging and systematizing of the thematic group of jāti-s. In this paper, I examine relevant text material, including two very important (...) manuscripts of the Nyāyabhṣya to show this semantic difference. The understanding gained by this analysis will help to trace the historical development of the complex of jāti-s within the larger context of the ancient Indian tradition of debate. (shrink)

The late 16th century Indian philosopher Vijñānabhikṣu is most well known today for his commentaries on Sāṃkhya and Yoga texts. However, the majority of his extant corpus belongs to the tradition of Bhedābheda (Difference and Non-Difference) Vedānta. This article elucidates three Vedāntic arguments from Vijñānabhikṣu’s voluminous commentary on the Brahma Sūtra, entitled Vijñānāmṛtabhāṣya (Commentary on the Nectar of Knowledge). The first section of the article explores the meaning of bhedābheda, showing that in Vijñānabhikṣu’s understanding, “difference and non-difference” does not entail (...) a denial of the principle of contradiction. The second shows how the relation between the individual soul (jīva) and Brahman can be understood as a relation of part and whole. The third section discusses Brahman as cause of the world, and Vijñānabhikṣu’s particular formulation of Brahman as “locus cause” (adhiṣṭhānakāraṇa). Understanding these arguments enables us to appreciate how Vijñānabhikṣu’s Difference and Non-Difference Vedānta is a credible alternative to the Advaita Vedānta schools prevalent in northern India in the late medieval period, and how in his later works Vijñānabhikṣu built upon this Difference and Non-Difference metaphysical framework to argue for the unity of Vedānta, Yoga, and Sāṃ-khya philosophies. (shrink)