- Probabilistic consistency norms and quantificational credences.Benjamin Lennertz - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6).details
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Epistemically Transformative Experience.Jane Friedman - manuscriptdetails
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On the preference for more specific reference classes.Paul D. Thorn - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6):2025-2051.details
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Sleeping Beauty, Countable Additivity, and Rational Dilemmas.Jacob Ross - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (4):411-447.details
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Imprecise Probability and Higher Order Vagueness.Susanne Rinard - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):257-273.details
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Expecting the Unexpected.Tom Dougherty, Sophie Horowitz & Paulina Sliwa - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (2):301-321.details
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Objectivity and Bias.Gordon Belot - 2017 - Mind 126 (503):655-695.details
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Imprecise Probabilities in Quantum Mechanics.Stephan Hartmann - 2015 - In Colleen E. Crangle, Adolfo García de la Sienra & Helen E. Longino (eds.), Foundations and Methods From Mathematics to Neuroscience: Essays Inspired by Patrick Suppes. Stanford Univ Center for the Study. pp. 77-82.details
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Decision making in the face of parity.Miriam Schoenfield - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):263-277.details
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The Dangers of Pragmatic Virtue.Daniel Nolan - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (5-6):623-644.details
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Evidential Incomparability and the Principle of Indifference.Martin Smith - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (3):605-616.details
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Sleeping beauty should be imprecise.Daniel Jeremy Singer - 2014 - Synthese 191 (14):3159-3172.details
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Credal Dilemmas.Sarah Moss - 2014 - Noûs 48 (3):665-683.details
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Demystifying Dilation.Arthur Paul Pedersen & Gregory Wheeler - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1305-1342.details
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You've Come a Long Way, Bayesians.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):817-834.details
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(1 other version)Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief.Miriam Schoenfield - 2012 - Noûs 48 (2):193-218.details
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Global Scepticism, Underdetermination and Metaphysical Possibility.Luca Moretti - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (2):381-403.details
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In defence of dogmatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):261-282.details
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Subjective Probabilities Need Not be Sharp.Jake Chandler - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1273-1286.details
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The Impossibility of Skepticism.Daniel Greco - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (3):317-358.details
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Decision theory for agents with incomplete preferences.Adam Bales, Daniel Cohen & Toby Handfield - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):453-70.details
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Coin flips, credences and the Reflection Principle.Brett Topey - 2012 - Analysis 72 (3):478-488.details
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Chilling out on epistemic rationality: A defense of imprecise credences.Miriam Schoenfield - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):197-219.details
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Options and the subjective ought.Brian Hedden - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):343-360.details
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Rational Reflection.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):121-140.details
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Bayesian Epistemology.William Talbott - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Evidentialism and skeptical arguments.Dylan Dodd - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):337-352.details
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Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.details
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Belief and contextual acceptance.Eleonora Cresto - 2010 - Synthese 177 (1):41-66.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic humility, arguments from evil, and moral skepticism.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 2:17-57.details
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Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)Interpretations of probability.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Deference Principles for Imprecise Credences.Giacomo Molinari - manuscriptdetails
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The Metaphysical Foundations of the Principle of Indifference.Binyamin Eisner - 2024 - Metaphysica 25 (1):175-191.details
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Suspension of judgment, non-additivity, and additivity of possibilities.Aldo Filomeno - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-22.details
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Concepts of Existential Catastrophe.Hilary Greaves - 2024 - The Monist 107 (2):109-129.details
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Rational Polarization.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (3):355-458.details
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(1 other version)Maximal cluelessness.Andreas Mogensen - manuscriptdetails
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Just Probabilities.Chad Lee-Stronach - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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Center Indifference and Skepticism.David Builes - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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Probability and Inductive Logic.Antony Eagle - manuscriptdetails
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Does Non-Measurability Favour Imprecision?Cian Dorr - 2024 - Mind 133 (530):472-503.details
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Suspending belief in credal accounts.Andrew del Rio - 2024 - Noûs 58 (1):3-25.details
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Imprecise Credences and Acceptance.Benjamin Lennertz - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.details
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Why Subjectivism?Chloé de Canson - manuscriptdetails
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Respecting Evidence: Belief Functions not Imprecise Probabilities.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2022 - Synthese 200 (475):1-30.details
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Closure, Underdetermination, and the Peculiarity of Sceptical Scenarios.Guido Tana - 2022 - Theoria 89 (1):73-97.details
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Generalized Immodesty Principles in Epistemic Utility Theory.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10 (31):874–907.details
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Comparative Opinion Loss.Benjamin Eva & Reuben Stern - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 107 (3):613-637.details
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Proper scoring rules in epistemic decision theory.Maomei Wang - 2020 - Dissertation, Lingnan Universitydetails
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