In a new introduction, the authors describe how science and its social context were understood when this book was first published, and how the study of the history of science has changed since then.

The ArgumentThis essay addresses the historiographical question of how to study scientific instruments and the connections between them without rigidly determining the boundaries of the object under historical scrutiny beforehand. To do this, I will explore an episode in the early history of the tachistoscope — defined, among other things, as an instrument for the brief exposure of visual stimuli in experimental psychology. After looking at the tachistoscope described by physiologist Volkmann in 1859, I will turn to the gravity chronometer, (...) constructed by Cattell at Wundt's Leipzig institute of psychology in the 1880s. Taking Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblances as a methodological suggestion to travel from one member to another to find out just how members relate to one another, I will investigate part of the family to which both the tachistoscope and the gravity chronometer turn out to belong. A detailed analysis of these instruments, using both historical sources and historical accounts of psychological instruments, may demonstrate that the instrument is not a standard package that, if well applied, will simply secure good results. Each package needs to be assembled again and again; the particular package that is assembled may differ on different occasions. Thus an alternative is developed to an understanding of instruments as univocally functioning material means. (shrink)

Excerpt from Grundzu ge der Psychologie Das vorliegende Buch ist zur Einfuhrung bestimmt, allerdings zur Einfuhrung in das Studium der Dinge und nicht blo Bin eine erste und allgemeine Kenntnis von ihnen. Es war ursprunglich bei weitem nicht so umfangreich geplant, wie es sich nun darstellt, aber als ich an die Ausfuhrung ging, bin ich sehr bald in diese grolzere Breite hineingedrangt worden. Zum Teil gewi Baus rein individuellen Grunden, zum Teil aber auch wohl, weil sich auf solche Weise die (...) Sache selbst ihr Recht verschafft hat. Die Psychologie ist in den letzten Jahrzehnten ungemein rasch fortgeschritten in der Kenntnis des seelischen Lebens im Kleinen und Einzelnen. Manches davon, was uns sehr wichtig erscheint, wird vermutlich einer spateren und reiferen Einsicht ziemlich unwichtig vorkommen. Gleichwohl kann man, nachdem dieses Wissen einmal erarbeitet ist, auch beim ersten llerantreten an die Psychologie nur dann in eine richtige Stellung ru ihr kommen, wenn man von ihm in einem grosseren Umfangs Kenntnis nimmt. Von groBter Wichtigkeit ist doch, da Bman gleich von vornherein von einem lebendigen BewuBtsein der erstaunlichen Reichhaltigkeit und Verwicklung des seelischen Lebens durchdrungen werde, und das ist nicht anders zu erreichen. AuBerdem: man kann mit Vorteil kurz sein, wo man sich auf vieles Feststehende nnd allgemein anerkannte berufen kann, an das im Einzelfalle nur mit einem Wort erinnert zu werden braucht. Wie wenig ist dessen in der Psychologie. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.". (shrink)

A prominent feature of late nineteenth-century psychology was its intense preoccupation with precision. Precision was at once an ideal and an argument: the quest for precision helped psychology to establish its status as a mature science, sharing a characteristic concern with the natural sciences. We will analyse how psychologists set out to produce precision in 'mental chronometry', the measurement of the duration of psychological processes. In his Leipzig laboratory, Wundt inaugurated an elaborate research programme on mental chronometry. We will look (...) at the problem of calibration of experimental apparatus and will describe the intricate material, literary, and social technologies involved in the manufacture of precision. First, we shall discuss some of the technical problems involved in the measurement of ever shorter time-spans. Next, the Cattell-Berger experiments will help us to argue against the received view that all the precision went into the hardware, and practically none into the social organization of experimentation. Experimenters made deliberate efforts to bring themselves and their subjects under a regime of control and calibration similar to that which reigned over the experimental machinery. In Leipzig psychology, the particular blend of material and social technology resulted in a specific object of study: the generalized mind. We will then show that the distribution of precision in experimental psychology outside Leipzig demanded a concerted effort of instruments, texts, and people. It will appear that the forceful attempts to produce precision and uniformity had some rather paradoxical consequences. (shrink)