Switch to: Citations

References in:

Free Will & Empirical Arguments for Epiphenomenalism

In Peter Róna & László Zsolnai (eds.), Agency and Causal Explanation in Economics. Virtues and Economics, vol 5. Springer. pp. 3-20 (2019)

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 1970 - In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory. Humanities Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   496 citations  
  • Consciousness, free will, and moral responsibility: Taking the folk seriously.Joshua Shepherd - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (7):929-946.
    In this paper, I offer evidence that folk views of free will and moral responsibility accord a central place to consciousness. In sections 2 and 3, I contrast action production via conscious states and processes with action in concordance with an agent's long-standing and endorsed motivations, values, and character traits. Results indicate that conscious action production is considered much more important for free will than is concordance with motivations, values, and character traits. In section 4, I contrast the absence of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Free will: sourcehood and its alternatives.Kevin Timpe - 2012 - London: Continuum.
    An important and engaging book on a key argument in contemporary debates about free will and moral responsibility.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • The Theory of Practice: An Ethical Enquiry.Shadworth Hollway Hodgson - 2013 - Hardpress Publishing.
    Unlike some other reproductions of classic texts (1) We have not used OCR(Optical Character Recognition), as this leads to bad quality books with introduced typos. (2) In books where there are images such as portraits, maps, sketches etc We have endeavoured to keep the quality of these images, so they represent accurately the original artefact. Although occasionally there may be certain imperfections with these old texts, we feel they deserve to be made available for future generations to enjoy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • What psychological states are not.Ned Block & Jerry A. Fodor - 1972 - Philosophical Review 81 (April):159-81.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   233 citations  
  • On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
    Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different "consciousnesses." Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state. The mark of access-consciousness, by contrast, is availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action. These concepts are often partly or totally conflated, with bad results. This target article uses as an example a form of reasoning about a function of "consciousness" based on (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1130 citations  
  • Mental paint and mental latex.Ned Block - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:19-49.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   260 citations  
  • Inverted earth.Ned Block - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:53-79.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   378 citations  
  • Consciousness, Implicit Attitudes and Moral Responsibility.Neil Levy - 2012 - Noûs 48 (1):21-40.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   50 citations  
  • Mind in a physical world: An essay on the mind–body problem and mental causation.Jaegwon Kim - 1998 - MIT Press.
    This book, based on Jaegwon Kim's 1996 Townsend Lectures, presents the philosopher's current views on a variety of issues in the metaphysics of the mind...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   871 citations  
  • The Illusion of Conscious Will.Daniel M. Wegner - 2002 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
    In this book Daniel Wegner offers a novel understanding of the relation of consciousness, the will, and our intentional and voluntary actions. Wegner claims that our experience and common sense view according to which we can influence our behavior roughly the way we experience that we do it is an illusion.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   486 citations  
  • Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.
    This essay challenges the widely accepted principle that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. The author considers situations in which there are sufficient conditions for a certain choice or action to be performed by someone, So that it is impossible for the person to choose or to do otherwise, But in which these conditions do not in any way bring it about that the person chooses or acts as he (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1055 citations  
  • Freedom and necessity.A. J. Ayer - 2000 - In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 271-284.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   120 citations  
  • Uncompromising source incompatibilism.Seth Shabo - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):349-383.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • Some neglected pathways in the free will labyrinth.Robert Kane - 2001 - In The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  • Reasons explanations of action: Causalist versus noncausalist accounts.Carl Ginet - 2001 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 386-405.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • Ifs, Cans, and Free Will: The Issues.Bernard Berofsky - 2001 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • A defense of Frankfurt-friendly libertarianism.David Widerker - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):87 – 108.
    Elsewhere, I proposed a libertarian-based account of freedom and moral blameworthiness which like Harry Frankfurt's 1969 account rejects the principle of alternative possibilities (which I call, Frankfurt-friendly libertarianism). In this paper I develop this account further (a) by responding to an important objection to it raised by Carlos Moya; (b) by exploring the question why, if unavoidability per se does not exonerate from blame, the Frankfurt-friendly libertarian is justified in exculpating an agent under determinism; (c) by arguing that some main (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • A Minimal Libertarianism: Free Will and the Promise of Reduction.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2018 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
    In this book, Christopher Evan Franklin develops and defends a novel version of event-causal libertarianism. This view is a combination of libertarianism--the view that humans sometimes act freely and that those actions are the causal upshots of nondeterministic processes--and agency reductionism--the view that the causal role of the agent in exercises of free will is exhausted by the causal role of mental states and events (e.g., desires and beliefs) involving the agent. Franklin boldly counteracts a dominant theory that has similar (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  • Does Libertarian Freedom Require Alternate Possibilities?Linda Zagzebski - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s14):231-248.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  • Libertarianism and the Philosophical Significance of Frankfurt Scenarios.David Widerker - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy 103 (4):163-187.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   43 citations  
  • Précis of the illusion of conscious will.Daniel M. Wegner - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):649-659.
    The experience of conscious will is the feeling that we are doing things. This feeling occurs for many things we do, conveying to us again and again the sense that we consciously cause our actions. But the feeling may not be a true reading of what is happening in our minds, brains, and bodies as our actions are produced. The feeling of conscious will can be fooled. This happens in clinical disorders such as alien hand syndrome, dissociative identity disorder, and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   73 citations  
  • Free agency.Gary Watson - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (April):205-20.
    In the subsequent pages, I want to develop a distinction between wanting and valuing which will enable the familiar view of freedom to make sense of the notion of an unfree action. The contention will be that, in the case of actions that are unfree, the agent is unable to get what he most wants, or values, and this inability is due to his own "motivational system." In this case the obstruction to the action that he most wants to do (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   490 citations  
  • Willusionism, epiphenomenalism, and the feeling of conscious will.Sven Walter - 2014 - Synthese 191 (10):2215-2238.
    While epiphenomenalism—i.e., the claim that the mental is a causally otiose byproduct of physical processes that does not itself cause anything—is hardly ever mentioned in philosophical discussions of free will, it has recently come to play a crucial role in the scientific attack on free will led by neuroscientists and psychologists. This paper is concerned with the connection between epiphenomenalism and the claim that free will is an illusion, in particular with the connection between epiphenomenalism and willusionism, i.e., with the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Beyond Button Presses.Robyn Repko Waller - 2012 - The Monist 95 (3):441-462.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Oblique causation and reasons for action.Frederick Stoutland - 1980 - Synthese 43 (3):351 - 367.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Mind-body interaction and supervenient causation.Ernest Sosa - 1984 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):271-81.
    The mind-body problem arises because of our status as double agents apparently en rapport both with the mental and with the physical. We think, desire, decide, plan, suffer passions, fall into moods, are subject to sensory experiences, ostensibly perceive, intend, reason, make believe, and so on. We also move, have a certain geographical position, a certain height and weight, and we are sometimes hit or cut or burned. In other words, human beings have both minds and bodies. What is the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   69 citations  
  • The mental lives of zombies.Declan Smithies - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):343-372.
    Could there be a cognitive zombie – that is, a creature with the capacity for cognition, but no capacity for consciousness? Searle argues that there cannot be a cognitive zombie because there cannot be an intentional zombie: on this view, there is a connection between consciousness and cognition that is derived from a more fundamental connection between consciousness and intentionality. However, I argue that there are good empirical reasons for rejecting the proposed connection between consciousness and intentionality. Instead, I argue (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Free-will, praise and blame.J. J. C. Smart - 1961 - Mind 70 (279):291-306.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   138 citations  
  • Conscious Control over Action.Joshua Shepherd - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (3):320-344.
    The extensive involvement of nonconscious processes in human behaviour has led some to suggest that consciousness is much less important for the control of action than we might think. In this article I push against this trend, developing an understanding of conscious control that is sensitive to our best models of overt action control. Further, I assess the cogency of various zombie challenges—challenges that seek to demote the importance of conscious control for human agency. I argue that though nonconscious contributions (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   43 citations  
  • Conscious Will, Reason-Responsiveness, and Moral Responsibility.Markus E. Schlosser - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (3):205-232.
    Empirical evidence challenges many of the assumptions that underlie traditional philosophical and commonsense conceptions of human agency. It has been suggested that this evidence threatens also to undermine free will and moral responsibility. In this paper, I will focus on the purported threat to moral responsibility. The evidence challenges assumptions concerning the ability to exercise conscious control and to act for reasons. This raises an apparent challenge to moral responsibility as these abilities appear to be necessary for morally responsible agency. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Alternative Possibilities and Causal Histories.Derk Pereboom - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s14):119-137.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  • Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and Their Relations.Christopher Peacocke - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
    Introduction This book is about the nature of the content of psychological states. Examples of psychological states with content are: believing today is a ...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   426 citations  
  • Scientific Challenges to Free Will.Eddy Nahmias - 2010 - In C. Sandis & T. O'Connor (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 345-356.
    This chapter contains sections titled: References.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • Moral Responsibility Without Alternative Possibilities?Carlos J. Moya - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (9):475-486.
    This paper is a critical comment on an article of David Widerker which also appeared in the Journal of Philosophy. In this article, Wideker held, against positions previously defended by him, that in was possible to design effective counterexamples, in the line initiated by Harry Frankfurt in 1969, to the so-called “Principle of Alternative Possibilities”. The core of my criticism of Widerker is to deny that agents, in his putative counterexamples, are morally responsible for their decisions, owing to the fact (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • The Works of Agency: On Human Action, Will and Freedom.Hugh McCann - 1998 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
    In these essays, Hugh J. McCann develops a unified perspective on human action. Written over a period of twenty-five years, the essays provide a comprehensive survey of the major topics in contemporary action theory. In four sections, the book addresses the ontology of action ; the foundations of action ; intention, will, and freedom; and practical rationality. McCann works out a compromise between competing perspectives on the individuation of action ; explores the foundations of action and defends a volitional theory; (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   96 citations  
  • Making decisions.Hugh J. McCann - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):246-263.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • The conceivability of mechanism.Norman Malcolm - 1968 - Philosophical Review 77 (January):45-72.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   119 citations  
  • Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action.Benjamin Libet - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):529-66.
    Voluntary acts are preceded by electrophysiological (RPs). With spontaneous acts involving no preplanning, the main negative RP shift begins at about200 ms. Control experiments, in which a skin stimulus was timed (S), helped evaluate each subject's error in reporting the clock times for awareness of any perceived event.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   760 citations  
  • The Importance of Awareness.Neil Levy - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):221-229.
    A number of philosophers have recently argued that agents need not be conscious of the reasons for which they act or the moral significance of their actions in order to be morally responsible for them. In this paper, I identify a kind of awareness that, I claim, agents must have in order to be responsible for their actions. I argue that conscious information processing differs from unconscious in a manner that makes the following two claims true: (1) an agent’s values (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Expressing who we are: Moral responsibility and awareness of our reasons for action.Neil Levy - 2011 - Analytic Philosophy 52 (4):243-261.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • When is an alternative possibility robust?Simon Kittle - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):199-210.
    According to some, free will requires alternative possibilities. But not any old alternative possibility will do. Sometimes, being able to bring about an alternative does not bestow any control on an agent. In order to bestow control, and so be directly relevant qua alternative to grounding the agent's moral responsibility, alternatives need to be robust. Here, I investigate the nature of robust alternatives. I argue that Derk Pereboom's latest robustness criterion is too strong, and I suggest a different criterion based (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.
    "This is a fine volume that clarifies, defends, and moves beyond the views that Kim presented in Mind in a Physical World.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   485 citations  
  • Mechanism, purpose, and explanatory exclusion.Jaegwon Kim - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:77-108.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   200 citations  
  • The dual regress of free will and the role of alternative possibilities.Robert Kane - 2000 - Philosopical Perspectives 14 (s14):57-80.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • The argument for anomalous monism.Ted Honderich - 1982 - Analysis 42 (January):59-64.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   75 citations  
  • A noncausal theory of agency.Stewart Goetz - 1988 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (2):303-316.
    My dissertation consists of two main parts. In the first part, I begin by assuming the plausibility of the libertarian thesis that agents sometimes could have done otherwise than they did given the very same history of the world. In light of this assumption, I undertake to develop a model of agency which does not employ the concept of agent-causation. My agency theory is developed in three main stages: I suggest that any agency theory must satisfy four desiderata: It must (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  • Reasons Explanation: Further Defense of a Non-causal Account.Carl Ginet - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):219-228.
    If moral responsibility requires uncaused action, as I believe, and if a reasons explanation of an action must be a causal explanation, as many philosophers of action suppose, then it follows that our responsible actions are ones we do for no reason, which is preposterous. In previous work I have argued against the second premise of this deduction, claiming that the statement that a person did A in order to satisfy their desire D will be true if the person, while (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • In Defense of a Non-Causal Account of Reasons Explanations.Carl Ginet - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):229 - 237.
    This paper defends my claim in earlier work that certain non-causal conditions are sufficient for the truth of some reasons explanations of actions, against the critique of this claim given by Randolph Clarke in his book, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and the Importance of Alternative Possibilities.Nadine Elzein - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (2):169-191.
    Proponents of modern Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples generally accept that we cannot construct successful FSCs in which there are no alternative possibilities present. But they maintain that we can construct successful FSCs in which there are no morally significant alternatives present and that such examples succeed in breaking any conceptual link between alternative possibilities and free will. I argue that it is not possible to construct an FSC that succeeds even in this weaker sense. In cases where any alternatives are clearly insignificant, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations