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(1 other version)Recombination, Causal Constraints, and Humean Supervenience: An Argument for Temporal Parts?Ryan Wasserman, John Hawthorne & Mark Scala - 2004 - In Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 1. Oxford University Press.details
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(2 other versions)Parts : a Study in Ontology.Peter Simons - 1987 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 2:277-279.details
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(1 other version)How Things Persist.Katherine Hawley - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):230-233.details
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(1 other version)On the Plurality of Worlds.William G. Lycan - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):42-47.details
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On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.details
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(1 other version)Parts: A Study in Ontology.Dale Jacquette - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (3):540-542.details
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(1 other version)The Problem of Material Constitution.Michael C. Rea - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (4):525-552.details
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Real Time.D. H. Mellor - 1981 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Review of R eal Time.David H. Sanford - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (2):289.details
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(2 other versions)Parts: A Study in Ontology.Peter M. Simons - 1987 - Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.details
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On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Humean Supervenience Debugged.David Lewis - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):473--490.details
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Reference and generality.P. T. Geach - 1962 - Ithaca, N.Y.,: Cornell University Press. Edited by Michael C. Rea.details
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Persistence through time.Sally Haslanger - 2003 - In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford handbook of metaphysics. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 315--354.details
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Identity.John Hawthorne - 2003 - In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford handbook of metaphysics. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 99--130.details
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(1 other version)How things persist.Katherine Hawley - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(2 other versions)Parts: a study in ontology.Peter M. Simons - 1987 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Theories of Location.Josh Parsons - 2008 - In Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. pp. 201-232.details
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Time travel, coinciding objects, and persistence.Cody Gilmore - 2007 - In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics:Volume 3: Volume 3. Oxford University Press UK. pp. 177-198.details
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Logical parts.Laurie A. Paul - 2002 - Noûs 36 (4):578–596.details
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Tensing the copula.David K. Lewis - 2002 - Mind 111 (441):1-14.details
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Temporal parts of four dimensional objects.Mark Heller - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 46 (3):323 - 334.details
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‘Wholly Present’ Defined.Thomas M. Crisp & Donald P. Smith - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):318–344.details
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Four Dimensionalism.Theodore Sider - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (2):197-231.details
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(1 other version)Constitution is not identity.Mark Johnston - 1992 - Mind 101 (401):89-106.details
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Preserving the principle of one object to a place: A novel account of the relations among objects, sorts, sortals, and persistence conditions.Michael B. Burke - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3):591-624.details
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(1 other version)Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Philosophy 67 (259):126-127.details
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(1 other version)How things persist.Katherine Hawley - unknowndetails
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Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time.Theodore Sider - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):642-647.details
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The metaphysics of hyperspace.Hud Hudson - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Must a Four-Dimensionalist Believe in Temporal Parts?Josh Parsons - 2000 - The Monist 83 (3):399-418.details
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Does Four-dimensionalism explain coincidence?∗.Mark Moyer - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):479-488.details
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Reference and generality: an examination of some medieval and modern theories.Peter Thomas Geach - 1980 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.details
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(1 other version)Material beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.details
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Simples and gunk.Hud Hudson - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (2):291–302.details
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Where in the relativistic world are we?Cody Gilmore - 2006 - Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):199–236.details
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(1 other version)Theories of Location.Josh Parsons - 2007 - In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics:Volume 3: Volume 3. Oxford University Press UK.details
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(3 other versions)Person and Object.Roderick Chisholm - 1976 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 39 (2):281-283.details
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Material Beings.Harold W. Noonan - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (167):239.details
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Why So Tense about the Copula?Ben Caplan - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):703 - 708.details
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(1 other version)The problem of material constitution.Michael C. Rea - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (4):525-552.details
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Reference and Generality.Peter Geach - 1962 - Studia Logica 15:301-303.details
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(1 other version)Constitution Is Not Identity.Mark Johnston - 1997 - In Michael Cannon Rea (ed.), Material Constitution: A Reader. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 44-62.details
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(1 other version)Recombination, Causal Constraints, and Humean Supervenience: An Argument for Temporal Parts?Ryan Wasserman, John Hawthorne & Mark Scala - 2008 - In Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.details
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Occasions of identity: a study in the metaphysics of persistence, change, and sameness.André Gallois - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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On The Plurality of Worlds.Graeme Forbes - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (151):222-240.details
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(1 other version)On the Plurality of Worlds.James E. Tomberlin - 1989 - Noûs 23 (1):117-125.details
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(1 other version)Temporal Overlap is Not Coincidence.Mark Heller - 2000 - The Monist 83 (3):362-380.details
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(1 other version)Temporal Overlap is Not Coincidence.Mark Heller - 2000 - The Monist 83 (3):362-380.details
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