- Permissivism, Underdetermination, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson & Margaret Greta Turnbull - 2023 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 358–370.details
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Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):35-59.details
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Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):586-632.details
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Impermissive Bayesianism.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2013 - Erkenntnis 79 (Suppl 6):1185-1217.details
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Dr. Truthlove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bayesian Probabilities.Kenny Easwaran - 2016 - Noûs 50 (4):816-853.details
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A defense of imprecise credences in inference and decision making.James Joyce - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):281-323.details
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The Ineffability of Induction.David Builes - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):129-149.details
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Cluelessness.Hilary Greaves - 2016 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (3):311-339.details
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Credence: A Belief-First Approach.Andrew Moon & Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (5):652–669.details
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On the Independence of Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Philosophical Issues 32 (1):9-31.details
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Suspending is Believing.Thomas Raleigh - 2019 - Synthese (3):1-26.details
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Rational Reflection.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):121-140.details
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Higher-order uncertainty.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Higher-Order Evidence.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 176-194.details
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Decision Theory.Johanna Thoma - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 57-106.details
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Dilating and contracting arbitrarily.David Builes, Sophie Horowitz & Miriam Schoenfield - 2020 - Noûs 56 (1):3-20.details
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Persistent Disagreement and Polarization in a Bayesian Setting.Michael Nielsen & Rush T. Stewart - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (1):51-78.details
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Chilling out on epistemic rationality: A defense of imprecise credences.Miriam Schoenfield - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):197-219.details
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The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences.Miriam Schoenfield - 2015 - Noûs 51 (4):667-685.details
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Imprecise Bayesianism and Global Belief Inertia.Aron Vallinder - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (4):1205-1230.details
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Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.details
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If We Can’t Tell What Theism Predicts, We Can’t Tell Whether God Exists: Skeptical Theism and Bayesian Arguments from Evil.Nevin Climenhaga - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion.details
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Being Rational and Being Wrong.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophers' Imprint 23 (1).details
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Expecting the Unexpected.Tom Dougherty, Sophie Horowitz & Paulina Sliwa - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (2):301-321.details
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A Decision Theory for Imprecise Probabilities.Susanna Rinard - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.details
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Demystifying Dilation.Arthur Paul Pedersen & Gregory Wheeler - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1305-1342.details
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On Treating Oneself and Others as Thermometers.Roger White - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):233-250.details
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In defence of dogmatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):261-282.details
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Does Non-Measurability Favour Imprecision?Cian Dorr - 2024 - Mind 133 (530):472-503.details
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Decision theory for agents with incomplete preferences.Adam Bales, Daniel Cohen & Toby Handfield - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):453-70.details
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Are non-accidental regularities a cosmic coincidence? Revisiting a central threat to Humean laws.Aldo Filomeno - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5205-5227.details
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Subjective Probabilities Need Not be Sharp.Jake Chandler - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1273-1286.details
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Imprecise evidence without imprecise credences.Jennifer Rose Carr - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2735-2758.details
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A subjectivist’s guide to deterministic chance.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2021 - Synthese 198 (5):4339-4372.details
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Options and the subjective ought.Brian Hedden - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):343-360.details
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You've Come a Long Way, Bayesians.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):817-834.details
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Belief without credence.J. Adam Carter, Benjamin W. Jarvis & Katherine Rubin - 2016 - Synthese 193 (8):2323-2351.details
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(1 other version)Maximal Cluelessness.Andreas Mogensen - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1):141-162.details
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Imprecise Probabilities.Anna Mahtani - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 107-130.details
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How Should Risk and Ambiguity Affect Our Charitable Giving?Lara Buchak - 2023 - Utilitas 35 (3):175-197.details
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Does rationality demand higher-order certainty?Mattias Skipper - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11561-11585.details
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Bayesianism II: Applications and Criticisms.Kenny Easwaran - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (5):321-332.details
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Chance and the Continuum Hypothesis.Daniel Hoek - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):639-60.details
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A Gentle Approach to Imprecise Probabilities.Gregory Wheeler - 2022 - In Thomas Augustin, Fabio Gagliardi Cozman & Gregory Wheeler (eds.), Reflections on the Foundations of Probability and Statistics: Essays in Honor of Teddy Seidenfeld. Springer. pp. 37-67.details
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Imprecise Probability and Higher Order Vagueness.Susanne Rinard - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):257-273.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic humility, arguments from evil, and moral skepticism.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 2:17-57.details
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Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):251-278.details
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Disagreement, evidence, and agnosticism.Jason Decker - 2012 - Synthese 187 (2):753-783.details
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Sleeping Beauty, Countable Additivity, and Rational Dilemmas.Jacob Ross - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (4):411-447.details
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(Almost) all evidence is higher-order evidence.Brian Hedden & Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Analysis 82 (3):417-425.details
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