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Transformative Experience.Laurie Ann Paul - 2014 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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What You Can't Expect When You're Expecting'.L. A. Paul - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (2):1-23.details
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Take the sugar.Caspar Hare - 2010 - Analysis 70 (2):237-247.details
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Prospects for Temporal Neutrality.David O. Brink - 2011 - In Craig Callender (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time. Oxford University Press.details
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Decision-theoretic paradoxes as voting paradoxes.Rachael Briggs - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):1-30.details
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The possibility of altruism.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Oxford,: Clarendon P..details
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No regrets, or: Edith piaf revamps decision theory.Frank Arntzenius - 2008 - Erkenntnis 68 (2):277-297.details
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Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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(3 other versions)What experience teaches.David K. Lewis - 1990 - In William G. Lycan (ed.), Mind and cognition: a reader. Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell. pp. 29--57.details
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(5 other versions)What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.details
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Big Decisions: Opting, Converting, Drifting.Edna Ullmann-Margalit - 2006 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 58:157-172.details
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Decision theory for agents with incomplete preferences.Adam Bales, Daniel Cohen & Toby Handfield - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):453-70.details
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Chilling out on epistemic rationality: A defense of imprecise credences.Miriam Schoenfield - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):197-219.details
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Subjective Probabilities Should be Sharp.Adam Elga - 2010 - Philosophers' Imprint 10.details
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(1 other version)Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence.Roger White - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 161-186.details
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(5 other versions)What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1979 - In Mortal questions. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 435 - 450.details
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Reason and the grain of belief.Scott Sturgeon - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):139–165.details
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(1 other version)Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence.Roger White - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3:161-186.details
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Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.details
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Why We Should Reject S.Derek Parfit - 1984 - In Reasons and Persons. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Objective and unconditioned value.Rae Langton - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):157-185.details
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The Possibility of Altruism.John Benson - 1972 - Philosophical Quarterly 22 (86):82-83.details
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A bias of rationality.Paul Weirich - 1981 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (1):31 – 37.details
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(1 other version)"I'll be glad I did it" reasoning and the significance of future desires.Elizabeth Harman - 2004 - In John Hawthorne (ed.), Ethics. Wiley Periodicals. pp. 177-199.details
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(1 other version)"I'll be glad I did it" reasoning and the significance of future desires.Elizabeth Harman - 2004 - In John Hawthorne (ed.), Ethics. Wiley Periodicals. pp. 177-199.details
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