- Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief.Martin Smith - 2016 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.details
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Truth, knowledge, and the standard of proof in criminal law.Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - Synthese 197 (12):5253-5286.details
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Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.details
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Thinking, Guessing, and Believing.Ben Holguin - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22 (1):1-34.details
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Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.details
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Belief, Credence, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):5073-5092.details
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The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth G. Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):1–13.details
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Inquiry and Belief.Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 53 (2):296-315.details
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What is Rational Belief?Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - 2024 - Noûs 58 (2):333-359.details
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Belief is weak.John Hawthorne, Daniel Rothschild & Levi Spectre - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1393-1404.details
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How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.details
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Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):586-632.details
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Legal Standards of Proof: When and Why Merely Statistical Evidence Can Satisfy Them.Paul Silva - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.details
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What Else Justification Could Be1.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10-31.details
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Inquiry and Confirmation.Arianna Falbo - 2021 - Analysis 81 (4):622–631.details
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Belief about Probability.Ray Buchanan & Sinan Dogramaci - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.details
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Good Guesses.Kevin Dorst & Matthew Mandelkern - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3):581-618.details
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Inquiry and the doxastic attitudes.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4947-4973.details
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Accuracy, Coherence and Evidence.Branden Fitelson & Kenny Easwaran - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5:61-96.details
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Belief Is Credence One (in Context).Roger Clarke - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13:1-18.details
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Beliefs do not come in degrees.Andrew Moon - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):760-778.details
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Kierkegaard on belief and credence.Z. Quanbeck - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (2):394-412.details
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The Limitations of the Open Mind.Jeremy Fantl - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Outright Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):309–329.details
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Credence: A Belief-First Approach.Andrew Moon & Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (5):652–669.details
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Who Cares What You Accurately Believe?Clayton Littlejohn - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):217-248.details
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On the Independence of Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Philosophical Issues 32 (1):9-31.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge, Bets, and Interests.Brian Weatherson - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken, Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 75--103.details
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(1 other version)Imprecise Probabilities.Seamus Bradley - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Degrees of Assertability.Sam Carter - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):19-49.details
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What does decision theory have to do with wanting?Milo Phillips-Brown - 2021 - Mind 130 (518):413-437.details
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Belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Belief, Credence, and Faith.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Religious Studies 55 (2):153-168.details
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The Right in the Good: A Defense of Teleological Non-Consequentialism in Epistemology.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn, Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 23-47.details
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Higher-order free logic and the Prior-Kaplan paradox.Andrew Bacon, John Hawthorne & Gabriel Uzquiano - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (4-5):493-541.details
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Belief, Credence, and the Preface Paradox.Alex Worsnip - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):549-562.details
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VI-B ayesian E xpressivism.Seth Yalcin - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2pt2):123-160.details
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Dilating and contracting arbitrarily.David Builes, Sophie Horowitz & Miriam Schoenfield - 2020 - Noûs 56 (1):3-20.details
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Bayesianism and Inference to the Best Explanation.Leah Henderson - 2014 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (4):687-715.details
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Reducing belief simpliciter to degrees of belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2013 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 164 (12):1338-1389.details
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The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences.Miriam Schoenfield - 2015 - Noûs 51 (4):667-685.details
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The Application of Constraint Semantics to the Language of Subjective Uncertainty.Eric Swanson - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (2):121-146.details
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Expecting the Unexpected.Tom Dougherty, Sophie Horowitz & Paulina Sliwa - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (2):301-321.details
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Lying and knowing.Ben Holguín - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5351-5371.details
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Perception and Probability.Alex Byrne - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):343-363.details
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Consequence and Normative Guidance.Florian Steinberger - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2):306-328.details
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Demystifying Dilation.Arthur Paul Pedersen & Gregory Wheeler - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1305-1342.details
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Believing epistemic contradictions.Beddor Bob & Simon Goldstein - 2018 - Review of Symbolic Logic (1):87-114.details
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Rational Faith and Justified Belief.Lara Buchak - 2014 - In Laura Frances Callahan & Timothy O'Connor, Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 49-73.details
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